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ABSTRACT
The thesis investigates postmortem spiritual development with particular reference to
the final destiny of the unevangelised in the context of opentheism, using the concept
of an intermediate state between death and the final consummation. Scripture warrant
for the existence of an intermediate state is outlined and the occurrence of the idea in
Patristic, medieval and Reformation theology noted. Varied interpretations of Christ's
descent to the underworld are given, including the possibility of a grace-filled
postmortem encounter with Christ for the unevangelised. The main tenets of
opentheism are expounded, affirming the openness of God to interaction with his
creatures. Emphasis is put on God's limitation of his own sovereignty to allow for
libertarian freedom with humans participating in choosing their own destiny in
response to God's grace. The idea of a change of direction or 'second chance' after
death is preferred to final decisions regarding destiny requiring to be made in this life.
Spiritual development, and even conversion, are conceived as taking place in an
intermediate state, leading to a theological position of 'hopeful' rather than dogmatic
universalism. Finally, the practical consequences for the life of the Church are
studied, including pastoral care, theodicy as an aid to mission, and the advancement of
dialogue with people of other faiths.
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SCRIPTURAL AND INTERTESTAMENTAL FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF
IN AN INTERMEDIATE STATE
(a) Introduction and Hermeneutics
The principal contention of this thesis depends upon the existence of an intermediate
state between the death of individuals and the final consummation of all things,
variously understood as the Last Judgment or the Second Coming of Christ. Every
human being would enter this interim existence, which would provide an opportunity
for further spiritual development and growth. Ways in which this concept differs from
the Roman Catholic doctrine of purgatory will be explored. The thesis departs from
traditional theology in a number of different respects, particularly in relation to the
doctrine of God. The particular type of modern theology known as opentheism provides
a more congenial context for the conclusions of the thesis. The origins of opentheist
thinking are identified, and its basic axioms explained. Its appropriateness for
encouraging a positive outcome for the final destiny of the unevangelised derives from
its advocacy of the interactive relations which it claims God has with his creatures, and
the libertarian freedom in which he allows them to respond to his initiatives. The thesis
departs from the traditional view that final decisions regarding an individual's ultimate
destiny require to be taken in this life before death. This opens up the possibility of a
'second chance' of deciding for Christ. While holding to the finality of Christ as the
sole way to salvation - an axiom shared with opentheism - the existence of an
intermediate state also enables those who are unevangelised at death, for reasons of
history or geography, to encounter Christ in the afterlife. The thesis is unable to affirm
belief in a dogmatic universalism because of scriptural witness to a double outcome of
this life leading to salvation or condemnation. Belief in 'hopeful universalism' means
that the possibility of conditional immortality is retained. The thesis concludes with
practical applications to the life of the Church.
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The scriptural basis of the thesis is important as safeguarding the project from
groundless speculation. The key thought here is the Bible's witness to the nature and
character of God as revealed in the incarnation of Christ. While frequent references are
made to scriptural texts, the conclusions of the thesis do not depend so much on proof-
texts as on deduction from the love ofGod made flesh in Jesus. Its hermeneutics are not
founded on a fundamentalist belief in biblical inerrancy, resulting from dictation to the
writers directly by God. Instead, it follows the usual doctrine of scriptural inspiration -
that, in the words of 2 Tim.3:16, the Bible is 'God-breathed' in the sense that God
shapes and guides its writers' thoughts. Scripture is not free from errors, and the best
principle of interpretation is to compare the meaning of passages with the life and
teaching of Christ. As Jesus teaches that the Spirit 'guides us into all truth' (John
16:13), and, as further revelation is added in every new generation, it is to be hoped that
despite the shortcomings and imperfections of the following pages, something of the
truth may shine through.1
(b) The Old Testament Background:
The idea of an intermediate state between death and the final judgment has its roots in
the Old Testament concept of Sheol, almost always translated in the Septuagint as
'Hades'. The prevalent belief in earlier periods of Old Testament history was that
everyone at death passed into Sheol.(Ps. 89:48). Sometimes the term simply denoted
'the grave,' or death in its broadest sense, but normally it described a locality, either
deep under the earth, (Is.38:18; Ezek.31:14 etc.) or beneath the cosmic ocean (Job
26:5), on which the earth stood. As a subterranean dwelling, far from the light of the
upper air, it was thought of as a place of darkness. At death, human beings when they
descended 'to the pit' ceased to be living 'persons.' They could be described as
'shades.' Their shadowy existence was only a kind of half-life, (Job 10:4) in this place
of gloom, silence and forgetfulness. It was certainly not a desirable form of existence,
and it is doubtful whether its denizens were fully conscious. The various activities
associated with this earthly life, such as working and planning, involving knowledge
and wisdom, could no longer be practised in Sheol. (Eccles.9:10). Instead, the
1 The hermeneutics of the thesis are based on tire insights of Keith Ward in What the Bible Really Teaches
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inhabitants of Sheol, called the 'Rephaim' or 'weaklings' existed in a state of rest or
perpetual sleep, free from the miseries of this life, for - "There the wicked cease from
the turmoil, and there the weary are at rest." (Job 3:17). For most ordinary men and
women, it was a land of no-return. (2 Sam.12:23; Job 7:9)2. Indeed, in a number of
passages, it is described as a prison with bars and gates preventing escape, a place of no
hope. (Job 17:13-16). Until the latest of Old Testament periods, Sheol was thought to
be beyond Jahweh's jurisdiction. (Ps.30:9f.; 115:17.) Eventually, however, Sheol came
to be included in Jahweh's domains, as men and women came to believe that his power
and presence reached over the whole earth, and so, beyond it, into Sheol. (Ps. 139:8;
Amos 9:2.)
A significant change in thinking about Sheol occurred in post-exilic times when the
Hasidim (i.e. the pious ones - the spiritual ancestors of the Pharisees), complained
because it appeared (according to the traditional concept of Sheol), that God would do
nothing for them after death. Could it be that the God whose communion they had
enjoyed on earth, and whom they had sought to serve through faithful adherence to the
Torah would ultimately abandon them? The contemporary picture of Sheol as a place
where the Rephaim could not praise God, repelled them. (Ps.88:10).
Already, therefore, we see the beginnings of a shift in conviction, which envisages
Sheol as an intermediate state. It begins to occur to some Old Testament writers that
Sheol would not be the final destiny of righteous men, for God would redeem their
lives from the grave.(Ps.49:14-15; Ps.73:24-26). Sheol would remain an appropriate
place for the wicked. (Ps.9:17; 22:29; 88:4fi; Pr.5:5; 7:26f.; 9:18.)3 The idea of
punishment, however, does not appear, and they simply continue to exist in the
"impotence or nullity of perpetual sleep." in a 'weak' state (Is. 14:10). Judgment
towards the end of the Old Testament usually refers to groups and nations, and
normally takes place within history.4
(London: SPCK., 2004), 4-7.
2 An exception was made for tlie shades ofmen of fame, such as Samuel, who was credited with
supernatural powers. (1 Sam.28:8ff)
3
Philip Johnston points out that the most frequent use of the tenn 'Sheol' is to hidicate human destiny, and
predominantly the destiny of the ungodly, that is, sinners, the foolish rich, scoffers and the immoral. They
could also be national enemies - Johnston, P.S., Shades ofSheol, (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity
Press, 2002), 81.
4 See Smith, R.L., Old Testament Theology, (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman & Holman, 1993), 383.
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The original idea of Sheol as a universal destination for the dead - a place of 'sleep'
and rest, irrespective of moral distinctions, persisted right to the end of Old Testament
times. Yet, now, alongside it, there emerged the beginnings of a belief that the
righteous would rise from the dead, and share in the life of happiness which would
follow the Day of Judgment. This development appeared in the biblical apocalypses,
Isaiah 24-27 and Daniel 12.2 Sheol remained a gloomy abode of the departed, but the
truly significant change in relation to the origins of an intermediate state was that the
duration of the sojourn of the righteous in Sheol was limited. This idea arose in
connection with belief in the resurrection of the righteous at the Last Judgment, the
earliest instance of this appearing in Isaiah 26:19. They would eventually share the
glories of the Messianic kingdom, while the wicked would receive due punishment for
their sins. This is hinted at in a number of passages which speak of the possibility of
God 'abandoning' the wicked to Sheol, or of God's wrath burning in Sheol, while the
righteous enjoy "eternal pleasures at God's right hand." (Ps.l6:10; 9:17; Pr.7:29;
Deut.32:22). Sheol has, therefore, become an intermediate state, and, for the first time,
postmortem moral distinctions are made between good and bad. There is, however, no
sign in the Old Testament, of the fate of the wicked in Sheol changing as a result of
repentance and conversion. Their destiny is forever sealed by the decisions they have
taken in this life, and by their character at death.
Hans Schwarz detects Zoroastrian influence in the emergence of belief in a two-fold
outcome of history -
... an eternity of bliss and an eternity of woe, allotted respectively to good
and evil in another life beyond the grave. There is also some kind of
intermediate state for those whose good and bad deeds are in strict
balance.6
Schwarz notes that it is no accident that similar ideas arose among the rabbis of the
post-exilic period, precisely at the time when the Jews were in contact with the Medes
5 The new emphasis noticeable in Is. 24:21-3; 25:6-8, is referred to by Bernard Anderson as follows: "In the
day of God's victory celebration, there will be no more death, and - like a tender plant - God will wipe
away all tears from human faces, and will remove the 'reproach' of his people Israel... In Dan. 12:1-4, the
writer speaks of those members of the community of faith whose names are enrolled in tire 'book of life'". -
Anderson B.W., Contours ofOld Testament Theology, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 317-8.
5 Schwarz, H., Eschatology, (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000), 57.
4
and Persians in exile. Those rabbis who had been punctilious in observing the Jewish
Law would ultimately achieve a reward. Sheol then became a passing stage, or
intermediate state on their way to heaven at the resurrection. Passages in the Old
Testament which could be interpreted as indicating an intermediate state are Ps.9:17;
49:14; 55:15; Pr. 15:11; 15:24. Study of the Sheol-Hades concept in the intertestamental
period and in the New Testament will confirm this position. The advantage of studying
Sheol here is that it traces the sources in the Old Testament of the later New Testament
references to Hades, and this is important as belief in an intermediate state is central to
the thesis.
(c) Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha
The development in Old Testament beliefs in Isaiah 24-27, and in Daniel 12 concerning
a resurrection to rewards and punishment at a Last Judgment continues into, and
becomes even more pronounced, in the intertestamental literature, with the significant
change, that moral distinctions now begin to be made in the intermediate state after
death. The tension between individual and corporate eschatology means that when
individuals die, a waiting-period ensues between their deaths and the final judgment,
when they will join in a general resurrection.7 The earliest recorded division in Sheol
between the righteous and the wicked occurs in 1 Enoch 22, which dates from about
150B.C. Joseph Ratzinger locates Sheol, as described in 1 Enoch, as being no longer
simply in the earth's interior, but, more specifically, in the West, the land of the setting
sun, in a mountain, where it occupies four different regions (pictured as caves.)8 The
just and the unjust are now separated. The unjust await the Judgment in darkness,
whereas the just, among whom the martyrs occupy a special position, dwell in light,
being assembled around a life-giving spring ofwater.9
7 Richard Bauckham, 'Life, Death and die After-Life' in Life in the Face ofDeath ed., Richard N.
Longnecker, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdinans, 1998), 87.
8
1 Enoch 22:3 identifies die four compartments as follows: one for die spirits of the righteous; anodier for
sinners who have not, in dieir earthly lives, been punished for die evils diey have committed; a diird
compartment is for die martyrs; and die fourth, for sinners who have already received punishment for dieir
sins in diis life.
9
Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology, Death and Eternal Life, (Washington D.C.: The Cadiolic University of
America Press, 1988), 207.
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The duration of stay in Sheol is clearly temporary, and its denizens, already to some
extent, anticipate their ultimate fate at the general resurrection. The righteous already
know that they will be vindicated, and rewarded in glory at the last day, and the wicked,
although not yet punished, can foresee the dread prospect of their condemnation. This
view is expressed in 4 Ezra 7:75-101, and (Bauckham maintains) is the commonest
view of the intermediate state in the Second Temple period. He also notes, however,
that, according to certain writings of the period, the delights of paradise and the
torments of hell are already experienced by the righteous and the wicked respectively in
the intermediate state before the final resurrection - a view which was later to become
the dominant one. Josephus, for example, records that the Pharisees held this view.10
Jeremias points to an ambiguity in the use of the word 'Hades'11. In several references
(1 En.22:l-14; 51:1; 102:5; 103:7; 2 Macc.6:23; 4 Esr.4:41;7:32; 1 Syr.Bar.ll:6;21:23),
it denotes the whole sphere of the dead (with their divergent destinies anticipated); but,
in other texts (1 En.63.10; Ps.Sol.l4:6;15:l 1 Wis. 17.14 etc.), it refers only to the
temporary sojourn of the souls of the ungodly.
Further ambiguity occurs with the usage in the 2nd Century B.C. of 'Gehenna'
Gehinnom in Hebrew).According to 1 Enoch 27:1, those who are punished in the
second compartment in Sheol, are later raised to receive further punishment in 'the
accursed valley' - a reference to the Valley of Hinnom (or Gehenna). This may be the
first reference in this literature to 'hell', although the word itself does not appear yet.
The confusion arises, because sometimes 'Gehenna' refers to Sheol as such, in other
texts, to a compartment in Sheol, and sometimes, as in 1 Enoch 27:11, to a place of
endless torment, subsequent to the final judgment (as in the popular understanding of
'hell'). The opposite realm or destination of the righteous is the Paradise of Delight (4
Ezr.7:30;2 En.8: l-6,42:3f.), similar to the Garden of Eden, "where there is no toil,
neither grief, nor mourning: but peace and exultation and life everlasting." (Test.of
Abr.20.14A). The same ambiguity surrounds 'Paradise' as 'Hades'. It is not always
easy to distinguish between an intermediate Paradise and the eventual resting-place of




Jeremias, Articles on Hades and Paradise in TDNT (vols. 1 &5), (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans,
1933), 147.
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outcome of judgment is more marked, and a definite parting of the ways to Paradise or
Gehenna occurs.
The study of Sheol, however, as an intermediate state, is the theme at present under
consideration. Karl Hanhart 12identifies three factors which combine to indicate the
emergence of teaching of an intermediate state. These are - (a) Time, an intervening
period, anticipating resurrection and judgment in the future, (b) Place, where the
departed have consciousness in a specific realm, and (c) The outlook of the believer.
The juxtaposition of these three factors occurs only late in the intertestamental period,
as, for example, in 4 Ezra 7:75ff. where we read that, seven days after their death, the
souls of the righteous enter their chambers in Sheol (promptuaria), where they remain
until the resurrection, when they see God's glory and rejoice in seven ways, which
include victory over sin, a view of the pain of the godless and comparison between the
misery of the past and the blessedness of the glorious age to come. The wicked, on the
other hand, experience pain, caused by the memory of their evil ways, the knowledge
that penance and good works are no longer possible, and a view of the present and
future happiness of the blessed.
The fact that the wicked now experience pain, marks, in 4 Ezra, which dates from about
100A.D., a further stage of development. Enoch defers the punishment until final
judgment, but, in Ezra, the pains of the godless begin in the intermediate state which
becomes, as both Ratzinger and Jeremias mention, "almost a definite Hell."13
While it is true that the earliest idea of Sheol as a place of 'sleep' and peace and rest,
persisted to the end, as was noted earlier in connection with the biblical apocalypses,
the Hasidim began to believe that the old account of Sheol was too good for the wicked
and too bad for the righteous.
This new division in the fate of the departed becomes even more obvious in the Book
of Wisdom than in Sirach. (Wis. 1:12-5:23), where a doctrine of torture emerges in
Hades for the souls of the wicked. They suffer remorse of conscience and anguish of
spirit. But "the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God and no torture shall touch
12 Karl Hanhart, The Intermediate State in the New Testament, (Franeker: T. Wever, 1967). 26.
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them." (Wis.3:l-4). They only "seem to have died." (Wis.3:9). Indeed, the thought here
is that the faithful will not pass into Hades at all, but will abide with God in love. They
are at peace, but their 'rest' is an intermediate state, and not their final state.
A word should be said at this point about the development ofHebrew psychology in the
intertestamental period. In the extra-biblical apocalyptic writings there is a move away
from the earlier idea of 'shades' or 'ghosts' in Sheol. They are referred to, instead, as
'souls'.(Sim.of En.; Ps. of Sol; 2 En., Test, of Abr., 4 Ezr.; 2 Bar., etc.). According to
earlier understanding, the 'spirit' or 'breath' (riicich), left a man at his death, and he
passed into a kind of undifferentiated fund, ceasing to be an individual spirit. But in the
Book of Enoch, there is a change of concept, because a dead man's spirit remains
individual. (I En.39:3-8; 41:2-4). Instead of a conception of personality wholly
dependent on the body, we have the different concept of 'soul' or 'spirit.' Such spirits
were discarnate - they did not have a body, but they were believed to possess form or
appearance, distinct from their buried bodies, but excluding many of their functions.
From 1 Enoch 9:10, we learn that they not only have consciousness, but are capable of
emotional reactions. They cry and lament, and they are capable of pain and pleasure in
the form of punishment or reward. Having said this, however, it must be emphasised
that the life of departed souls in Sheol was incomplete, particularly in its fellowship
with God. To some degree, their life was still 'shadowy' and would remain so until the
resurrection, when, once again, their personalities could be fully expressed.
As the main focus of this thesis will centre upon the possibility of moral and spiritual
change, and indeed, conversion, in the intermediate state, is there any sign of this idea
emerging in the intertestamental period? The prevailing view in the apocalyptic books
is that the fateful decisions regarding human destiny are taken in this life and cannot be
posthumously reversed. (1 En.5:5; 22:8-11; Dan.l2:10; 2 Bar.85:l 1-15)14 The souls of
the departed are unable to repent (2 En.62:2), and there can be no communication by
way of prayer either for, or by, the departed.15 Nevertheless, there are a few books
13
Ratzinger, op.cit., 121. (cf, Jeremias, op.cit., 147).
14 "Each of them has prepared for his own soul tonnent to come, and each of them has chosen for himself,
glories to come." (2 Bar. 54:15).
15 "There shall not be there.. .a change ofways, nor place of prayer, or sending of petitions, nor receiving of
knowledge, nor giving of love, nor place of repentance, nor supplication for offences, nor intercession of the
fathers, nor prayer of the prophets, nor help of the righteous." (2 Baruch 85:12).
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where a contrary opinion is expressed -that change can occur through the power of
intercessory prayer.16
Jeffrey A. Trumbower identifies 2 Maccabees 12:39-45 also, as a passage where "a
salvific ritual for the posthumous forgiveness of sins was seen as possible and
desirable."17 The passage describes how Judas Maccabaeus and his men brought back
the bodies of some Jews who had been killed while fighting for the independence of
their community. They had been wearing sacred tokens of the idols of Jamnia which the
Jewish law forbade. Judas and his followers prayed that the sin might be blotted out.
His real concern was to prevent the survivors from being contaminated by the sin, but
the narrator of 2 Maccabees, Jason of Cyrene, writing in the late 2nd or early 1st century
B.C., thought that a collection which Judas had organised for a sacrificial sin-offering
was for the posthumous salvation of individual sinners. Jason adhered to the same
understanding of a posthumous division between the righteous and the wicked, as is
found, for example, in Daniel 12:3. One would therefore have expected that the dead
soldiers, who had sinned by wearing tokens of idolatry, would be included among the
wicked, destined for punishment. Yet, in a time of fierce nationalism, it looks as if they
were still considered, despite their sinfulness, as part of the nation. Nevertheless, it is
surprising that postmortem salvation is even deemed to be possible, in this period, for
sinners.
Trumbower goes on to indicate two other passages where intercession for the dead is
mentioned.18 One is the Testament of Abraham 14:1-5, probably dating from around
100A.D. Here, Abraham prays to God to have mercy on some who have already died.
He gains release for a soul whose sins were exactly equal to his righteous deeds (14:1-
5), and, in another case, he obtains pardon for sinners he had erroneously cursed and
destroyed during his lifetime (14:10-15).19
16 Thus the angels pray for the departed Adam (Apoc. ofMoses 35:2), and the sun and die moon intercede
on his behalf (36:1). Great store is set by the prayers of great and godly men like Enoch and Abraham and
Moses who, diough diemselves among die departed, are able to intercede on behalf of others.
17
Jeffrey A. Trumbower, Rescue for the Dead: The Posthumous Salvation ofnon-Christians in Early
Christianity. (Oxford: University Press, 2001), 26f.
18
Trumbower, ibid., 29.
19 E.P. Sanders remarks diat - "This may be the earliest instance in Jewish sources in which intercessory
prayer is considered effective after die deadi of die person on whose behalf it is offered." - Sanders, E.P.,
The Testament ofAbraham in Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed. Charlesworth J.H., (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, 1983-85), 891 n,14b.
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The other Jewish text noted by Trumbower, on the issue of posthumous forgiveness is 4
Ezra dating from shortly after 70A.D.20 In 4 Ezra 7:82, the angel reveals to Ezra that in
the period between death and the Final Judgment, wicked souls "cannot now repent and
do good that they may live." Ezra then asks in 7:102-103 -
Whether on the day of judgment, the righteous will be able to intercede
for the ungodly, or to entreat the Most High for them, fathers for sons, or
sons for fathers, brothers for brothers, relatives for their kinsmen, or
friends for friends.
But the angel, (no doubt expressing the author's view), answers 'no' to Ezra's question,
whereupon Ezra complains that such harshness is inconsistent with the biblical tradition
in which, for example, Elijah intercedes for a dead child. (4 Ezra 7:109). Trumbower
interestingly comments -
Ezra's clear articulation of his request for intercession, as well as the
vehemence with which the angel refutes it, may reflect a real debate
among Jews at the end of the 1st century A.D.21
In these passages, the possibility of postmortem forgiveness was believed to occur at
the final judgment, but, if so, then one must surmise that the sinful dead were in some
kind of intermediate state, awaiting that Judgment. As has already been noted, in many
places, in the intertestamental literature, such waiting souls were located in Hades - the
location understood, not literally, but symbolically or figuratively. The concept of
'Hades' as an intermediate state is carried forward into the New Testament, for the
Jews of Jesus' day inherited, many of the ideas which were current in the two preceding
centuries.
(d) The Eschatology of Qumran
When studying the intertestamental period attention must also be paid to the sectarian
literature of Qumran, which presents a confusing and obscure picture. The theology of






the idea of reward and punishment beyond death, and the direct influence of the
apocalypses can be detected in the writings of Qumran. According to John Collins, the
principal sectarian rule books indicate that as soon as the earthly life of an individual is
ended, that person experiences the eternal reward and punishment. There is, therefore,
no need for a general resurrection.22 The main emphasis in the Scrolls lies in the idea
that eternal life is rooted in the cultic experience of the sect. The members, although
still subject to the evils of earthly life, are already thought to be sharing the life of the
angels in their community. This is a transcendent experience which ushers the faithful,
at death, into life with the angels in heaven.
The Qumran literature makes no mention of resurrection, yet the punishment of the
wicked is postmortem perdition, and so, presumably, the reward for the righteous of
eternal life extends beyond death. The absence of reference to resurrection probably
means that the Essenes do not believe in the resurrection of the body, but rather the
Greek idea of the immortality of the soul. It is the spirit or nephesh which lives on,
either in fellowship with the angels, or to suffer torture in the netherworld.
The shape ofQumran theology, however, as portrayed by Alex Deasley, for example, is
more confused than Collins's understanding. Deasley follows Collins in noting the
significant temporal dimension of Qumran eschatology. He calls attention to its stress
on the restoration of fallen humanity to its original glory at creation. God will purify the
individual and, at the time of his final visitation, extinguish evil for ever23. Deasley
identifies -
a quasi-millennial conception according to which there eventuates on
earth, and within time, a real, though limited, measure of the life of
eternity.24
The interesting question which arises for this thesis is whether Qumran theology has a
conception of an intermediate state, and here, the picture is obscure.25 Deasley's
22
Collins, J. J., Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 129.,
23 'Discourse on the Two Spirits' in Community Rule, IV. 17b-19a.
24
Deasley, Alex., The Shape ofQumran Theology, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2000), 294.
25
Deasley frames the question as follows - "If recompense comes to the departed, through the visitation of
judgment at the time of death, how is this visitation related to God's visitation at the end? In particular, is
the renewed world one in which tire faithful departed have a share, and, if so, is resurrection tire gateway by
which they enter it? If this is tire case, then resurrection implies some sort of intermediate state between this
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conclusion is that there is tension in the Qumran literature between the life to come
seen as a temporal extension of this life with the recreation of the nation in quasi-
millennial terms, and the life to come viewed transcendentally. There is a further lack
of clarity as to the point of entry into the after-life - at death, or at the general
resurrection. Qumran appears to hold both elements together, without reconciling them,
and fails, therefore, to provide a single, coherent picture.26
(e) The New Testament Background
The variation in conceptions of Hades in later Judaism - different views as to who goes
to Hades and for how long - is reflected in the New Testament, which complements
and expands Old Testament teaching. As in the Old Testament, so in the New, the word
'Hades' often accompanying the word 'death' usually means the ' realm of the dead'
(Acts 2:27,31; Rev. 1:18; 6:8; 20:13; Matt. 11:23; 16:18). In some passages, it denotes
a place of assembly for all souls, as in Acts 2:27,31. In other passages, there seems to
be a double view, teaching that there is an intermediate state of conscious existence,
both for the righteous and the wicked, though Hades itself tends to be used only of the
place of punishment for the wicked. The souls of the ungodly languish in an
underworld at the heart of the Earth. (1 Peter 3:19).According to Rev.20:13, this is also
the abode of non-Christians.
The principal passages in the New Testament's synoptic tradition, with a bearing on an
intermediate state, are the parable of Dives and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31), and our
Lord's conversation with the penitent thief on the Cross. (Luke 23:43). In both
passages, there is a close link with ideas which were common in later Judaism, and
Jesus uses imagery familiar to the Jews of his day from the intertestamental apocalyptic
literature. Hades is depicted in Luke 16:19-31, very much as it was in Ethiopian Enoch
22, which would represent the popular view of the time. After death, men and women
go to Sheol, each 'to his or her proper place', borne thither by angels, or carried off by
emissaries of the devil. An example of this, is Judas, who leaves the apostolic ministry
life and the life of eternity." - Deasley, op.cit., 298. Deasley,, however, quotes the opposite opinion from E.
Puech "that the prevailing view at Qumran was in harmony with Daniel 12:2-3, namely, that resurrection
was the prelude to judgment which resulted in either everlasting life or everlasting condemnation." - Puech,
E., La Croyance des Esseniens en la Vie Future: Jmmortalite, resurrection, vie eternelle, (Paris: Gabalda,
1993).
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"to go where he belongs" (Acts 1:25). Both Enoch and Luke envisage there being in
paradise, a fountain of water springing up, while hell, for both writers, is the place of
torment by fire. The intermediate condition after death is noticeable. It is temporary,
and lasts only till the Day of Judgment. When that Day comes, and not before, the
separation of spirits, mentioned by Jesus in Matt. 13:25 and Mark 9:43ff., occurs, when
some pass to the glory of the world to come, while others go to Gehenna. This
understanding of an intermediate state in the New Testament is the traditional
interpretation, and it coheres well with the position taken in this thesis which promotes
the intermediate state as a temporary period, as distinct from a permanent hell.
The objection is sometimes made, however, that the parable does not provide relevant
information about the life to come, because its purpose was to illustrate the danger of
wealth (Luke 16:24), and the need for repentance (Luke 16:28-30). Yet it seems
undeniable that it refers to the intermediate state, as the resurrection of the dead and the
final judgment have not yet occurred (Luke 16:27-31). While Jesus was not concerned
to teach details about the existence of the intermediate state, he would not require to
invent a non-existent state to make his point of the need for repentance in this life, to
avoid punishment in the next. As in the rest of his teaching, Jesus used illustrations
from the real world, and this would also be so in this case.
A number of features of the intermediate state are implied by these two passages in
Luke. According to some verses in the New Testament (e.g. Mark 5:39; 1 Thess. 5:10;
John 11:11-12 etc.), the souls of the dead are said to be 'asleep', but this is usually a
figurative expression for death, suggested by the outward resemblance of a dead body
to a sleeping one. The doctrine commonly held by the Jews was that believers after
death were in a dreamy, semi-conscious state, neither happy nor miserable, awaiting the
resurrection body. Yet, in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, it is a state of conscious
existence for both the righteous and the wicked - for the righteous, a state of joy; for
the wicked, a state of suffering. The parable indicates that there is consciousness of
surroundings (vv.23-24), memory of the past (w.27-28), and rational thought (v. 30),
and therefore Jesus must have sanctioned these characteristics of the intermediate state.




whether in paradise or Sheol, still bear some resemblance to what they have been.
Dives and Lazarus are mutually visible in paradise and Hades, and appear to have the
same bodily parts as they had on earth. It is also worth noting that Moses and Elijah
appear recognisably at the Transfiguration. This raises questions about the traditional
view which maintains that the departed are disembodied in the intermediate state. The
view here that human beings in the intermediate state are conscious is a necessary
presupposition for this thesis as it allows the possibility of conversion and sanctification
in this interim period.
Another implication of the parable has created a certain amount of theological
confusion. The dominant view in the New Testament asserts that judgment will
coincide with the coming of the Son ofMan in glory (Matt.25:31-46). Yet Luke 16:22
implies that, after the death of the individual, his or her disembodied soul goes to
'Abraham's bosom', or paradise, or Sheol. having already been judged, presumably at
death. The divine verdict upon his life is pronounced prior to the resurrection. The same
implication arises in Luke 23:43, when Jesus promises the penitent thief an immediate
place in paradise. There is no doubt that these passages shift the emphasis away from
the Last Judgment, to what our souls have done before and after death. This theory of a
double judgment established itself as the normal teaching of the western Church. All
that was left to the general judgment was the resurrection of the body, and the
consequent rewarding or punishing of the body. This thesis would contend that
judgment is a process which would not be finalised until the final consummation or
Last Judgment.
One other passage in the New Testament suggests an interim punishment of the
ungodly (2 Peter 2:9). It speaks of the Lord "holding the unrighteous for the Day of
Judgment, while continuing their punishment." This verse, therefore, confirms the
picture ofDives in the parable and his judgment.
The two Lukan passages under consideration, then, provide considerable evidence of a
double aspect ofwaiting for the final judgment - a state which, for the believer, means
a foretaste of heaven, and for the unbeliever, a foretaste of damnation. At least this
minimum can therefore be said about the intermediate state, that the Christian's
communion with his Lord is affirmed. The presence of Christ in the intermediate state
14
is vital for the argument of the thesis, as conversion of the unevangelised depends upon
a postmortem encounter with Christ.
It has, however, to be said, that there has been fairly widespread opposition by New
Testament scholars to the traditional understanding of an intermediate state in these two
passages. J.M. Creed, for example, says that there is nothing here to imply that an
intermediate state is pictured. He goes on to note that the rich man alone is in Hades,
and that Hades here is being used as almost equivalent to Gehenna.27
W.Strawson notes that in Luke 16:26, Abraham, in addressing Dives, alludes to "a great
chasm fixed, so that those who want to go from here to you cannot, nor can anyone
cross over from there to us." Strawson sees here "an unchangeable and final division",
which rules out any possibility of an intermediate state.28
It seems however, that no such dogmatic conclusions can be drawn from this detail. As
the story is a parable, not every detail can be taken literally. It cannot be assumed, for
example, that the abodes of the saved and the lost are in close proximity, and that
intercourse takes place between the two classes. Nevertheless, B.H. Streeter makes an
interesting observation on the 'great gulf fixed' when he says that there is no need to
think of the gulf in spatial terms. It could, instead, be "one of quality of life, expressing
itself in feeling and character." In this way, saint and sinner could converse with one
another in the next world.29
Another theologian who rejects an intermediate state is Stephen Travis. The traditional
view is that the believing dead are with Christ in a disembodied form (Luke 23:43),
waiting to receive their resurrection bodies with the return of Christ. Yet, Travis
wonders why the New Testament writers did not tell us more clearly, if this indeed was
the case. He claims that texts such as Luke 23:43 and Philippians 1:23 show no hint that
'being with Christ' is only an interim stage before the resurrection.30
27
Creed, J.M., The Gospel according to St Luke, (London: Macmillan, 1950), 212.
28
Strawson, W., Jesus and the Future Life, (London: Epwortlr, 1970), 211. Jeremias makes the same point -
"The gulf expresses the irrevocability of God's judgment; hence Jesus knows no doctrine of purgatory." -
Jeremias, JRediscovering the Parables, (London: SCM., 1966), 130.
29
Streeter, B.H. (ed.), Immortality, (London: Macmillan, 1930), 137.
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C.Ryder Smith also rejects any notion of Hades being temporary, believing that the
reference in the parable is probably to Gehenna, which is located in Hades, and that the
wicked arrive there when they die.31
In keeping with his contention that death itself and one's character at the moment of
death are the deciding factors in determining one's destiny, Karl Rahner also disposes
of an intermediate state.32
Karl Hanhart, perhaps, speaks representatively for those opposed to an intermediate
state, when he says that the thief s words to Jesus on the Cross 'when you come into
your Kingdom' refers to "Jesus's ascendancy to the Messianic throne." Paradise is the
opposite of hell, and v.43 "does not of itself speak of a limited period of waiting in
paradise."33
Opinion, therefore, among New Testament scholars is sharply divided as to whether the
Lukan passages affirm the existence of an intermediate state. As will become obvious
later, preference is given in this thesis to the views of traditionalists such as Culimann
and Stauffer. An intermediate state is essential if there is to be any hope of conversion
for the unevangelised after death.
Consideration must now be given to some other passages in the Gospels which might
suggest an intermediate state. Jesus, for example, in Matthew 10:28 comforts his
apostles by assuring them that they need have no fear of those who will kill the body,
but cannot kill the soul. Modern exegetes are unhappy about such a text as it denies the
psychosomatic unity of a human being, but it does harmonise well with the traditional
view of a disembodied soul surviving death. Also, the story of the Transfiguration
implies that the saints, in this case, Moses and Elijah, live gloriously in the intermediate
state amid the transcendent splendour of paradise. (Matthew 17:4).
30
Travis, Stephen, H., IBelieve in the Second Coming ofJesus, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982) 174.
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The famous verse, John 14:2, "In my Father's house are many resting-places",
according to William Temple's well-known interpretation, seems to give clear support
to there being an intermediate state. Temple describes the resting-places as 'wayside
caravanserais' - shelters at stages along the road where travellers may rest on their
journey. Hanhart disputes this, and believes that "it refers not to an intermediate, but to
a final abode."34 But, surely, this is not what Temple meant, for he explains that there
are many resting-places on the long pilgrimage to perfection, and the Lord goes on
before to prepare them for us35This text is particularly helpful to the argument of this
thesis as it implies stages in the process of spiritual development on the way to heaven.
Jeremias sees many references in the Gospels to the intermediate state (e.g. John 12:26;
Mark 13:27), and also in Acts 7:59, maintaining that the New Testament writers are
unanimous in "presenting communion with Christ as the specifically Christian view of
the intermediate state."36
The principal passages in the Letters of St Paul, associated with belief in an
intermediate state, are 2 Corinthians 5: 1-10 and Philippians 1:23, but here again, as in
the Lukan passages, opinion among scholars is sharply divided. The main crux occurs
in 2 Corinthians 5:2-3 - "Meanwhile we groan, longing to be clothed with our heavenly
dwelling, because when we are clothed, we will not be found naked," and also in v.8 -
"We are confident, I say, and would prefer to be away from the body, and at home with
the Lord." w.2-4 refer to receiving a new body at the Parousia, but the fear of being
"found naked" could refer to the intermediate state. These words could mean, at least in
part, a desire not to be bodiless, but to share in the full glory of God. The early views of
Paul in 1 Thessalonians 4:13-18 and 1 Corinthians 15 imply sleep in a bodiless




Temple writes - "It may be that we are still far from perfect fellowship with the Father... We have a long
journey ofmany days before us ere our pilgrimage is accomplished. But there are by God's mercy many
resting-places. Otherwise of what avail would be tire promise of the Lord to prepare a place for us? If it
were only in the realm of ultimate attainment, would he mock us with tire promise of a welcome
there?... The Lord calls us to absolute perfection; but he points us here and now to what is for each one the
next stage, the next resting-place on the way to it... There is no special reference to the final stage." -
Temple, W., Readings in St John's Gospel, (London: Macmillan, 1955), 226-7.
36 Jeremias, J., article on 'Paradise' in Theological Dictionary ofthe New Testament, (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1933), 769.
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This immortality is not an intellectually and individualistically conceived
survival, but only a hope.37
When, however, attention is paid to 2 Corinthians, there is a shift of emphasis, because
of Paul's brush with death, and the possibility of his having to face death before the
Parousia. v. 8 shows that Paul had ceased to think of the intermediate state as simply
sleep, but looked forward to a conscious condition of happiness, and that indeed his
postmortem state was much to be preferred to this life. Even if the believer is bodiless,
Paul believed, he is in conscious enjoyment of the Lord's presence. The fact that Paul
has already received the Spirit 'as an earnest' enables him to overcome his horror of
nakedness. A further source of satisfaction is that, though death might mean temporary
nakedness, it would also mean freedom from earthly frustration.
The above traditional interpretation as an intermediate state has been widely questioned
in modern times. It has, for example, been charged with inconsistency. On the one
hand, Paul is said to want to live on in his earthly existence until the Parousia, so as to
avoid the disembodied state of 'nakedness'. This intermediate state is essentially
undesirable, because it is a less than fully human existence. But, on the other hand, he
is said to want to leave the body, so that he can go to be with the Lord now. As Paul
says in another letter (Philippians 1:21-26), his desire is to depart and be with Christ.
So, according to the traditional view, the intermediate state is both desirable and
undesirable.38
Paul Fiddes raises a different objection. The traditional view rests on an understanding
of the soul being disembodied in the intermediate state, thus combining Greek notions
of the soul with Hebrew ideas of resurrection. Fiddes rejects this interpretation of
'being naked', and he does not believe that it describes the intermediate state.39
37
Barrett C.K.,"Immortality and Resurrection", in C.S. Duthie (ed.), Resurrection and Immortality,
(London: Samuel Bagster & Sons Ltd., 1979), 86.
38 W.L. Craig, however, in "Paul's Dilemma in 2 Cor.5:l-10: A Catch-22", in New Testament Studies, 34
(1988), 145-147, concludes "that there is no inconsistency in the traditional interpretation. Rather, tire
appearance of inconsistency arises out of a paradoxical situation in which Paul was placed, and the catch-22
decision which confronted him".
39 Fiddes says: "But the feeling of the passage is quite against this. Paul makes no reference to the soul, and
finds being 'unclothed' a deeply undesirable state, where, in the drought ofPlato and Philo, the soul longs to
rid itself of the weight of the body and be naked. Being 'naked' is not meant to describe dre intermediate
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Hanhart, in keeping with his general dismissal of all ideas of an intermediate state,
believes that 'nakedness' stands for the shame of unrighteousness, and refers not to
natural death, but to eternal death.40 This is also Calvin's view, interpreting 'nakedness'
in a moral sense, as being without the righteousness with which one must be clothed
before the tribunal of Christ.41
The desire to be "with the Lord", Hanhart believes, refers not to an intermediate state,
but to the new age. This opinion is also held by E. Earle Ellis who maintains that
'nakedness' has the connotation of guilt and judgment, and will not be at death, but at
the Parousia42.
Ronald Berry's understanding, however, of vv.1-2 is in line with J.A.T. Robinson's
belief that v. 1 does not refer to the spiritual body of the individual, but to the Body of
Christ, the Church. Paul is longing (in v.2), for that 'clothing' at the Parousia which
will signify "the perfection of the body in its corporateness." In Berry's view, the
'nakedness' is "the loneliness of separation from those he serves and whose fellowship
5,43
is precious.
This, is a persuasive argument which gives powerful support to the concept of an
intermediate state. The traditional view that Paul envisages an intermediate state is also
supported by C.K. Barrett who maintains that Paul was thinking of an interval of
bodilessness between death and the coming of the Lord.44 Barrett comes to this
conclusion as a deduction from Paul's thinking in 1 Cor.l5:35ff. The interval between
the sowing of a seed, and its fruition (1 Cor. 15:37-38) implies a period of waiting.
Although the 'nakedness' of the bodiless state is undesirable for Paul, it does not
separate the deceased from God's love as Phil. 1:23 - 'with Christ' - makes clear. The
state, but is an image for the non-being with which death confronts us." - Fiddes, P., The Promised End,
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Philippians text is important for the conclusion of this thesis as the presence of Christ in
the intermediate state, both for the onward sanctification of believers, and for the
conversion of the unevangelised is necessary. J.D.G. Dunn is less confident, and
considers it to be a 'moot question', whether, in view of possible development in Paul's
thought, he envisaged an intermediate state. What Dunn does believe to be certain is
that Paul believed that there was an "incompleteness in the process of salvation, which
can only be resolved by the new body of resurrection."45
Further arguments have been advanced in opposition to the traditional viewpoint. David
Wenham links v.3 - "we will not be found naked" - with Jesus's eschatological
teaching in Luke 12:36-38, where he urges wakefulness, that is (among other things),
keeping one's clothes on, and having one's loins girded.46
This, appears to be extremely far-fetched and unlikely. A much weightier contention is
advanced by a number of scholars, including G.B. Caird, T.F. Torrance and B.
Reichenbach. These theologians refer to the problematical nature of time after death.
Caird, for example, points to the fact that when Paul thought of death as sleep, he may
have been reflecting on the similarity between sleep followed by waking, and death
followed by the Day of Christ. From our conscious angle, time is suspended while we
are asleep. In the same way, after death, the next thing we may be aware of is entering
the presence of Christ, and we all do this simultaneously.47 Such a view
comprehensively disposes of an intermediate state. From a slightly different angle,
Torrance reaches the same conclusion.
Looked at from the perspective of the new creation, there is no gap
between the death of the believer, and the Parousia of Christ, but, looked
at from the perspective of time that decays and crumbles away, there is a
lapse between them.48
The relationship between time and eternity is a considerable philosophical problem,
which would require more extended treatment than is possible here. Suffice it to say,
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that plenty of theologians (for example, notably Cullmann), envisage postmortem time
as sequential. This would require to be the case if there is to be postmortem spiritual
growth, which presupposes the temporal categories of past, present and future.
The opinion of Reichenbach that there is no postmortem consciousness in an
intermediate period appears to contradict many of the scriptural passages mentioned
earlier in this chapter.49
The interpretations ofPhilippians 1:23, where Paul says: "I desire to depart and be with
Christ, which is far better." vary along similar lines to those of 2 Corinthians 5. Ellis,
for example, believes that this verse in Philippians does have the intermediate state in
view, and therefore offers a parallel to our Lord's promise to the penitent thief (Luke
23:43).50
Gordon J. Spykman speculates that Paul's preference for the intermediate state disposes
of the old idea that it was an unreal, sleepy or dreamlike condition. In an arresting
metaphor, he writes that "Death is not the doorway to a geriatric waiting-room, where
life is suspended." Paul could not have conceived our after-life as soul-sleep or
unconscious existence. If he had, he would not have thought that departing and being
with the Lord was 'far better.'51 This understanding follows views which F.F. Bruce
had expressed when expounding 2 Cor.5. In order for the desire expressed in Phil. 1:23
'to be with Christ', to be realised, Bruce holds that "some kind of new embodiment is
necessary at death." For Paul, "a body of some kind was essential to personality"52.
What he shrank from was any kind of spiritual nakedness or isolation. This appears
preferable to the traditional view that 'nakedness' implies disembodiment. Modern
49 Reichenbach holds similar views to Torrance. Speaking in particular of Luke 23:43 and Philippians 1:23,
he says of these passages - "They are not speaking of objective time, but rather subjective time. Though the
time between death and resurrection is objectively long, subjectively, it is experienced as immediate. The
reason for this is that, in tire interim, there is no consciousness, for there is no individual to be conscious.
And without consciousness, there can be no awareness of passing time. Thus, Paul can say that to die is to
be with (to experience) Christ (at the next conscious moment)." - Reichenbach, B., IsMan the Phoenix?
(Washington: University Press of America, 1983), 185.
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views on the holistic nature of the personality (body and soul inextricably combined)
53support Bruce's view that:
physical death will mean no hiatus of disembodiment, but the immediate
enjoyment of being 'at home with the Lord.'54
This, in no way, need deny an intermediate state, but argues for a spiritual body in
advance of the Parousia. This makes sound sense, as the spiritual body is already being
formed in this life, through the indwelling power of the Holy Spirit. Bruce admits,
however, that it is difficult to distinguish the new body immediately available at death
from the spiritual body to be received when the last trumpet sounds. (1 Cor. 15:32). The
spiritual body which we receive at death (2 Cor.5:l-2) is referred to as oikodome, which
may have a suggestion of something under construction, something that God is
preparing for his people (cf. John 14:2). William Lillie agrees with many other scholars
in rejecting J.A.T. Robinson's belief that it refers to the Body of Christ, but makes the
interesting suggestion that when the individual receives the oikodome at death, he or
she "may be more capable of intimate relationship with others and with Christ himself
than the 'earthly tent' ever was."55 This may be true because the spiritual body would
not suffer from the limitations of language or the impossibility of sharing another
person's actual sensations of pain - conditions which affect our physical bodies.
As one might expect, however, Hanhart opposes this position, believing that "the finale
of man's story is the moment of death." and that the words 'with Christ' belong to the
new age and the new creation.56
H.H. Rex agrees, in opposition to Cullmann, who is wholeheartedly committed to the
intermediate state, believing that it brings believers into a "special proximity to
Christ".57
53 Paul's confidence was that God would provide for believers (ifnot necessarily for others), "a changed
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A number of other Pauline passages, which tend towards universalism, may imply an
intermediate state. For example, Ephesians 1:10, envisages God "bringing all things in
heaven and on earth together under one head, even Christ." Colossians 1:20 speaks of
God's plan "to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth, or things in
heaven." In 1 Corinthians 15:25,28, Paul asserts that "Christ must reign until he has put
all his enemies under his feet...When he has done this, then the Son of Man himself
will be made subject to him who put everything under him, so that God may be all in
all." Romans 11:32 is clearly of universal importance - "For God has bound all men
over to disobedience, so that he may have mercy on them all." The best case of all for
holding that Paul believed in the final salvation of all souls is founded on the closing
verses of the hymn in Philippians 2:9-11, which ends with the vision of the glorified
universe in its peace and concord. The universalist hope extends beyond the writings of
Paul - for example, to 2 Peter 3:9 - "The Lord is patient with you, not wanting anyone
to perish, but everyone to come to repentance." These texts underpin an important
axiom of opentheism, namely the view that God makes salvation universally accessible.
It is possible that these universalist passages imply an intermediate state. The promise
that God "will be all in all" quite obviously fails to find fulfilment in this earthly life, as
many scriptural passages (e.g. our Lord's parable of the Wheat and the Tares) indicate.
So, when and where does the reconciling death of Christ on the Cross succeed in saving
all souls? Some modern Roman Catholic scholars, notably Rahner and Boros, maintain
that the reconciliation occurs at the death of the individual. Yet, this would negate any
opportunity for growth in grace after death - and still poses the temporal problem of
squaring individual salvation with the final corporate consummation. If these passages
mean that God will ultimately save everyone, it seems much more likely that this would
happen after a period of probation in an intermediate state, than at death, or in heaven.
A number of other New Testament passages contain hints of an intermediate state. The
author of the Letter to the Hebrews is ambiguous on the subject. Hebrews 9:27 speaks
of "man, being destined to die once, and after that, to face judgment." It could be, and
has been, interpreted as declaring that the final, public judgment, and not simply a
private judgment, takes place for the individual immediately after death. Yet, Hebrews
11:39-40 affirms: "These were all commended for their faith, yet none of them received
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what had been promised. God had planned something better for us, so that only
together with us, would they be made perfect." Here there can be found the concept of
an intermediate state where human beings lack something which they would require in
order to be truly normal and completely happy. These verses conceive the intermediate
state as a state of waiting. A similar idea is suggested in Revelation 6:9-11, where the
souls of the martyrs wait "under the altar". This does not denote 'Heaven', for their
condition is incompatible with the restfulness, satisfaction and perfection which will
characterise heaven.58
Loraine Boettner claims that one of the clearest references to those in the intermediate
state occurs later in the same book - "Then I heard a voice from Heaven say, 'Write:
Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord from now on.' 'Yes', says the Spirit, 'they
will rest from their labour, for their deeds will follow them.'" (Revelation 14:13).59
Further clear references to an intermediate state are contained in 2 Peter 2:4,9, which
pictures evildoers 'resting in torment' till the Judgment Day. The New Testament says
little about the condition of the ungodly in the intermediate state, since its chief concern
is with the future of God's people, but 2 Peter 2:9 says that "the Lord knows how to
rescue godly men from trials and to hold the unrighteous for the day of judgment, while
continuing their punishment." What is described here is obviously not the final
judgment of the ungodly, but a punishment that precedes Judgment Day. This verse,
therefore, confirms the pre-Judgment Day punishment of Dives in Luke 16:19-31. A
similar point of view is expressed in Jude 6, where fallen angels "are kept in darkness,
bound with everlasting chains for judgment on the great Day." These texts are
compatible with the conclusion towards which this thesis is working, that the
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intermediate state will provide for evildoers a purgatorial opportunity for healing and
cleansing.
It would appear, then, after surveying all the New Testament evidence, and the
conflicting views of theologians for and against an intermediate state, that the balance
of probability lies in its favour. The intermediate state is clearly of limited duration,
and, throughout the New Testament, serves only an interim purpose. It receives souls
after death, and delivers them up again at the Resurrection. "Death and Hades gave up
the dead that were in them, and each person was judged according to what he had done.
Then death and Hades were thrown into the lake of fire. The lake of fire is the second
death." (Revelation 20:13-14). The Resurrection, then, constitutes the end of Hades,
and it is replaced by Gehenna as the final place of punishment.
One might well ask what are the forces which drive the development of the idea of an
intermediate state. One of these would be the tension between individual and corporate
eschatology because of the interval between individual deaths and the general
resurrection at the final judgment. Another would be the evolution of the idea through
the Old Testament concept of Sheol, developing into the New Testament concept of
Hades. Yet another, particularly arising out of the experience of Paul, is the delay in the
arrival of the Parousia. This would account for the change in Paul's thinking between 1
Cor. and 2 Cor. 1 Cor. 15 is concerned primarily with corporate hope of the Church, and
places the resurrection at the Second Advent. Paul becomes increasingly concerned
about the fate of believers who die before the Parousia. As he reflects upon their
spiritual regeneration in this life, he becomes convinced that death will not separate
them from Christ, and he becomes unhappy with the traditional idea that they will sleep
until the final consummation. A higher degree of consciousness is required. Therefore
the emphasis in 2 Cor.5 is on the destiny of the individual believer, for whom death
inaugurates a deeper communion between himself and his Lord (v.8b). Hence, the
development of the idea of an intermediate state.
The foregoing investigation into the biblical evidence for an intermediate state is meant
to prepare the way for consideration of the possibility of posthumous conversion. It has
already been noted that the Old Testament holds out no such hope. The question must
now be asked whether there are any signs in the New Testament of salvation for
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unbelievers after death. The main emphasis in the New Testament is laid upon the need
for decision for or against Christ in this life, and upon the Parousia, rather than upon
what might happen in an intermediate state.
Nevertheless, a number of texts indicate the possibility of posthumous conversion. The
principal ones are those which refer to the descent of Christ to Hades (e.g. 1 Peter 3:18
and 4:6), consideration ofwhich is postponed until Chapter 3. One of the other relevant
texts is 1 Corinthians 5:5 - "..hand this man over to Satan, so that the sinful nature may
be destroyed, and his spirit saved on the day of the Lord." It is possible that Paul could
be hoping here that excommunication will cause the man to repent in this life.60
Also, as has already been noted, a number of texts, such as Romans 11:32 and 1
Corinthians 15:24-28, may imply universal salvation, which would probably entail the
posthumous salvation of some people. There is little doubt, at any rate, that this would
be God's desire as 2 Peter 3:9 makes plain - "The Lord is not slow about his promise,
as some think of slowness, but is patient with you, not wanting any to perish, but all to
come to repentance." Another important text is 1 Corinthians 15:29 - "Now if there is
no resurrection of the dead, what will those do who are baptised for the dead? If the
dead are not raised at all, why are people baptised for them?" The practice of vicarious
baptism 'on behalf of the dead' would appear to have been pointless, unless it could
have altered the fate of unevangelised dead. Trumbower also refers to a passage from
Article 1257 of the new Catechism of the Catholic Church which quotes "Let the
children come to me; do not hinder them." (Mark 10:14; cf. 1 Timothy 2:4), and
observes:
Indeed the great mercy of God who desires that all men should be saved,
and Jesus' tenderness toward children allow us to hope that there is a way
of salvation for children who have died without baptism.61
There are, however, a number of New Testament texts which speak of 'eternal'
punishment or destruction for the wicked (2 Thessalonians 1:9; Matthew 25:46). These
verses suggest to some that there can be no conversion after death, but the final
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separation of the sheep from the goats presumably takes place at the great day of final
judgment and not necessarily on the death of the individual.
Although New Testament scholarship is divided on the matter, and, although the Bible
does not enable one to quote many proof-texts in favour of posthumous salvation, there
would appear to be a firm foundation in scripture for the conclusions of this thesis.
Sufficient biblical evidence has been provided in this opening chapter for the probable
existence of an intermediate state of temporary duration, in which there would be ample
opportunity for sanctification, and, in the case of the unevangelised, for conversion.
The Gospel of Christ and his Cross testifies clearly to God's infinite mercy and loving-
kindness towards the least, the last and the lost. Among contemporary theologians, this
emphasis is strongly expressed in the theology of George Newlands for whom love "is
the central characteristic of God in himself and in relation to the created order."62 This
thesis will argue that a favourable destiny for the unevangelised can be deduced from
the justice, love and mercy of God. Newlands also envisages an interactive relationship
between God and his creatures in which, although God's presence is hidden - "Love's
Tetting-be' in epistemic distance is also the love that will not let us go." As will
become evident in later chapters below, it is this divine love which give space or
freedom to God's creatures to respond to him in faith - one of the basic axioms also of
opentheism. The discussion must now proceed in chapter 2 to consider the witness of
early Christian traditions from the Patristic period.
62 Newlands George, God in Christian Perspective, (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1994), 40, 74.
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CHAPTER 2
The Intermediate State in Patristic, Medieval and Reformation Periods
(a) The Patristic Period
It was important in Chapter 1, to investigate the scriptural basis for belief in an
intermediate state during which the unevangelised might have that opportunity to
encounter Christ which accidents ofgeography or history prevented them from having
in this life. Varying interpretations of the biblical witness, however, mean that the
developing understanding of the Early Church Fathers needs to be taken into account.
Which of the biblical emphases do they underscore, and how do they regard
posthumous conversion in an intermediate state? Whether there can be a positive
destiny for the unevangelised remains an open question.
In the first section of this chapter, attention will focus on the beliefs of the Early
Church Fathers, from about 100 to 600A.D., concerning the fate of the dead between
death and the final judgment. In the second century A.D., there was considerable
speculation about the fate of those who had lived before Christ, or those who lived
contemporaneously with Christ, and after him, who did not have a chance to hear the
Christian message before their deaths. Christ died for all humanity, yet there were
many who did not have the chance either to accept or reject the message, through the
accidents of timing or location of birth. These questions and ideas inspired references
to the subject in the ninth Similitude of the Shepherd ofHernias Jin which 40 apostles
and teachers preached to, and baptised the dead after their own deaths. Yet there is
mention only of "those who had fallen asleep in righteousness and great purity", and
no indication of any chance of postmortem reformation of the wicked.
In the Apocalypse ofPeter 2and the Sibylline Oracles 3there is evidence of a tradition
of the righteous wishing to save some of the damned, of their being granted their
wish, and of the intercessory power of the holy ones to save "whomsoever they ask






for." This would happen at the Last Judgment, but the categories of pious and wicked
would remain distinct.
The general view, however, from the Apologists onwards is that judgment on an
individual's life occurs at death rather than at the end of the world. This is a
continuation of the belief expressed in Scripture, for example in the Parable of Dives
and Lazarus (Luke 16: 19-31). It implies the concept of an intermediate state between
death and resurrection - an idea which becomes more cogent with the continuing
postponement of the parousia. In this interim period, the dead anticipate in some way,
the fate which will be theirs, in its fullness, once history reaches its final
consummation. Justin Martyr, for example, foresees some kind of provisional reward
for the just, and punishment for sinners, after death. He rejects the Platonic notion that
the soul is, with all its powers, immortal by nature. The human soul cannot be eternal
like God. The biblical concept of Hades, a shadowy underworld of the dead, persists
through the intertestamental period, and influences the thought of early Patristic
writers such as Justin Martyr and Irenaeus. The Syriac tradition speaks of a "sleep of
souls" in a kind of suspended animation between death and resurrection. Justin,
however, does maintain that humans survive with sensation after death, with the souls
of the righteous staying in a better place, and those of the wicked in a worse one.4 The
location of the righteous and the wicked in the intermediate state is of no great
relevance to this thesis, but Justin Martyr's belief that there is provisional reward for
the righteous and punishment for sinners after death coheres well with the contention
of this thesis that the just enjoy satisfaction and peace in the presence of Christ, and
the wicked may suffer the agonies of conscience which would be necessary before
repentance and conversion.
Irenaeus of Lyons gives further details, envisaging that souls will be separated from
bodies, and - "go away to the invisible place allotted to them by God,"5 where, as
shades, they will retain the "form" of their body, and memory of their existence on
earth, but not its fleshly substance.6 The temporary destination of the righteous,
Irenaeus describes as "paradise" which "has been prepared for righteous men such as
4 JustinMartyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 5; IApology, 18.20.
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have the spirit."7 At the parousia they are reunited with their bodies and go into the
presence of God. In this context, Irenaeus pictures prophets and righteous men of the
Old Testament enjoying the presence of Christ in the millennium, but as chiliasm will
not be researched as part of this project, it is mentioned only in passing.
Irenaeus conceives the fate of the ungodly as eternal separation from God, and not
annihilation.8 He is anxious to make it clear that the wicked condemn themselves. It is
important, therefore, to note that there is no sign of universalism in his thought, and
that this is typical of orthodox writers of his time. There is no hint of the very different
beliefs which theologians such as Origen and Gregory of Nyssa hold in the third and
fourth centuries, A.D. The main purpose of judgment is to separate the righteous from
the unrighteous, and that judgment is final.
The general ideas of Irenaeus are developed in greater detail by Tertullian. At the end
of his De Artima (55-58), he pictures Hades as "an enormous subterranean space,
hidden deep in the bowels of the earth," which serves as a reception room (hospitiiim)
for all the dead, the wicked and the righteous alike.9 The scriptural warrant for the
existence of such a place is the Parable of Dives and Lazarus (Luke 16: 19-31), and
Jesus' Descent to Hell (1 Peter 3: 18-20; 4:6.) The souls confined there are unchanged
in age and form from the time of death, and Tertullian, like Justin Martyr and Irenaeus
before him, imagines that they anticipate there, their ultimate fate, either "gloom or
glory."10 In his view, there is an interval - the millennium between the first and second
resurrections. All those who are not martyrs, both Christians and non-Christians go to
temporary storage facilities to await the final judgment. The righteous go to the
'bosom of Abraham' and the wicked to a place of anticipatory punishment.11 The soul
in this intermediate state is capable of heroism or sin, because it possesses a genuine,
if subtle and very limited, corporeality.12 Hades is imagined by Tertullian, as divided
into two regions, one for the good, and one for the wicked.13 The just are received into














even now, an image of the future.14 Sinners, on the other hand, begin, already in
Hades, to suffer for their sins, especially the sins committed through the soul alone.15
In the opinion of Brian Daley, - "it was Tertullian who really laid the foundation for
Latin Christendom's doctrine of the 'last things'"16.
It should be noted that there is not a word in Tertullian about a suffering of the
imperfectly good. Those who suffer are those who will be condemned. There is no hint
here of an anticipation of the later belief in purgatory. There is plenty of evidence in
the time of Tertullian that prayers are offered in the Church for the dead, but these
prayers are not intended to relieve penal suffering. 'Rest', 'sleep', 'a place of repose',
'a place and a mansion in God's kingdom', 'in green pastures', 'sanctification' - these
are the things prayed for. It is implied that these are the things ofwhich it is hoped that
the Christian dead are already assured, and which they enjoy. It is also significant that
Tertullian maintains that there is no sleep of the soul in the intermediate state. It is not
a time of inaction, for the body is not indispensable to the sorrows and joys of the soul,
and the torments of the lost begin directly after death. An exception is made by
Tertullian for the martyrs, who have the special and unique privilege of entering at
death into paradise; but their paradise he identifies with the place beneath the altar
where St John saw them in the Apocalypse. (Revelation 6:9).
The types of eschatology which have been examined so far have been broadly dualistic
- those of second century theologians who say that the just will live in eternal bliss
and the unjust in eternal damnation. The delay in the arrival of the parousia, however,
has another consequence, additional to the encouragement of an intermediate state. As
believers in the Early Church began to realise that the coming of the parousia was
going to be delayed, the feeling of tension caused by impending crisis was relaxed.
G.W.H. Lampe notes that where before, thoughts had been concentrated on what
would happen in the last days, now there came to be a new emphasis on mysticism or
pneumatology.17 One of the theologians thinking along these lines was Origen. He
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of the soul takes place, as it progresses towards union with God. There are various
degrees or stages in the soul's ascent to communion with the divine - an idea which
was to occur again much later in modern theology in the thought of John Hick. The
emphasis, here, is on gradual spiritual development rather than on what Lampe
describes as a "catastrophic divine act in the culmination of the historic process." With
this new emphasis dominant, typical eschatological ideas such as the prospect of the
parousia, the resurrection of the body, the judgment and the renewal of creation are
regarded increasingly as superfluous. Gradual spiritual growth in the afterlife is
preferred in this thesis to instant perfection at death, otherwise the continuing identity
of the person before and after death is imperilled.
As eschatology develops, then, in the Alexandrian School of the third and fourth
centuries, there is a significant departure from the dualist theology which prevailed in
the preceding century - a development which promises to look much more favourably
on the ultimate conclusions of this thesis regarding eschatological evangelisation.
Clement of Alexandria shrinks from the thought that the eternal fate of human beings
is irrevocably sealed at the grave; and hence his belief that opportunities for
repentance will continue in the life to come. He believes in a 'heavenly' intermediate
state of the soul. The body is inferior to the soul, and the latter being less susceptible
to vice, will find its improvement capabilities enhanced through separation from the
body.18 He is also sympathetic to Gnostics' and Neoplatonists' intellectualist and
speculative concerns, especially to their emphasis on the role of knowledge and
learning in believers' attempts to perfect themselves.19 Most influential is his doctrine
of punishment, which he sees as medicinal and educative, as vindictive punishment he
regards as being alien to God's perfectly good nature. Since it is medicinal, at least
20
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According to Daley, this had two important consequences - "(1) Clement asserted that sins
committed by believers would be cleansed in this way, thus becoming the first Christian writer to assert
categorically, that even the just would endure punishment after death, albeit of a purgatorial kind. (2)
He suggested that the punishment might be enough to purify or turn believers to God after death. It is
unclear whether he thought that this would in fact lead to universal salvation, although his thought
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Origen develops Clement's eschatology in the direction of universalism. He believes
that when an individual dies, his earthly body will be transformed into a spiritual body,
and the whole person will be judged and punished immediately.21 He holds that all
must come to the refiner's furnace, basing this opinion on 1 Corinthians 3:13. No later
Greek Father reaffirms this doctrine that even the most perfect Christians must
undergo a fiery purgation hereafter. The doctrine of a hell that is remedial and
temporary is later taken up by Gregory ofNyssa. The thesis finds here justification for
its view that every human being passes through the intermediate state for purgation.
The experience would literally be hell for the wicked as long as they remain
unrepentant, but this need not be a permanent state.
The kingdom of God, in Origen's eyes, consists of a gradual accumulation of those
individuals who have been purified in this life, and through medicinal punishment
after their death22. A phrase which Origen often repeats is 'the end is always like the
beginning'23. He likes to speak on a cosmic scale of the restoration of the whole
human race to its original state.24 The soul retains the form (or eidos) of the body,
which is more than just the body's appearance, but seems to be the bearer of the
body's essential characteristics. From the eidos, the spiritual body is built up.25 From
this, it is obvious that Origen does not believe the soul to be entirely disembodied, for
more than once, he states that only God is utterly incorporeal.26
Origen clearly follows Clement in regarding punishment as medicinal, and not
retributive, as in Augustine. Yet it is a form of very unpleasant and bitter medicine,
ensuring that over time the soul will be gradually purified, and so restored to its
original rank. Here, Origen bases his views on 1 Corinthians 15:28, believing that all
things will finally be 'restored' through God's goodness, through their subjection to
Christ, and through their unity with the Holy Spirit - to the end which is like the
beginning. For this interpretation to be in keeping with scripture, he takes aionios to
tends in that direction. It is also unclear whether the purgatorial punishment constrains sinners to repent
against their will, or works in harmony with human freedom." (Daley, ibid., 47).
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mean 'lasting for an age', rather than 'lasting for ever'. Also, the submission of God's
enemies in 1 Corinthians 15:28 is understood to mean that they will repent, not that
they will be annihilated.27
While a soul is undergoing the process of purification, it is also a time of instruction.
He sees the process largely in intellectualist terms, and even speaks of a 'school of
souls' after death28. Origen gives two opinions on where this might occur; in the first,
the saints will dwell in the air between heaven and earth; in the second, they will dwell
in a special place on earth, identified with the earthly paradise. (Genesis 2:8). In both
places, they do the same thing; they gain full knowledge of the things they have seen,
and the reasons why things are so. In the 'school of souls', the well-trained and alert
soul will quickly pass from there into the air, and from the air into the heavens. The
heavens have many stages through which the soul passes. (John 14:2). The presence of
Christ pervades everywhere, since he is not confined to his corporeal body. When the
soul attains the perfection of this knowledge, it is led by Christ to contemplate the
Father 'face to face'. (I Corinthians 13:12).29 It is interesting to note Origen's theory of
successive steps in the soul's ascent, which, according to his exegesis of the
Pentateuch, are prefigured in the successive stages of the wilderness wanderings.
Gregory of Nazianzus, in his panegyric on his brother Caesarius, reflects on the
intermediate state, believing that, at death, when freed from the limitations of its
physical body, every good soul "immediately begins to sense and perceive the
blessings that await it."30 He sometimes speaks of an eternal and avenging fire, but
also that punishment after death is medicinal. He implies that God will finally
consume evil, and that the goal of the universe is the union of all creatures with God.
Gregory ofNyssa is probably the theologian most influenced by Origen, for example,
in his concept of apokatastasis, the restoration of humanity to an original state of
perfection, unity with God in contemplative beatitude.31 He clearly shares Origen's
27 Ibid., 3,6.5.
28 Ibid., 2.11.6.
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hope for universal salvation. Although a few passages in his works allude to the
exclusion of sinners from God's city,32 Gregory makes it plain in many other places
that he believes God's plan will be ultimately realised in every creature. The
restoration to unity will touch "those now lying in sin,"33 and will include even those
previously condemned to hell.34
Again, as in Clement and Origen, Gregory maintains that in order to participate in the
eternal movement of endlessly knowing and loving God, every human being needs to
be purified in both these capacities. If such purgation (e.g. by purgative fire), is not
realised before death, it must take place after the resurrection. Gregory nowhere
asserts that sinners will be punished eternally. Such punishment could only be
vindictive, and God punishes only to separate the good from evil, and to draw it into
the communion of blessedness.35 The universalist conclusions of Origen and Gregory
as a matter of dogmatic certainty are unacceptable because of scripture's witness to a
'double outcome' of salvation for some, and condemnation for others.
No account of Patristic theology would be complete without mention of Augustine of
Hippo, because of the powerful influence he had upon all the Latin theology which
was to follow in the medieval period and beyond. The key to understanding his
eschatological hope is 'the sharp metaphysically grounded distinction he draws
between time and eternity'36. Time, for Augustine, is a created entity which will finish
on the last day - the 'place' in which we dwell, the place of change and corruption.
Eternity is the place where God dwells, the place of changelessness and incorruption.
Augustine defers the fate of believers until the End. He believes that the souls of the
dead are immediately judged at the end of their lives, and that they enter the place of
reward or punishment, without their bodies, although they may receive a sort of
likeness, a phantasm of their resurrection bodies. The prayers of the Church for the
forgiveness of sins, and even a purgative effect of temporal punishment, if it turns the
heart of the sinner away from himself to God, may release the souls of some from
32
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condemnation to salvation before the general resurrection.37 Yet Augustine is
contemptuous of attempts to see all punishment as purgative and therefore temporary,
and he devotes chapter 21 (17-21) in the City of God to repudiating the idea. He sees
all punishment as retributive in itself, but with the possibility of it occasionally having
a purgative side-effect.38
The question as to whether Augustine subscribes to a doctrine of purgatory has been
much debated, particularly with reference to 1 Corinthians 3:16. Thiselton maintains
that Augustine does envisage the possibility that to be saved 'through fire' may be
something close to a doctrine of purgatory, considering a kind of 'worldliness that is
venial' which may then be consumed in flames. Of such a fire of tribulation 'here or
hereafter' he comments - "this I do not contradict because possibly it is true."39
Thiselton detects some ambiguity in the City of God 21:13, but says that the passing
allusion to prayers for the dead in 21:24 is more telling in favour of Augustine's own
belief in purgatory.40
Augustine clearly rejects universal salvation. In his reply to Orosius, he invokes
Matthew 25:46 - "And so (the wicked) will go into eternal burning, and the just into
eternal life.41" In the same passage he sees another danger in allowing for universal
posthumous salvation. This would mean, in his opinion, that as there would be an end
to the punishment of the wicked, this would cast aspersions upon the reward of the
just. There might also be, in that case, the possibility that even the just would relapse
into the uncleanness of sin and death.42 The mere mention of such a possibility is
anathema to Augustine, but this thesis holds to the possibility of postmortem apostasy,
because it claims that humans retain libertarian freewill beyond death. There would be
little value in spiritual progress, if there were to be no options and no chance of
regressing. There can be no doubt for Augustine about the eternity of punishment for
37 "Not all who undergo temporal punishment after death will come to everlasting punishments which
will take place after the final judgment. For, some will be forgiven in the age still ahead, for what has
been forgiven in this age, so that they will not be subjected to eternal punishments of the coming age."
(Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 21:13.)
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the wicked and the unbaptised. The perpetual death of the damned, that is their
alienation from the life of God, will abide without end, and it will be the common
punishment of them all, whatever conjectures rising from human emotions, men may
make about the variety of punishments and the relief or intermission of their woes.
Many of the leading theologians of the Early Church opposed posthumous salvation,
opting instead for a dualistic eschatology. They included 2 Clement, Hippolytus,
Tertullian, Cyprian, John Chrysostom, the later Jerome, Augustine and Gregory the
Great. Jeffrey Trumbower identifies one conviction which they all had in common,
namely, that if God were to forgive non-Christians after death, and if it were possible
for non-Christian to repent after death, then there would be no pressure upon them to
amend their ways in this life. Such a view would threaten the authority of the Church,
as it "would not be the sole focus of salvation, and moral seriousness might go into
decline."43
A number of objections could be advanced to this line of thinking. Postmortem reward
or punishment ('pie in the sky when you die') should never be envisaged as supplying
prudential motives for virtuous living before death. Moral seriousness in this life
should be the fruit of faith, thus avoiding justification by works. The commitment of
faith arises in grateful response to God's redemptive love in Christ, and is unworthy if
it is made as a kind of self-centred insurance for admission eternal life. Also,
submission to Christ in this life brings the believer a joy and satisfaction which is quite
independent of any hope of eternal reward, or fear of eternal punishment. Conversion
to Christ, and the life which it brings could be offered to non-Christians with far more
honourable and immediate inducements, and the authority of the Church remain
unimpaired.
It will be obvious from the foregoing that the eschatology of Clement of Alexandria,
Origen and Gregory of Nyssa is a much more favourable arena for identifying the
possibility of posthumous salvation than a dualistic eschatology. Posthumous salvation




purgatory in the West; prayers now for mercy at the final judgment in the East. To
these matters attention will now turn in the following section of this chapter.
(b) The Medieval Period
Eschatology in the Middle Ages follows on naturally from the time of Augustine with
the belief that there is an intermediate state between death and resurrection when
human souls enjoy rest or suffer affliction while awaiting, either the completion of
their salvation, or the consummation of their damnation.44 The transition from the
Patristics to the early Middle Ages is marked in particular by Gregory the Great, in
Book IV of the Dialogues - a pastoral, rather than a theological work, which speaks in
terms of visions and wonders. It is clear from visions, that, at death, the soul is thought
to pass to an incorporeal existence.45 The perfect go straight to heaven. Despite their
disembodied state, souls know and consort with each other. The dead are occasionally
revived, either to warn others, or to be given a second chance. It is clear that Gregory
believes that the soul's postmortem existence is related to the quality of its life here in
this world. The soul must therefore endure a period of purgation after death. As he
holds that this existence of the soul will be more active than that envisaged in the
biblical and Greek traditions, he thinks that it will be necessary to move the cleansing
fire from the Last Day to the day of death 46 Yet it is not at all clear that Gregory
intends to teach that the soul actively and literally undergoes punishment immediately
upon the death of the body, and there is no developed doctrine of purgatory in his
writings. Finally, hell is described as an eternal death for the souls of the wicked.
When we move from the sixth to the late tenth century, Aelfric of Eynsham can be
taken as a typical theologian of the period. Like Gregory, Aelfric teaches that in the
intermediate state there is an active existence for the soul in which it suffers eternal or
temporary punishment, or enjoys eternal bliss until the fullness of time. The soul has
the likeness of the body in all its members, and can therefore experience comfort or
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purgation, suffer as long as is necessary. The saints, on the other hand, dwell in
heaven, interceding for the living and those undergoing purgation. Again, however, as
in Gregory, the doctrines relating to purgatory for this period, remain peripheral and
unarticulated47.
Peter Abelard (1079-1142) is another prominent medieval theologian. One of the main
points of interest for this thesis in his theology concerns the fate of unbaptised
children. Abelard finds himself unable to follow the hard-line beliefs of Augustine,
which held sway until his time. Sin, in the sense of guilt cannot be passed on from
parents to children, since newborn children, lacking reason, and so freewill, cannot
incur guilt. How can God be just in damning them, as Augustine believes he does, if,
as Abelard holds, they have not inherited the guilt of Adam'sin? He asks, whether
among humans, we would not consider it as a very great evil, if an innocent son was
consigned to "transitory earthly flames, not to speak of eternal ones" because of his
father's sin.48 Abelard answers, by claiming in principle, that whatever God decides, is
for the best, even ifwe cannot understand why; but, in any case, it is possible to show
how the damnation of unbaptised children is for their good. Their damnation, Abelard
suggests, merely consists in deprivation of the beatific vision; and, he claims, God
allows to die unbaptised, those who, he has foreseen, would have been very wicked,
had they lived and merited severer punishments 49
Abelard's position on the salvation of good pagans who lived before Christ, is also of
interest. With Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux he argues that, just as
baptism is the remedy for original sin under the New Law, so the Old Law has its
remedy - circumcision, (though enjoined only on Jewish males), and so does natural
law with its gifts and sacrifices. Pagan lack of faith presents a more serious obstacle,
but Abelard believes that many good pagans who lived before the coming of Christ are
saved. Faith in the incarnation was available to the ancients to follow if they chose,
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through prophecies which were the result of supernatural revelation. Also, he believes
that God does not deny grace to those who live as well as they can by natural law.50
The outstanding theologian of the high Middle Ages is Thomas Aquinas. Since his
views are so influential, they require more extended treatment. Aquinas follows
Aristotle in holding that the soul "is the form of the body", and that "it is... contrary to
the nature of the soul to be without a body."51 Therefore, after death, since the soul is
the form which determines the matter of the body, it carries, in the intermediate state, a
natural orientation towards forming a body. In this state, however, it is imperfect, and
it is therefore impossible for the soul to be perfectly happy. It cannot fulfil all its
potentialities, and thus, in a sense, longs for the resurrection, when body and soul will
be reunited. 52A1so, punishment, like ultimate reward, demands reunion of soul and
body.53 He believes that there is no reason, in the case of the infliction of punishment,
or the bestowal of reward, why souls should wait for the resumption of their bodies.54
This is because the soul, in its operation of the will, directs the body in acts of sin or
love, and not the body the soul. Even before the resurrection of their bodies, the souls
of the pious can enjoy God on a par with the spiritual angels who enjoy the vision of
him in heaven.55 If it be asked how souls awaiting their bodies can suffer punishment
when such punishment is described in the Bible in terms of bodily torment by fire,
Aquinas argues that such descriptions contain metaphorical elements pointing to
torture by remorse of conscience.56 Purgation is necessary because a soul which
ultimately is going to be rewarded must be 'entirely purified.'37 This involves there
being a double judgment - an individual one at death, and a general judgment at the
end. The apocalypse would then only be the ratification of the judgment of the soul at
the hour of death - which would appear to detract from its value and critical function.
These views obviously imply an increased importance of purgatory. Those who have
not been purged while living, must not be consigned to eternal punishment, but must,
in their disembodied state, be allowed to complete their satisfaction. It is noteworthy,
50
Abelard, P., ibid., 200, 446-50.
51













however, that Aquinas holds out no hope of postmortem repentance. He maintains that
when the soul separates from the body at death, no further changes can take place in a
person's will, either from good to evil, or from evil to good.58
Aquinas's position on unbaptised children is that he regards them as ineligible to
admittance to heaven, and, to accommodate them, he promotes the hypothesis of
limbo, a term which is derived from the Latin limbus, meaning 'fringe', denoting the
fringe of hell.
The topic of eschatological evangelisation is addressed from time to time by
theologians in the medieval Church. Sanders, however, identifies two factors which
hinder them from reaching a clear solution to the problem, as follows:
1. They are simply unaware of how many unevangelised there
actually are. Aquinas thinks that there are only a handful of such
people. The magnitude of the problem only becomes evident after the
great explorations and discoveries of new lands in the 15th and 17th
centuries.
2. When the question of salvation outside the Church is brought up, it
is typically directed to heretics and schismatics rather than the
unevangelised.59
The position of pre-Christian pagans is not considered to the same extent.
Aquinas, at least in his earlier writings, believes that nearly everyone has had an
adequate opportunity to hear the Christian message. Ignorance of the basic elements of
Christian faith would be rare indeed. Medieval Christians know that besides Christians
there are also Jews and Moslems, but these people have heard enough about Christ not
to have the excuse of invincible ignorance. To be completely ignorant of the gospel, a
person would need to be totally isolated from the civilised world, as in the case of a
child who had been "brought up in the forest or among wild beasts."
From this, it seems obvious that the destiny of the unevangelised is a much more
pressing problem in the 21st century than in the 13th. In the later Middle Ages, as they
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gospel, greater attention comes to be paid to the question - What about the fate of
those who remain outside the sphere of human preaching? Will they be damned
without hearing about Christ? The guiding principle is that no-one is damned without
an opportunity for salvation. Aquinas is quite clear that God will send the message of
the gospel to them. His position is that everyone since the time of the incarnation must
believe the general articles of the Faith, the trinity, the incarnation and the
resurrection.
Referring to the handful of people who, he believes, remain to be evangelised, those
'brought up in the forest or among wild beasts,60' for such people, he believes that
God in his providence will give them what is necessary for salvation. This would
happen, either through interior illumination for someone who used his natural reason
in choosing good and avoiding evil, or, by the sending of a preacher, as Peter was sent
to Cornelius. (Acts 10:20). If Aquinas is right in this contention, then it could be
argued that postmortem evangelism would not be necessary. This thesis, however, will
argue that even if a person chooses good rather than evil by the use of natural reason,
this in itself would not be sufficient for salvation. Also, Aquinas's other alternative is
unacceptable, because the failure of preachers to reach the unevangelised would be
due, not to shortcomings in God's providence, but because, in receiving the gift of
freewill from God, the Church on earth simply failed to undertake its mission
effectively.
There is speculation that Aquinas in his later work, the Summa Theologicie is no longer
confident that God would send a preacher, to make sure that a person who was "doing
what lay in his power" would not lack the possibility of coming to explicit faith in
Christ. Sullivan quotes J.de Guibert, and suggests that as he grew older Aquinas came
to realise that it wasn't only the rare "child brought up in the wilderness" but whole
nations who had never had the gospel preached to them. Sullivan believes that
Aquinas then fell back upon Augustine's belief that they were ignorant of the gospel
because God was punishing them for their sin, at least original sin.61 Sullivan goes on
to mention other indications that Aquinas may have come to know that it might not
have been so rare that only a handful could not have known Christ. He notes that in the
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13th century, Franciscan and Dominican missionaries had penetrated quite far into
Asia, and that Marco Polo had come back from China. Sullivan's conclusion is that
when Aquinas spoke of people who had never heard of Christ, he was thinking of
isolated individuals rather than of whole nations, because the "renown" of the gospel
had spread to all nations in his day, but it had not reached every individual.
On Sanders's second point regarding heretics and schismatics, Aquinas holds that the
only kind of unbelief that would not be culpable is that of a person who had heard
nothing about the faith. He explains:
Unbeliefmay be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so
that a man may be called an unbeliever, merely because he does not
have faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to
the faith, in which sense a person refuses to hear the faith or despises
it. It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense
that unbelief is a sin.62
People in the first category would not be damned for lack of faith, but for personal sins
which "cannot be taken away without faith." The Summa fails to come up with the
solution found in his earlier work, that to such individuals God would provide the
means by which they could arrive at an act of saving faith.
A third factor which Sanders could have mentioned as a hindrance to medieval
theologians is that they had no idea of the age of the world. Modern science has
revealed the fact that there have been humans on the planet for many millennia before
the biblical era. The numbers in this category must run into billions for whom there
had been no opportunity to hear the gospel of salvation. This is a fact which could
never have occurred to Aquinas and other medieval theologians.
Aquinas believes that every human being is condemned because of both original sin
and (if they live long enough), actual sin63. For adults to achieve salvation from this
condemnation, an 'act of faith' is necessary64. As this is a central concern for the main
theme of this thesis, careful scrutiny must be given to what he means by an 'act of
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faith'. Aquinas follows Augustine in believing that the faith required for salvation has
always in some sense, been faith, not only in God, but also in Christ, as the one
mediator of salvation. He comes, however, to recognise that faith in the one mediator
could be implied in that faith in God which is described in Hebrews 11:6 - "And
without faith it is impossible to please God, because anyone who comes to him must
believe that he exists, and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him."
Who would qualify as having this faith? Aquinas makes a sharp distinction between
clergy and laity in this regard, allowing lay believers a greater margin of error in the
doctrines they are required to believe for salvation. He also classes Gentiles who lived
before the Christian era in the same category as the laity. All that would be required of
them would be a vague knowledge ofGod's desire to save them.65 There are, however,
much stricter guidelines for lay people living after the incarnation. They have to
believe in Jesus Christ and the Trinity in order to be saved, but they do not require to
have such a clear and accurate understanding of the doctrines as the clergy.66
Aquinas holds strongly to the universal salvific will of God. It is because it is God's
desire to save everyone that, in his providence, he makes available to each person the
essential prerequisite for salvation, except in those cases where the person himself
provides the obstacle. While holding that God desires all to be saved, Aquinas,
however does not believe that all will be saved. Nor does he hold out any hope of an
opportunity for repentance after death. He specifically asserts that when Christ
descended into hell, he did not effect the release of any souls there.
The Middle Ages witnesses a steady development of the concept of purgatory. The
idea which has been foreshadowed in the writings of Clement of Alexandria and
Augustine becomes popular through the Dialogues of Gregory the Great (c. 540-604).
He says that a purging fire will cleanse the soul from minor faults (venial sins) before
judgment, and that the prayers of others and the sacrifice of the mass can free a soul
67








Aquinas produces the classic formulation of purgatory. He says that, in purgatory,
suffering takes place for unforgiven guilt for light or venial sins.68 This suffering -
more painful than the greatest pain in this life — and caused by actual fire, varies with
the measure of guilt. The pain is accepted voluntarily, the sinner knowing it is the last
stage of preparation for heaven. He admits, however, that neither the Bible nor reason
enables us to locate purgatory. It is noteworthy that the doctrine implies that there will
be, for the individual, a 'particular judgment' at death when he or she is confronted by
the whole truth of the life they have lived, and are made 'their own judge.' If they die
in faith in Christ, their sins, indeed, are forgiven, but they are not yet purged of their
sins. They have not yet expiated them, by suffering the necessary temporal
punishments. The goal is the perfecting of the person in accordance with God's plan
and purpose. In later centuries, the fire is generally considered to be a metaphorical
description of a spiritual experience. Moltmann refers to it as the light and fire of
God's eternal love experienced by the believing soul after death. It burns away the sins
which separate the soul from God, and draws the soul to God.69 It comes to be
regarded, not as pain inflicted externally, but rather the intrinsic pain which arises
when the ego-centred self is surrendered so that the God-centred self of love may take
its place.
While the doctrine of purgatory enriches the notion of personal responsibility, it does
not lead to any idea of a second chance being given after death, to put right what has
been rejected or destroyed in this life. The decisions we make in this life are regarded
as having eternal consequences, and the idea of purgatory is strictly for people with
unfinished penance.
Possibly the biggest influence on the popular mind of ideas relating to purgatory
comes, not through the work of a theologian, but through the poetry of a layman -
Dante Alighieri.70 In the Divine Comedy, Dante borrows imagery from the descent of
Aeneas to the underworld, in Vergil's Aeneid He pictures purgatory as lying on a
mountain of purification with seven stages, a mountain that reaches from earth to
heaven. In The Inferno there is a vivid account of the outermost circle of hell, where
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there is untormented sadness' — that is to say, no bliss, but no torment either. Here,
there is to be found limbo. There is supposed to be a limbus infantium, for infants, and
a limbus patrum for Old Testament patriarchs. In the Divine Comedy, Dante even
proposes a limbo for such greats as Socrates, Plato and Vergil. The theory is that while
children may be innocent of personal sin, they are still in a state of original sin, so they
remain in limbo for eternity. Augustine had held that unbaptised children only suffer
some mild degree of punishment compared to adults. In any case, he argued, such
punishment is better than complete annihilation. Dante asks his guide through hell if
any have ever left hell for paradise. He is told that when Jesus descended into hell, he
removed the saints from Old Testament times, such Adam, Abel, Abraham and David.
They were delivered because they believed the special revelation about the Messiah. In
The Paradiso, Dante directly addresses the question ofGod's justice in relation to the
unevangelised:
A man is born in sight of Indus water, and none there to speak of
Christ, and none to read or write. He died unbaptised and cannot
receive the saving faith. What justice is it damns him? Is it his fault
that he does not believe?
Dante's guide responds:
To this high empery, none ever rose but through belief in Christ, either
before or after his agony.
Dante, therefore, holds that explicit knowledge of Christ is necessary for the salvation
of those who have lived both before and after the incarnation. Yet this principle does
not mean that all the unevangelised are damned, for in Canto 20, he places some noble
pagans in heaven. Dante concludes his discussion of salvation for the unevangelised
by saying:
Mortals, be slow to judge! Not even we who look on God in heaven
know, as yet, how many he will choose for ecstasy.
The Council of Florence in 1439 made purgatory the official doctrine of the Church.
The Western Church came to the belief that hell and purgatory are not identical, and
70 The references to Dante's works are taken from Sanders, J., No Other Name, op.cit., 160-2.
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thus they differed from the Eastern Church on two points - namely, that purgatory is a
place distinct from hell, and that the souls are punished therein by corporeal fire. The
Greeks held to the view that fire must be understood as a figure of speech in the
intermediate state, since the immaterial soul could not suffer from material fire - that
the suffering is spiritual is an idea, much more congenial to modern minds.
It is worth commenting on the fact that the developed medieval doctrine of purgatory
in the Church of Rome, differed considerably from the teaching, for example, of
Origen. Origen had held that the soul, after death, remains free to choose good or evil,
and so, even after this life, may fall again, as well as rise. This differs markedly from
the official Church view in, say Aquinas, and later in the Councils of Florence and
Trent, that a persons' fate is decided at death; that purgatory does not offer fresh
opportunities of repentance; and that it purifies only those who repented and believed
during their earthly life. The position maintained at Florence, for example, was, that if
the faults which deprive the soul of sanctifying grace in this life are not wiped out
then, it is useless to expect them to be wiped out beyond the grave. The arguments of
the Council, therefore, renounce the hypothesis of postmortem conversion or
evangelisation. The Council of Trent also reaffirmed the practice of praying for the
dead, following on from Aquinas' belief that Christ' descent into hell set us the
example of love, to come to the assistance of our friends in purgatory. As already
indicated, this thesis follows Origen rather than Aquinas in its concept of purgatory.
(c) The Reformation Period
The Reformation begins with a dispute over the practice of indulgences. They had
been introduced in the 11th and 12th centuries, and soon they come to be applied to the
punishment in purgatory. The Reformers and the Protestant Churches reject the idea of
purgatory as a place or state where the living can influence the fate of the departed,
and where the dead can make up deficiencies in their earthly lives. John Calvin, for
example, describing the abuses and futility of purgatory, calls the idea of purgatory a
revelation of Satan which can only be sustained through ignorant distortions of some
scriptural passages.71 1 Corinthians 3: 13-15 says that on 'the Day', a fire will test the
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work of each person, but there is no hint, in the text, of fire purifying a person. 2
Timothy 1:18 asks for "mercy from the Lord on that day" for Onesiphorus. Those who
use this verse as evidence of purgatory assume that Onesiphorus is dead, and that this
is a prayer for the dead. But the Reformers regard this as an unwarranted assumption
and a forced interpretation of the text. 2 Maccabees 12: 44-45, from the apocrypha, is
also quoted as giving scriptural support for the doctrine of purgatory, as Judas is said
to offer sacrifices and to pray for the dead to be freed from their sin, but Protestants
disregard this passage as it lies outside their canon of Scripture.72
In the 95 theses of 1517, which Luther pinned to the door of the Church in Wittenberg,
he reacts strongly against the abuse of indulgences, yet still affirms - "I am most
certain that there is a purgatory"73. Yet, due to the lack of a scriptural basis, and the
misuses connected with purgatory, he becomes more and more sceptical about its
reality, and in 1530, writes his Rejection ofPurgatory. In his Schmalkaldic Articles of
1537, he describes purgatory as an illusion of the devil, and to be discarded as error
and idolatry.
In addition to rejecting purgatory because of its lack of scriptural support, the
Reformers also regard it as undermining the central Reformation doctrine of
justification by faith. Luther, for example, holds that the sinner knows himself to be
justified by an eschatological act of pure grace, which anticipates Christ's ultimate
vindication of the sinner at the final judgment. The believer possesses a righteousness
which is real, though not yet fully realised. Since righteousness is primarily to be
thought of as imputed, it begs for a later eschatological realisation or 'impartation' at
the apocalyptic end of the world.74 It is the element of satisfaction in medieval theory
which most distresses Calvin, for it is Christ who is the propitiation for the sins of the
world. In his view, there is no other source of satisfaction or purgation beyond the
blood ofChrist, and he describes purgatory as "a dreadful blasphemy against Christ."
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That is to say, if Christ has made full expiation for our sins on Calvary, there is no
postmortem call for us to make further satisfaction, which would in any case smack of
righteousness ofworks which is anathema to the Reformers.
The rejection of the Roman Catholic concept of purgatory poses a lasting problem for
Protestant theologians. If the soul is not purified of earthly sins, what happens to it,
and where does it go after death? Also, what happens to the souls between the time of
death and the Last Judgment? During the 16th century there are two basic Protestant
schools of thought, attempting to answer these questions.
Firstly, for some Lutherans and for the Anabaptists, the soul 'sleeps' - free from pain,
but also free from consciousness. Luther inherits the medieval tradition of dualism,
that at death the soul is separated from the body, though on this point, he entertains
some doubt. In The Promotion Disputation ofPetrus Hegemon in 1545, he says that
"in death the spirit returns to the Lord". He believes that "the soul is separated from
the body", but that does not necessarily mean that "the body and soul are separate
things." Luther's view is that the soul of the deceased sleeps 'between heaven and
earth', and is then reawakened on the last day.75 What he means is that those who one
day waken, will have no idea at all as to how long they slept or where they were.76
Luther can describe the death of a Christian as a sleep, because he is freed from the
wrath of God. "Death is become my slumber," is the way in which he puts it in his
hymn paraphrase of Simeon's song (Luke 2: 29~32).77 A Christian then goes into death
calmly and peacefully, as though he were going to sleep and were not really dying. A
godless man, however, feels death and is eternally terrified by it.78 Luther makes
certain exceptions to the rule that the dead sleep. God can also, he says, awaken them
for a time - just as he allows those of us here upon earth to alternate between waking
and sleeping. In commenting upon the Parable of Dives and Lazarus (Luke 16: 19-31),
he infers that God may temporarily waken the dead from sleep, but adds that - "no
certain rule may be set up about this." 79Also, in his lectures on Genesis, he compares
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our sleep at night with the sleep of the soul at death. On earth, our body sleeps, and
our soul is awake, and thus has visions and hears conversations between God and the
angels. The same could apply to the soul asleep in death. 80There is, however, a certain
ambivalence about Luther's views, because elsewhere he talks about fellowship with
Christ immediately after death, perhaps with Philippians 1: 23 in mind. 81Speaking of
Urbanus Rhegius (the reformer ofLuneberg), Luther says:
We are to know that he is blessed and that he has eternal life and
eternal joy and participation with Christ in the heavenly Church.
This may seem at first sight to be irreconcilable with soul-sleep, but Althaus points
out that, for Luther, the two views are not incompatible, since the temporal
categories which we have here on earth do not apply after death. Earthly lapses of
time are then of little consequence. The intermediate state lasts for only a very short
time. When people die, the Last Judgment comes, either as soon as they die, or very
soon afterwards.82 If we were to enquire into Luther's beliefs about the location of
the dead, we would find that he is more interested in theological rather than
topographical discussion. He is certain that all who die in faith, have their 'peace' in
God's word and Christ's promise. The fathers of the Old Testament, he holds, rest in
Abraham's bosom; that is the word of promise given to Abraham83.They 'rest' and
'sleep' in the bosom of Christ. This is Luther's definitive statement about the
condition of the departed.
Althaus draws attention to the fact that later Lutheran theology departs from the
concept of soul-sleep, reverting to the medieval tradition that souls live in a blessed
condition with Christ before the resurrection, even though they are without bodies.
84But, as Luther himself had pointed out, this would detract from the resurrection itself
- "It would take a foolish soul to desire its body when it was already in heaven."85
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Soul-sleep, is unacceptable to this thesis which argues for spiritual development and
sanctification in the intermediate state, which would necessitate consciousness.
The other prominent Protestant school of thought reacting to the rejection of purgatory
is that of Calvin and his followers. The Psychopcinnychia of Calvin was written with
the express purpose of opposing the Anabaptist idea of the sleep of the soul between
death and the final judgment. Calvin bases his position on the biblical view that the
souls of believers after death are in a state of alertness, with, and in, Christ, actively
praising him, and waiting for the resurrection of the body.
Like Luther, Calvin believes that death marks the separation of the soul from the body.
The soul, freed from the body, enters the sphere of blessedness. Death is the end of the
fight for believers, since they no longer have to struggle against the desires of the
flesh.86
Calvin, therefore, agrees with Luther that the soul is immortal, but Quistorp draws a
distinction between Calvin's creationism and Lutheran traducianism.87 Calvin realises,
of course, the sinfulness of the soul, and that, in a certain sense, it too must die. But
this death is a spiritual death - something different from the death of the body. But
Jesus Christ is the saviour from this death of the soul. Calvin pictures the life of the
believer's soul as an upward progress. There are various stages, one beginning at
death, when the soul enters upon a blessed immortality. Here, Calvin differs
noticeably from Luther, in holding that this new postmortem life of the soul would be
destroyed if Luther's idea of 'soul-sleep' followed death. Calvin's eschatology, as
Torrance observes, is 'activist' whereas Luther's is 'quietist',88Calvin's protests
against soul-sleep, because he does not see how souls can grow and progress towards
the vision of sleep if "they become buried in the comatose condition of sleep". He
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describes the postmortem condition of the soul as one of 'rest'. The souls of the saved
attain eternal peace in death. They are in Abraham's bosom; they are already with God
and Christ. This rest of the soul is no idle leisure, for in its waking condition the soul
can display its capacities, particularly reason and will, to the honour of God, and thus
live out its true life. The rest of the soul also consists in peace of conscience, and
awareness of reconciliation with God through faith. As the intermediate state is, for
Calvin, one of the progress of the soul, we have here another difference from Luther's
beliefs, because Calvin regards the interim period between death and the last judgment
as a time period, according to the measure of our time. Lurking behind this issue, there
lies the important philosophical problem of time and eternity. We might also note that
although Calvin rejects purgatory, he allows progress towards perfection in the
intermediate state. Although the righteous, when they die, are with Christ, they do not
enjoy to the full, the great blessedness of heaven, which is not to be received until the
resurrection at the end of the age.89 With death, the saint enters immediately into
God's kingdom, which has begun, but is to be perfected. While the intermediate state
is a blessed state, it is imperfect, in Calvin's view without the body and its rewards.
The conclusion of this thesis will be much more in line with Calvin's thought than
with Luther's.
The other outstanding characteristic of this period is that it is, in Calvin's eyes, a time
of expectation. This expectation is no longer based on faith, but now on sight. Souls
await, indeed, what they have not yet, but they are nevertheless happy, because they
both realise their adoption in God, and see their future reward, resting in assured hope
of the resurrection. One would like to know more about how Calvin views the
intermediate state, but he discourages such speculation as imprudent, which is why
God has hidden the particular details from us.90
What, then, does Calvin have to say about the fate of the wicked after death? Here,
too, he opposes the doctrine of the soul's sleep, as there is no rest in death for the
impious. Their souls are agitated with the terrible fear of the judgment which awaits
them. They suffer a foretaste of hell, experiencing the fate which Jude allots to the
89 Calvin, Commentary on John 14:2.
90 Calvin, ibid., 81, 213.
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devils who are bound in chains until they suffer the punishment to which they are
condemned.91
Yeaton comments on this, that they are not confined to a given location, but are, in
some sense, free to move about at will.
If a man's fate is the same as that of the apostate angels, it would seem
that man's punishment would also be of a similar nature. If this is true,
man's punishment in the intermediate state would consist of:
1. Not living in God's presence.
2. Being held in 'chains'.
3. A lack of joy and the loss of the light ofGod, being instead in utter
darkness.
4. A loss of dignity.92
We might wonder whether Calvin makes any concessions, concerning the fate of those
who had not had an opportunity to hear and respond to the gospel. The answer is
clearly in the negative. His doctrine of predestination includes the idea that if some
people had not been given the opportunity to hear the gospel message, this is rightly
seen as a sign that God had predestined them to eternal damnation.93 This belief is, of
course, incompatible with this thesis's conclusion about the possibility of postmortem
evangelism.
Martin Luther appears to be much better disposed to the question of the salvation of
the unevangelised. Whether he could be regarded as one who supports universally
accessible salvation is unclear. At the very least, he does not appear to oppose 'the
wider hope'.
91 Jude 6, in Calvin, Institutes, 3.25.6.
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World had not, until now, had a chance to hear the gospel preached, is a manifest sign that all their
ancestors were among the reprobate, for if God had willed their salvation, he would have made it
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Huldrych Zwingli is another Reformer, who like Calvin, attacks purgatory because it
conflicts, in his belief, with salvation which is through faith in Christ. Also, because he
does not accept the apocryphal books as canonical, he rejects Maccabees as support
for the doctrine.94 For Zwingli, faith in Christ is central, and if we have to make
atonement for our sins in purgatory, this makes Christ's death on the Cross of no avail.
He might be said to have died in vain.95 Zwingli also believes that those who die
without faith are condemned irrespective of election.96 Moreover, he rejects the use of
the sacrament as a viaticum, or nourishment for the road, once people are dead,
because they are then off the road. Either, they are with God in which case they no
longer need the sacrament, or, they are condemned and therefore have no further use
for it97
Before the Reformation period is left behind, it is worth enquiring how the
Reformation Confessions regard these matters. The Westminster Confession of Faith,
in particular, includes ideas which show the long-standing influence of the
Augustinian tradition. Continental theology, stemming from Calvin is also expressed
in many of its Articles, and Scots representation at the Dutch Synod ofDort in 1619,
influenced the writings of Scottish theologians, such as David Deelisch and Samuel
Rutherford.98 The Westminster Confession also draws upon the writings of English
Puritans who learned their theology from other Zurich theologians, notably Bullinger.
The covenant theology of the Puritans can be added to the Augustinian theology of the
Brelist tradition, and the Reformed theology of the continent as the major influences
upon the Westminster divines. On the destiny of the unevangelised, the Westminster
Confession has this to say:
Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ
through the Spirit, who worketh when, where and how he pleaseth.
94
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So, also, are other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly
called by the ministry of the Word."
This would appear to permit the salvation of some unevangelised, but, on the other
hand, the writers do specifically rule out the idea that:
people not professing the Christian religion, be saved in any other way
whatsoever, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to
the light of nature and the law of that religion they do profess.100
This would appear to be designed as a safeguard against any idea that another religion
could be a permitted way of approaching God. The general teaching of both the
Westminster Confession and the Second Helvetic Confession is that the souls of
believers, immediately after death, enter upon the glories of heaven, where they await
the full redemption of their bodies, whereas the souls of the wicked after death, are
cast into hell, and, for disembodied souls, there is, according to scripture, no other
destination, apart from heaven and hell.101
In conclusion, one would say that the Reformers hold out little hope of posthumous
conversion, and certainly Calvin would reject any possibility of repentance after death.
He does, however, believe in an intermediate state, where believers make progress
towards perfection.
Despite the rejection of purgatory at the Reformation, a case can be made out for
modernising the concept.102 Apart from its scriptural basis, the argument for a
Protestant version of purgatory arises from the fact that when we die, no-one is
perfect. The process of sanctification, even if begun in this life, has some way to go
beyond death. Even although believers have been justified by faith, they require daily
to 'die to sin'. Growth in holiness implies development from a worse state of soul to a





102 W.R. Matthews was a prominent supporter of the idea of a modernised version of purgatory, as
follows - "To me the idea of an intermediate state has many attractions. Ofhow many people could we
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better state. Whereas in heaven perfection will have been reached, in the intermediate
state, sins still have to be repented of, and impurities cleansed before the soul is ready
for perfect communion with God. It is likely that the postmortem encounter with
Christ will effect a more powerful spiritual growth than usually occurs before death.
There would be no complete break between life here and life hereafter. The departed
spirit would progress from where it left off at death. The personality would retain
memory, otherwise it would not be the same person. The sins of the past would come
before the awakened conscience in their true colours. Exactly how such continuity
would be achieved is shrouded in mystery, but it is here that Polkinghorne makes an
interesting suggestion. If, as this thesis contends, resurrection of the body is more
likely than immortality of the soul, there requires to be a new creation of the
personality by God. The continuing link, Polkinghorne, surmises, could be an
"information bearing pattern" which God imparts to the recreated soul, from his
knowledge of its past life.103 As freedom of the will continues beyond death, being
part of the dignity of responsible human beings, there would be the possibility of
spiritual regression as well as development. In those souls habituated to evil ways and
rejection of God, the spark of the divine might be so faint as to be beyond revival.
Such a degraded soul would be on the way to annihilation. In order for there to be
spiritual development or its opposite, temporal categories would seem to apply in the
intermediate state; souls would be at varying stages of development, and it is far from
clear when a soul would reach such a state that it could graduate to the beatific vision
and full communion with God in heaven. The period of purgation could vary from
individual to individual, but there can be no assurance on whether some perfected
souls attain heaven before the final consummation at the end of history, or whether the




Polkinghorne says: "It is a perfectly coherent hope that the information-bearing pattern that is a
human being could be held in the divine memory after that person s death.. .It is a further coherent
hope, and one for which the resurrection of Jesus provides the foretaste and guarantee, that God in the
eschatological future will re-embody this multitude of information-bearing patterns in some new
embodiment of God's choosing." - Polkinghorne, J., The God ofHope and the End ofthe World,
(London: SPCK., 2002), 107-8.
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In this chapter, the development of the idea of an intermediate state has been traced
through the teaching of the Early Church Fathers, building upon the foundation of
scripture. Dualist thinking which pictures judgment taking place at death with the just
entering upon eternal bliss and the unjust consigned to eternal damnation gives way to
Alexandrian theology with the intermediate state becoming a state of purification and
healing. The pendulum swings back with the influential theology of Augustine,
rejecting posthumous conversion and universalism in favour of the 'double outcome'.
Belief in purgation in an intermediate state becomes more prominent in the medieval
period, especially in the thought of Aquinas, the major theologian of the period.
Again, there is no hope of postmortem repentance, and the destiny of the
unevangelised is not a significant problem. A marked shift in eschatological thinking
occurs at the Reformation, with the rejection of purgatory because of lack of scriptural
support, and since it is held to undermine justification by faith. Distinctions between
the positions of Luther and Calvin are noted, particularly in regard to soul-sleep.
While the 'wider hope' is not opposed by Luther, Calvin's doctrine of predestination
rules out any possibility of salvation for the unevangelised.
It is interesting to note that some of the ideas promoted by opentheists in the modern
period are not original to them, but were held by theologians in the earlier periods
described in this chapter. For example, the salvation of good pagans who lived before
Christ, a belief held by the opentheist, John Sanders, is to be found in the writings of
Peter Abelard in theearly 12th century. Moreover, Aquinas held views which were
similar to Clark Pinnock's inclusivism. One of opentheism's basic axioms - the
universal, salvific will of God is also to be found in the theology of Aquinas. Also, the
refusal of opentheists to allow for postmortem repentance and "second chances" had
been the position of the Reformers many centuries before.
The main contributions made by theologians of the Patristic, Medieval and
Reformation periods to the conclusions of this thesis derive from the continuing belief
in an intermediate state with the prospect of gradual spiritual growth, including
medicinal purgation - views particularly evident in the Alexandrian theology of
Clement, Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. Where this thesis departs markedly from the
earlier periods is in its rejection of Augustinian dualist eschatology and predestination,
and in its advocacy of postmortem repentance. The following chapter considers an
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article of the faith of the Early Church which takes a more positive view of the






CHRIST'S DESCENT INTO HELL
The idea that Christ spent some time in the realm of the dead between his death and
resurrection is widespread in the New Testament. A number of other early Christian
texts also assume the presence of Christ and, in some cases, of the apostles, in the
underworld. As will be noted, these traditions persisted right down to Augustine, and
indeed, even later. It will be necessary to explore the possibility that the visit and stay
of Christ in the underworld was understood in these biblical and patristic texts as a
mission to effect some kind of posthumous rescue. In this study, therefore, of the final
destiny of the unevangelised, the descent of Christ into hell assumes particular
importance.
(a) The Descent in the Creeds
In popular thought, the "descent into hell" is usually associated with the article of the
Apostles' Creed -"He descended into hell". This article was one of the latest additions
to the Creed. Its first credal appearance was in the Fourth Formula of Sirmium of 359,
which affirmed that the Lord had "died and descended to the underworld, and
regulated things there, when the gates of hell saw and shuddered"1. There are early
references to the descent in the sources of various eastern creeds; it was also included
in the Athanasian Creed, composed about the middle of the fifth century, and
accepted by both East and West, probably reaching western formularies under
influence from the East. It did not finally become part of the universally accepted
Apostles' Creed until the eighth century, although, before that, it is mentioned in local
forms of that Creed. There have been various opinions regarding the source of the
idea. A large group of modern Protestant scholars, of whom Beare is a notable
representative, have detected an application to Christ of a redemption myth, common
in the ancient world (best known in the ancient story of the Descent of Ishtar to the
underworld)2. Yet, Kelly rejects this source, maintaining that the doctrine need have
had no connection with pagan mythology, though he concedes that similar parallels
appeared there. The notion derives, rather, from Judaeo-Christian ideas about the
condition of the soul after death3. It was a common assumption in Second Temple
Judaism, and also in Greek thought of the period, that the dead existed in an
underworld, termed Sheol or Hades. Early Christians would therefore naturally
1
Kelly, J.N.D., Early Christian Creeds (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1950), 378
2 See Dalton, W.J., Christ's Proclamation to the Spirits, (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1965), 21.
3
Kelly, J.N.D., op'.cit., 380.
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believe that Christ, by virtue simply of his death, would enter the underworld. 4 The
idea of a descent would appear to presuppose the ancient cosmology, according to
which, there was a vast cavern under the earth, forming the abode of departed shades.
Von Balthasar, however, believes that it does not necessarily imply a 'mythical three-
story world picture', but expresses rather the way in which ordinary people regarded
light and heaven as situated 'above' darkness, and the world of graves 'below.'5
However that may be, the idea of a descent into this region only occurred in the later
apocalyptic literature (e.g. the Book ofEnoch)6.
It is interesting to enquire into the motives at work in the insertion of the clause into
the Creed. In early times, the descent of Christ's soul to Hades was used as an
argument against the Apollinarian denial of a human soul in Christ. The soul of Christ
was thought to be that of a mere man by death, but Christ came with a soul which
could not be kept in bonds, in order to burst the bonds of those kept in bonds, and to
give them freedom. If, however, polemical motives are to be sought with the intention
of combating heresy, Kelly believes that Docetism would be the obvious target, and
that the details of our Lord's experiences were elaborated to underline the reality of
his death7. Pannenberg probes more deeply into the intention with the view that the
article was inserted in order to describe in more detail what happened to Jesus when
he died. Death, for him, was more than a physical experience. He suffered the same
fate as human beings do - death as the consequence of sin, which meant that they
were shut out from God and salvation.8
(b) The Descent in the New Testament
In turning to the New Testament to find scripture warrant for the descent, scholars
such as Ayo9 and Schwarz 10are united in maintaining that it is nowhere explicitly
mentioned in the New Testament, and that, therefore, it is not possible to construe a
doctrine of an actual descent ofChrist to hell or the deceased. Yet it may be suggested
4
MacCullocli, J.A., The Harrowing ofHell, (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1930), 313. - "The disciples
must have believed that the soul of Christ between his death and resurrection, was in the Intermediate
State, or Hades, whether in the better part of it, or, more vaguely, within its bounds". See also
Bauckham, R., The Fate ofthe Dead: Studies on the Jewish and ChristianApocalypses (Leiden: Brill,
1998), 38. - "Since tire commonest Jewish view in New Testament times was that all tire dead descend
to She'ol (Hades), Jesus' descent to Hades was simply the corollary of his death".
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in several passages. St Matthew 12:40 describes the Son ofMan as being "three days
and nights in the heart of the earth" - a passive stay in the realm of the dead. Hanson
maintains that this verse definitely implies a descensus ad inferos,n but Wayne
Grudem, on the other hand, believes that it simply refers to the fact that Christ was in
the grave between his death and resurrection.12 Texts such as Revelation 1:18, where
Christ is said to possess the keys to the underworld, and can open its gates, portray
him as the one who has won the victory over the powers of death and Hades. At other
places, in the context of Christ's death and resurrection, the redemption of some or all
of the dead is mentioned. This is particularly so in St Matthew 27:51-53 which
describes the incident of the raising of the dead saints. The description of them as
'saints' indicates that, while they were alive before the coming of Christ, they had
proved themselves worthy. Trumbower describes it as a "posthumous rescue, but not
posthumous salvation", since the passage does not make it clear "whether these
raised-up righteous ones died again, ascended into heaven, or were still living on
earth as the author wrote."13 The rescue, which occurred almost before the crucified
Christ breathed his last, was thought by various Patristic writers to be connected with
Christ's appearance in Hades.
Support for the idea of the descent has been principally found in the following five
passages - Acts 2:24-28; Romans 10:6-7; Ephesians 4:8-9; 1 Peter 3:18-20; 4:6
1. Acts 2:24-28.
Hanson detects behind v.24, "freeing him from the agony of death", an Aramaic or
Hebrew source, in which the phrase means that God "loosed the cords of death."14
Hence, the concept is ofChrist lying in the realm of death and being delivered from it
by God. We are prepared for a reference to the descensus, and he finds it in vv.25-28.
This is part of Peter's sermon on the day of Pentecost, where he is quoting Psalm
16:10. Grudem, however, holds that the Old Testament 'Sheol' here means simply
'the grave' or 'the state of death', and that Peter is using David's Psalm to show that
Christ's body did not decay, and that the passage, therefore, is about the resurrection,
and does not convincingly support the idea that Christ descended into hell.15
2. Romans 10:6-7.
11
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Some scholars, including, for example, Hanson 16and Stauffer,17 believe that St Paul's
belief in the descent can be deduced from a number of passages including Rom. 10:6-
7, where he says, "Do not say in your heart, 'Who will ascend into heaven?'" (that is,
to bring Christ down), "or, 'Who will descend into the deep?"' (that is, to bring Christ
up from the dead). This interpretation, however, is disputed by Grudem, who holds
that 'the deep' in v.7 refers not to hell as a place of punishment, but rather to a place
"that is inaccessibly low (the deep, or the realm of death)". Abyssos is a term often
used in the Septuagint for the depths of the ocean, but can also apparently refer to the
realm of the dead. He therefore concludes that "No clear affirmation or denial of a
descent into hell can be found in this passage."18
3. Ephesians 4:8-9.
In this passage the writer quotes from Psalm 68:18, and then asks:
What does 'he ascended' mean except that he also descended to the
lower earthly regions? He who descended is the very one who
ascended higher than all the heavens, in order to fill the whole
universe.
Hanson's position in supporting a reference to the descent is as follows:
The right interpretation seems to be that the author of Ephesians had
no difficulty in finding in Ps.68 a typological reference to the
resurrection and ascension of Christ, but that he could not find any
obvious reference to the descensus there, and therefore wrote w.9-
10.19
Grudem, again, opposes there being any reference to the descent here, and bases his
opinion on the NIV translation (which is used above), and which speaks of 'the lower,
earthly regions'. Grudem finds here a reference, not to a descent into hell, but to the
incarnation.20
W. Hall Harris, however, who has written a whole book on the descent to Christ in
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resurrection), but that it occurs after the ascension, and indicates that the ascended
Christ descended as the Spirit to impart gifts to his church. (4:11-16).21
4. 1 Peter 3:19.
The greatest scholarly comment by far, however, has been reserved for the two
passages in 1 Peter 3:19 and 4:6. In 1 Peter 3:18-20, we read:
For Christ died for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous,
to bring you to God. He was put to death in the body, but made alive
in the Spirit, through whom also he went and preached to the spirits in
prison who disobeyed long ago when God waited patiently in the days
ofNoah while the ark was being built.
If this letter is the work of St Peter, it would seem natural to think that these
sentences must be based on special knowledge given to St Peter by his Master
after the resurrection, which would make them authoritative. The passages,
however, abound with difficulty. The first question to be answered is - Who were
the 'spirits in prison'? They are either the souls of human beings who have died,
to whose souls Christ turned when he went to preach, or, they are supernatural
beings. If they are human souls, to which dead persons does the verse refer? Bigg
treats 3:19 and 4:6 as referring to the same event, and says that the context "seems
to imply that they (the spirits) were those of the men who refused to listen to
Noah." He cites Hebrews 12:23 as showing that pneumata can be used of the
spirits of human beings after death. The reference in 4:6 to the gospel being
preached to the dead, he believes, confirms this interpretation.22 Cranfield follows
Bigg in identifying the 'spirits in prison' as the generation of mankind that
perished in the Flood. They would be mentioned as being generally regarded as
the most notorious and abandoned of sinners. "If there was hope for them," says
Cranfield, "then none could be beyond the realm of Christ's saving power."23
There is a further reason why the Noachian sinners, overwhelmed in the Flood,
may have been specially mentioned at this point. Dublin alludes to this when he
observes that for Jews in the apostolic age, the waters of the Flood were the
waters leading to Hades, the abode of the dead. The disobedient in Noah's days
were thought of as examples ofwhat happened to the sinful when they entered the
21
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Abyss which is Hades. The "waters of the Flood were conceived of as the
abysmal waters which burst forth in judgment."24
A powerful point in favour of this interpretation is that it was the common tradition of
the Fathers of the Early Church who identified 'the spirits' as Noah's sinful
contemporaries, or else those Jews and Greeks who lived before the incarnation. This,
indeed, was by far the most strongly represented view up to Augustine.
Although the descent was a popular theme in earlier times, the first of the Early
Fathers to cite 1 Peter 3:19 specifically was Clement of Alexandria.25 Origen, too,
clearly understood the verse 3:19 in the same way,26 as did St Cyril of Alexandria.27
This interpretation, however, was later abandoned by the Fathers, as it could be taken
to imply the possibility of the conversion of sinners in the next world. Augustine
resorted to the possibility that the Petrine passages do not refer to hell or Christ's
descent at all. Maybe the "spirits shut up in prison" are people living now and "the
dead" are unbelievers, as in Christ's saying - "let the dead bury their own dead." (St.
Matt.8:22) 28This would mean that Christ, pre-existing in his divine nature, preached
to Noah's contemporaries, while they were still alive, imprisoned in sin and ignorance.
This line of interpretation was followed for more than a thousand years, but the
majority of scholars today regard it as far-fetched.
The other line of interpretation that 'the spirits in prison' are supernatural beings - the
fallen angels referred to in Genesis 6:1-4 - is supported by a powerful body of
scholarly opinion, including Selwyn, Dalton, Kelly, Best and Achtemeier. While there
are instances in the New Testament ofpneumata as the spirits of human beings, as
noted above by Bigg, Selwyn finds that it is used overwhelmingly to refer, not to
human dead, but to supernatural beings who are primarily malevolent.29 Achtemeier
notes the existence of a clear Jewish tradition recording the imprisonment of the
angelic beings of Gen.6:l-6, whose disobedience caused the Flood. The word used to
describe them is pneumata, and so, in Achtemeier's view should be understood as
non-human. (1 Enoch 13:6; 15:4,6,7).30
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He follows Kelly31 and Reicke 32in maintaining that it is this tradition which underlies
the reference here to 'spirits'. Yet, as Dublin points out, although the idea of fallen
angels in bondage is a favourite theme with Jewish apocalyptic writers, the idea of
Christ actually preaching to the fallen angels is one not found elsewhere in Christian
literature.33 It is interesting that Reicke, followed by Hanson,34 expresses the idea that
the phrase 'disobedient spirits' could cover both sinful human beings and fallen
angels.
The questions which now arise are - Where is the prison of these spirits, and when
did the 'preaching' take place? The precise location of the confinement is not clear,
although most scholars conclude that it describes a descensus ad inferos.. As to the
timing of Christ's journey, three solutions have been offered, according to Best.35 (a)
before his incarnation. This goes back to Augustine, but is out of sequence with the
thought of 3:18-22 which moves from Christ's death to his heavenly session, (b)
between his death and resurrection. As was noted above, other passages in the New
Testament could suggest such a journey during the interval. This was also the view of
Patristic writers beginning with Clement of Alexandria in the late second century, (c)
at the ascension. Best opts for the second solution, and Hanson and Cranfield agree, In
view of the latter's opinion that the spirits were the souls of dead people, it was
perhaps natural for him (and many others before him) to assume that the 'prison'
denoted the nether world (Sheol). Kelly, Dalton and Achtemeier, nevertheless, once
again present powerful arguments in favour of (c). Kelly notes the evidence from 1
Enoch 18:12-14 that the prison is an abyss at the end of heaven. According to 2
Enoch 1-3,36 dating from the early first century A.D., both the world of the dead and
the world of spirits, good and evil, are now located above the earth, and Enoch relates
how he came across the apostate angels, tormented and weeping, in the second
heaven. Kelly concludes that the context of the passage here in 1 Peter points
decisively to the upper regions, and advances three arguments in favour of the
ascension. Dalton rejects (b) in favour of (c), believing that the words "He was put to
death in the body but made alive by the Spirit". (1 Peter 3:18) refer to Christ' bodily
resurrection at the end of the triduum, and hence the preaching to the spirits took
place after that, that is, during the forty days between the resurrection and the
ascension. This preaching, he holds, took place in the realm of the air, which,
31
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according to him, is where the rebellious angels were confined. Trumbower is also
inclined to agree here with Dalton.37
The next question to be answered is - What was it that Christ preached? The
traditional view, supported by, among others, Beare38, Best,39 Cranfield40 and
Hunter41 is that he preached the gospel of salvation to dead human beings. They
interpret the verse in this way because it seems to them more satisfactory to take
'preached' in its normal New Testament sense, that is, the gospel. Additional
evidence cited is the identity of the verse with 1 Peter 4:6, where proclamation of
salvation to human dead is clearly found. Hanson, in supporting this view, advances
the conjecture that the opening verses of Psalm 89 may have been part of the
background of this passage. The words - "In the heavens shall thy truth be prepared."
(Ps.89:2) may provide a hint that Christ's message of salvation was preached to the
angelic powers. He believes that there is present in this passage, the idea that Christ in
his descensus turned the waters of chaos into the saving waters of baptism.42 Selwyn,
Kelly and Achtemeier, however, take a very different line. Selwyn notes that in
Roman 5:2, the Greek word used here, is there used of an angel's proclamation, and
he thinks that this neutral meaning is more probable here.43 Kelly, coming to the same
conclusion, makes two additional points. He draws a parallel between the post-
resurrection activity of Christ and the legendary mission of Enoch, declaring that
Peter saw Enoch as a type of Christ. His task had been to declare, not forgiveness but
doom to the apostles. Christ's 'proclamation to the spirits' could then be understood
as his triumphant announcement that their power had been finally broken Kelly's
second additional point is that such a message would stiffen the conscience of the
Asian Christians as they faced insults and attacks. Their attackers are merely
reproducing the rebellious characteristics of the demonic powers whose agents they
still are, and will surely share their destruction.44 Achtemeier follows Selwyn and
37
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Kelly, noting other New Testament passages in which kerussein is used in a strictly
neutral sense of 'proclamation', and also making the valid point that in the New
Testament, Satan and the evil angels are not to be rescued but condemned.45 This
condemnation is to be understood as the outcome of Christ's victorious rising from
the dead Yet doubts remain in one's mind about this interpretation. Stauffer and
Hanson, instead of finding a correspondence between the missions of Enoch and
Christ, contrast them. This contrast is well-expressed by Stauffer who observes that,
whereas the content ofEnoch's preaching to the fallen angels of Gen.6 in Hades was
God's eternal wrath, Christ's message, by contrast, when he descended to Hades, was
good news to the dead. Noah had failed to bring the wicked generation of the Flood to
repentance; the Flood swallowed them up, and their 'spirits' were imprisoned in
Hades - but into that same prison the crucified Christ, in his preaching, called them to
a decision with the message of salvation.46
This is also Hanson's opinion, for he notes that this is a Christian text, and so "the
redeeming mission of Christ is all-important here."47 This is persuasive, as a visit by
Christ to proclaim victory and to pronounce condemnation upon rebellious sinners,
even if they were minions of Satan, seems out of character for the Good Shepherd who
goes out to find and rescue a lost sheep. Reicke, nevertheless, advises caution about
reaching any conclusion about the purpose or result of the preaching48.
5. The other relevant passage in 1 Peter occurs at 4:6
For this is the reason the gospel was preached even to those who are
now dead, so that they might be judged according to men in regard to
the body, but live according to God in regard to the Spirit.
Bigg understands 'the dead' in v.6 in the same sense as 'the living and the dead' in
v. 5, and must include all the dead, and not merely those who perished in the Flood.
Death is the punishment which all human beings alike must pay, and so the object of
the preaching was the salvation of the dead.49 Best 50and Cranfield 51follow Bigg in
holding that the most natural interpretation is to connect it with 3:19, and to
45 Achtemeier, op.cit., 260 notes - "As the result of his resurrection, the powers of evil have been
defeated, and the risen Christ, on his way to the right hand ofpower, announces to the imprisoned














understand a reference to the 'spirits in prison'. In their view, the two texts probably
refer to the same occasion - Christ's descent to Hades. The meaning would therefore
be - "in order that though they have died as all men must (death itself being regarded
as God's judgment), they might nevertheless live by God's power in the spirit." In the
opinion of men, the dead have had their judgment, but the Good News has been
preached even among them in order that those who respond to it might live eternally.
Some of the early commentators (Hermas, Clement of Alexandria, Irenaeus and
Ignatius), restrict 'the preaching' to the just, guided probably by the mention of the
'saints' in Matt.27:52. But Bigg rejects this as he believes 3:20 clearly implies that St
Peter regarded the offer as having been made to all, though some might have rejected
the light in Hades.52
Dalton also finds the restriction of 'the preaching' to the just, unacceptable, as Wis.3:l
teaches that "the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God", and Wis. 5:15 that "the
righteous live for ever, and their reward is with the Lord", and so one would wonder in
what sense their life in 'Abraham's bosom' or in paradise was inadequate, so that
Christ had to preach to them in order that they might live."3
The same division among scholars occurs in the interpretation of 4:6 as was noted
above in 3:19. Some believe 'the dead' means the spiritually dead, but the reference in
v.5 almost certainly refers to the physically dead. Kelly notes that the aorist verb, 'was
preached', points to a definite occasion, not to a general availability of the gospel to
sinners; and he feels it to be improbable that 3:19 and 4:6 refer to the same event,
because the former speaks of 'spirits', meaning disembodied souls or supernatural
beings, whereas the latter speaks of 'dead persons' with no suggestion of
disembodiment. Once again Kelly alludes to the context and says it is hard to see what
comfort such verses would bring (under the traditional interpretation) to readers in
their trying situation. Kelly's conclusion is that "those who are dead" were people who
had lived in communities addressed by Christ. In response to his preaching, they had
become Christian, but had since died.54
Dalton and Achtemeier again follow Kelly, noting that the notion of disembodied
souls in Hades is a view of the after-life which is quite absent from the New
Testament. Kelly also believes that the possibility of repentance and conversion after








there is a reference to the Last Judgment in v.6, there is no mention of the rejection of
the wicked - whereas in the New Testament, the final judgment always has a double
outcome. Achtemeier concludes, as Kelly does, that the nekroi in this verse refers to
Christian dead who, during their lifetime, had heard and accepted the gospel, but who
had died prior to the return ofChrist. Again he sees the context as relevant55.
The interpretation of these verses by Cranfield and others seems attractive because it
appears to give scripture warrant to the doctrine of postmortem conversion. Pinnock,
for example, though admitting that the scriptural evidence for postmortem encounter is
"not abundant", nevertheless observes that it seems to have some support in 1 Peter
3:19-20 -"where the text sounds as if the dead are given an opportunity to respond to
Christ"56. Yet, the exegesis of these verses by Selwyn, Kelly and Achtemeier is
difficult to gainsay. The context is important. As Kelly and Achtemeier point out, if
these verses imply the possibility of conversion and repentance for rebellious sinners,
this would be of small consolation to those suffering persecution for their faith. What
would be the effect upon them if they were told that their attackers could well
eventually be confronted not with condemnation but with the gospel of salvation? That
would do nothing to lift their morale. But if the verses meant that Satan and his angelic
minions were to hear the proclamation of their defeat, then the stand of the persecuted
would be vindicated, and their morale undoubtedly raised.57
Powerful modern voices have, however, been raised in support of the traditional view.
For example, Hans Kiing includes 1 Peter 4:6 as evidence of a reconciliation for all,
and mercy for everyone, basing his view also on 1 Cor. 15:24-28 and Rom.5:18
^Nevertheless, no doubt conceding the ambiguity in the interpretation of the Petrine
passages, Kung is happier to appeal on more general grounds to the saving efficacy of
the Cross as having power also in the world to come, which was also the standpoint of
Origen in the third, and J.AT. Robinson in the twentieth centuries. Advocates of
postmortem conversion, who may be disappointed by the lack of fully-agreed, clear-
cut, unambiguous, scriptural endorsement of their position have also received much
55
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encouragement from the views of Keith Ward. Ward holds that the natural reading of
the Petrine passages is that Jesus's preaching is to the disobedient, and that preaching
is meant to lead to penitence. He rejects Dalton's interpretation of 1 Peter 3:19 as
referring to Jesus's condemnation of fallen angels, imprisoned between heaven and
earth. This view, he says, "strikes me as very forced and weakly evidenced"59 The
traditional interpretation by such as Cranfield and Ward is the nearest this thesis gets
to scriptural warrant in the sense of precise textual evidence.
At this point, the study departs from a precise focus on the biblical passages, and
investigates later history of the wider doctrine, first in Patristic references. The earliest
references to the descent seem to have been in Syriac materials, where it was probably
synonymous with Christ's death and burial. Ignatius states60 that before the time of
Christ, the prophets were waiting expectantly for Christ; who came and raised them.
He does not say precisely that Christ preached in Hades, but this is implied. Christ
liberates them by transferring them from Hades to paradise, or heaven. Only the
prophets benefit from this liberation. Polycarp does not actually mention the descent,
but it is inferred by his references to Philippians 1 and Acts 2:24. In Hermas, it is the
apostles and teachers, not Christ, who preach in Hades, and again, the benefits are
reserved for the faithful dead.61
When attention is directed to the Greek Apologists, Justin Martyr is found quoting one
of the passages, which he accused the Jews of expunging from the Old Testament -
"The Lord God remembered his dead people of Israel who lay in their graves, and he
descended to preach to them his own salvation"62. This passage is also quoted by
Irenaeus, and seems to interpret Christ's "descent into the realm of the dead" as a
liberation of the patriarchs of the Old Testament. Irenaeus is convinced that Christ
preached salvation in Hades. He holds out "hope for those who feared God and were
righteous"63. Cook finds that "the doctrine is now almost safely embedded in the
teaching of the Church".64
In the teaching ofWestern theologians of the third century, there is a departure from
the traditional view, that the captive righteous are liberated from Hades. Tertullian
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states precisely that Christ descends into Hades, but his purpose in so doing is to
defeat the Devil, death and Hades65. This is also the view, for example, of Lactantius,
who also asserts Christ's victory over Hades and death.66- This does not mean,
however, the liberation of the captive righteous, and their translation into paradise,
though it does mean that the just are not held in the grip of Hades eternally. Initially,
then, the preaching of Christ was meant for the Old Testament saints, and not for
everyone.
In later writings, for example, the Shepherd of Hermas, the scope of those thought to
benefit from the preaching was widened:67 also, the apostles were seen to be preaching
to the deceased after their death. Nowhere is it a proclamation of the gospel to people
who died as non-believers, calling them to repentance, or offering everybody salvation
in Christ. Hades itself is divided into different spheres for the good and the bad. The
descent of Christ is a visit only to the good part where the faithful of the Old
Testament waited.
The first sign of a wider scope of salvation is to be found in the Christian version of
the "Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs"68 (200A.D.) Mention is made there of the
conversion of disobedient hearts and of the descent of the Spirit upon them. Clement
ofAlexandria69 extended the preaching in the underworld to include the conversion to
faith of those deceased who died as unbelievers. He also thought that the souls of the
apostles took up the same task when they died - not only to Jews and saints, but to the
heathen as well, as they had no chance of knowing "as was only fair"70. This still did
not imply a full-scale universalism, as those who failed to repent at the preaching of
Christ remained there, making Hades almost synonymous with Gehenna. Bigg
believes that Clement "allowed the possibility of repentance and amendment till the
Last Day"71. Punishment, in Clement's view, is purgatorial rather than retributive and
he appears to be thinking, when speaking of purgatorial fires, more of the righteous
than of unbelievers. This is a marked difference between his position and that of
Origen. Trumbower points out that there is an unresolved question here as to whether
Clement presupposed a universal offer of salvation to all the dead at the time of the
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descent. Trumbower believes that Clement's position here is ambiguous, but he
concludes that Clement did envisage some of the dead having a change of heart
towards God, "and thus he does believe to some extent in posthumous salvation."72
When consideration is given to the thought of Origen, one of the most prominent
theologians of the Early Church, one notes that he makes a clear distinction between
Hades and Gehenna.73 Hades is the abode of all the saints and repentant sinners who
died before the time of Christ's death and resurrection. Gehenna, on the other hand, is
the abode of the Devil, his demons and all hardened, unrepentant sinners - a place of
fiery torment for the wicked, which Christ did not visit on his descent. Christ's
preaching in Hades allows some of the dead to be transferred to paradise. Origen
appears to have been the first to believe that all the saints could be admitted to
paradise - previously it had been thought to be open only to martyrs. After Christ's
descent, the just, no longer go to Hades, but direct to paradise, and Hades is now
closed. Purgatorial fire is an important concept in Origen's theology, but he does not
seem to envisage an intermediate state between the death of the individual and the
general resurrection.74
Origen often describes the fires of Gehenna as 'eternal' and 'inextinguishable'.75 Yet,,
in other texts, he suggests that the pains of Gehenna might come to an end He defines
aionios ('eternal') as 'a very long time'76. Hennessey says that he presents the doctrine
"not as a dogma, but as a profound and secret hope; he has definite doubts and
hesitations".77
Gregory ofNyssa, is strongly influenced by Origen's thought, but he tends to think of
Hades, not so much as a place, but rather as a condition of soul after death,78 whereas
Origen usually understands Christ's descent quite literally. Both Origen and Gregory
consider that posthumous salvation is possible for everyone - albeit, in many cases,
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Augustine accepts the idea of Christ's descent, but is uncertain about what happened
there. He admits that Christ rescued some in hell from their sorrows, those whom
Christ thought worthy, but rejects posthumous salvation as being impossible now.
Christ descended to rescue "those who were to be rescued".79 He only went to the
"souls at rest" like Lazarus and Abraham, and not to the wicked. Augustine believes
that one's actions in this life are the decisive ones, and that no-one at Christ's descent
repented or changed his or her relationship with God.
The most influential of the medieval thinkers who refer to the descent is Thomas
Aquinas. By this time, the doctrine of purgatory has emerged in the Roman Catholic
Church, and Aquinas teaches that Christ descends into that part of hell where the just
are detained (i.e. purgatory), to give them hope of attaining to glory.80 He quotes St
John Damascene - "As he evangelised those who are upon the earth, so did he those
who were in hell"81. Christ descended "not in order to convert unbelievers unto belief,
but to put them to shame for their unbelief'.82 He does not believe that Christ transfers
the souls of the saints at once from hell to paradise, but rather delivers them "by
enlightening them with the light of glory in hell itself'83. Aquinas makes a clear
distinction between purgatory and the "hell of the lost". He delivers those in purgatory
by the power of his passion because, through being united to his passion through faith
quickened by charity, their sins are taken away. But there is no such deliverance for
those in "the hell of the lost", because they , as infidels, have no such faith in Christ's
passion. Not everyone in purgatory is delivered from it. When Christ descended, he
liberated only those who were already cleansed, or who, because of their faith and
devotion towards Christ's death in their earthly lives, merited such a deliverance.84
According to this medieval view, all that the final judgment can do is to confirm the
judgment which has already been passed at the point of death, beyond which, even the
power of God can produce no repentance or liberation. This doctrine will be explored
in greater detail in Chapter 6 below.
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Consideration must now be given to how Reformation theologians viewed the descent.
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According to both Luther and Calvin, Jesus experienced on the Cross hell's tortures in
place of sinners. But Luther can admit an experience of hell, even for the dead
Christ. Christ would have truly gone down into hell, so as to undergo the dolores
postmortem. For a time he was surrendered up wholly into the hands of the devil, and
subjected to the full wrath of God's judgment. "He descended into the depths of all
depths, under the law, under the devil, sin and hell, and that, I think, is verily the last
and lowest depth"87. But just this suffering is his triumph over hell, so much so that he
can speak of a victrix infirmitcis. In this respect, Luther is continuing the patristic
tradition, seeing the descent to hell as the beginning of Christ's triumphal procession,
his victory over the powers of sin and death. He interprets it as a summary of Christ's
offensive against Satan and all his forces, against the dominion of death, and also, -
this, above all, as a reference to the deliverance of the saints of the old covenant from
their imprisonment in the realm of death. To stress the aspect of triumph in a unilateral
way, interpreting the descent in terms of Christ's exaltation, rather than his humiliation
became, according to Lewis, standard in Lutheran dogmatics88. Although Christ
suffered on the Cross the hell of forsakenness and absolute death, yet, as Moltmann
points out, the Easter icons of the Orthodox Church associate the descent of Christ to
the dead with the resurrection. It is the Risen Christ who breaks down their prison
walls and leads them out into the freedom of eternal life. At the head of this procession
are Adam and Eve.89
The image of the crucified now appears, not as one who is humiliated and dishonoured
but as Christ, the king, ruling from the Cross.
Calvin, and most Reformed theologians, found this interpretation too mythological,
and offered a different explanation90. What, asked Calvin, does the Bible mean by
'hell'? Surely not a locatable underworld with its hierarchical order of powers. It
means, primarily, separation from God, abandonment by God. Quite legitimately,
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Calvin interprets the words 'descended to hell' in the light of Jesus' cry of dereliction
from the Cross: "My God, my God why hast thou forsaken me?" (St Mark 15:34).
Hell is the experience of the crucified Christ that lies behind these words. Lochman
points out, that, not only physically but also spiritually, the Son of God was mortally
wounded by the sting of death. Here, in the descent to hell, Anselm's dictum finds its
most poignant expression - "You have not yet considered the full weight of sin" For
Christ to have endured merely physical death would not have satisfied God's righteous
judgment. Christ, as God's perfect sacrifice for human sin, had to partake of the full
weight ofGod's divine vengeance. It was therefore necessary for him to visit hell, "to
engage, at close quarters, the powers of hell, and the horrors of eternal death." This
meant that, as Calvin put it - "He endured the death which is inflicted on the wicked
by an angry God"91. Thus Christ bore on his soul the torture of condemned and ruined
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man.
For Calvin, then, the descent is the assumption of judgment which happens for us. For
him, the god-forsakenness of the one in whom God acts, in our place, is the descent.
But he also maintained that Christ illuminated the souls which were waiting for him. A
few of the Reformed, such as Zwingli, Bucer and Beza, understood 'hell' as the grave,
but most of them tended to follow Calvin - especially in the Heidelberg Catechism:
Q. Why is there added, "He descended into hell"?
A. That in my severest tribulations, I may be assured that Christ my Lord
has redeemed me from hellish anxieties and torments by the unspeakable
anguish, pains and terrors which he suffered in his soul both on the Cross
and before.93
Lewis strongly asserts that the resurrection should not be permitted to verge upon the
Cross. He notes that it is typical of the Reformed Confessions that the Westminster
Shorter Catechism emphasises the humiliation of Christ from his birth, leading to the
crucifixion, and consisting finally in his "being buried and continuing under the power
of death for a time."94
The larger Catechism mentions the article in the Apostles' Creed in A50:
Christ's humiliation after his death consisted in his being buried, and
continuing in the state of the dead till the third day, which hath been
expressed in these words: 'He descended into hell'.
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(d) The Descent in Modern Theology
Attention must now be paid to the descent in modern theology. There is general
agreement on the mythological character of the doctrine. As Hanson notes, the various
mythical elements were inherited by the New Testament from first century Judaism.
The writers of the New Testament then used them when stating their doctrine. They
include, "the land of the dead, the waters of chaos, the spirits in prison, and the
triumph over the infernal powers."95
The description of the descent in scripture, and indeed right down to the modern era
implies an outdated cosmology, according to which there was a three-tier universe,
including an underworld as the abode of the dead (although von Balthasar, as already
noted above, had reservations about this). It was certainly never a scientifically proved
description, and must therefore, from the beginning, have been an imaginative
portrayal. It concerns what transcends our understanding, but it can be approached
indirectly through the imagination, as Lewis observes.96 It therefore almost goes
without saying that the descent is not to be understood as a historical event, but is a
symbolical expression of the universal significance oflesus' vicarious death.
Before exploring this meaning further, however, reference must be made to what is
regarded as one of the most difficult philosophical problems in eschatology - the
problem of time. Lewis refers here to "naive conceptions of time and eternity"97.
Hanhart, for his part, rejects Cullmann's "purely temporal interpretation of the two-
aeon eschatology." While it is true that God's redemptive act in Christ has to be
described in terms of time and space, Hanhart believes that "these terms point to that
which is beyond the spatio-temporal", and so it is not acceptable to say that the dead
98
must be 'waiting in time'.
As it is true that the descent does not belong to our calculable history, and because the
concepts of time taken from our world may no longer be valid, we cannot determine in
temporal terms, the taking on of the experience of Sheol by the Redeemer (nor,
consequently, the waiting of the unredeemed for him) We obviously do not have
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character of the descent is shrouded in a certain mystery. Moltmann's treatment of the
problem is possibly the most satisfying spiritually, when he observes that the dead no
longer belong to the sphere of the kind of linear time we have on earth. He suggests,
however, that if we understand time relationally as God's time for creation, then the
dead "have time in Christ because Christ has time for them."99 He makes the point on
the basis of 1 Peter 3:19 and 4:6. Both Moltmann and Macquarrie use the phrase "the
fullness of time" with reference to God's time. God must have a freedom from time
and for time, beyond our imagining.
The central significance of the descent varies between its association either with the
Cross or with the resurrection. One of the principal concerns of Lewis in his study of
Easter Saturday is to prevent us failing to appreciate the horror and god-forsakenness
of Jesus in Hades, because we are anticipating the victory and glorification of the
resurrection. The wonder of God's raising of his Son can only be fully appreciated
after contemplation ofGod in the grave.
Theologians appear to line up on one side or the other, associating Easter Saturday
either predominantly with our Lord's humiliation, or with his exaltation. Von
Balthasar clearly sides with the former party,100 and refers to the change which then
takes place in the meaning of death for us. We can now see in death the love which
gives itself unreservedly into the hands of God. It is then not merely an atonement for
everything that we failed to do, but, beyond that, an earning of grace for others, to
abandon their egoism, and choose love as their innermost disposition. This is a
valuable comment as it brings an article in the Creed, which might seem extremely
remote from our experience, right down into our own mortal lives. Another Roman
Catholic theologian, Schillebeeckx, takes a similar line, emphasising that Jesus'
descent into hell must be seen as part of his death and not of his resurrection101. Du-
Toit holds a similar view that the descent is not a new aspect which comes after death;
it simply is the implication of death itself.102 Barth, following Calvin, also stresses the
verdict of judgment which God carries out, in that he himself in Jesus Christ takes the
place of the condemned man and suffers what man had to suffer.103
99 Moltmann. op.cit., 105.
100 Von Balthasar, H.U., Credo:Meditations on theApostles' Creed, (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1989),
53 - comments: "It was as a humanly dead man that the Son descended to the dead, and not as a
victorious living one with an Easter banner, such as is depicted on Eastern icons through an
anticipatory projection of the resurrection on to Holy Saturday."
101 Schillebeeckx, E., Christ: The Christian Experience in theModern World, (London: SCM, 1977),
230
102 Du-Toit op.cit., 77.
103
Barth,, K. Dogmatics in Outline, (London: SCM., 1947), 118.
77
Brunner goes even further. It is not simply that Christ suffers the penal death which we
deserve - but also, this penal death in despair, in complete separation from God, in
hell. Hell is unconditional despair, and we do not have to suffer it in its completeness,
because ofwhat Christ has suffered and done for us104.
This leads on to reflection upon the vicarious nature of Christ's suffering, and his
solidarity with the dead. Through this solidarity, Christ avails himself of his salvific
possibilities for them, and thus brings the dead hope. This solidarity with the condition
of the dead would be the prior condition for the work of redemption. Von Balthasar
understands the 'preaching' of 1 Peter 3:19 as the publication of the redemption
actively suffered and brought about by the Cross of the living Jesus - and not as a new
activity, distinct from the first. The actively formulated term, 'preaching', is therefore
to be conceived as the efficacious outworking in the world beyond, of what was
accomplished in the temporality of history105 This is very much the central theme of
this thesis which conceives of the redemptive activity of Christ (the 'preaching')
occurring for the unevangelised in the intermediate state..
Interestingly enough, Lewis points to the alleged problem of the retroactive validity of
Christ's death as being caused partly "by neglect of the vicarious nature of our Lord's
humanity"106. Is he implying that, if the early Christians had properly understood the
eternal application of the redemption wrought on Calvary, there would have been no
need to include the descent into hell, in the Creed?
Another group of theologians associate the descent with the resurrection. Weber, for
example, observes that, seen in terms of the Creed, "descended into hell" is clearly
meant eschatologically, referring to the "new creation", and connected to the
resurrection. Nowhere, he says, is it an issue of what has happened within the "history
of death". The centre of that history is the Easter event.107 If this were to be true it
would have little relevance to the final destiny of the unevangelised, as the 'new
creation' would occur in heaven, and not in an intermediate state.
The preaching to the dead, with the gospel of salvation, as recorded in 1 Peter,
certainly seems to be consistent with the energies and redemptive spirit of the Risen
Christ, enabling the dead to enter upon an experience of purification, and greater
knowledge, and preparing their souls for ultimate entrance to heaven and the Beatific
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Vision. Gregersen believes that the preaching to the dead may indicate the persistence
of God in seeking to overcome the stubbornness of human wills which are preventing
"a final transformation of selfhood"108 This persistence, one imagines, would continue
throughout the intermediate state, as long as there was a spark of the divine left in
human souls.
These ideas almost introduce some kind of purgatory, where the dead are cleansed
until they are acceptable to God. If, however, the exaltation of Christ is emphasised at
the expense of his humiliation, there is a danger of losing the redemptive value of his
solidarity with sinners, with the vicarious bearing of judgment on human sin, and the
dereliction and god-forsakenness of the crucified God. It is surely the fact that Christ
underwent the depths of degradation, drinking the cup of human shame and ignominy
to the very dregs, that effects our redemption.
The problem is where to put the emphasis - on Christ's humiliation or on his
exaltation. Von Balthasar tends to emphasise Christ's solidarity with the dead, his
sense of forsakenness and abandonment by the Father, and his sharing of the weakness
of sinners (the refa 'im) in Sheol. How appropriate is it to use the word 'triumph' of
Christ's going to the dead? Von Balthasar does use that word, but in a carefully
restricted sense. He does not triumph over the 'powers of hell' in the sense of
subjecting them to him, because that would only be possible through new life and
strength. The only triumph he contemplates is his own, but not "in the shining forth of
the life of the Resurrection" because then he would lose "a point of contact with this
chaos."109 Von Balthasar cannot really be suspected of undermining the seeming
finality of the death of Christ, because he describes the descent as that of a humanly
dead man, rather than as that of "a victorious living one with an Easter banner."110
This, incidentally, would seem to disarm the objection of interpreters of 1 Pet. 3:19
who maintain that Christ visited the realm of the dead in order to proclaim his victory.
Von Balthasar pictures Christ crossing the deepest hell, since he is not bound by any
of the bonds of sin, but is rather, 'free among the dead'111. In Von Balthasar's thought,
then, the descent is treated as a passage from defeat to victory, a process which
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generates movement in the intermediate state of the departed. It is an extension of
Christ's suffering and death, through which sin is conquered, death is overcome and
humanity as a new creation is established.112
The point is also made clear by Karl Barth who does not regard the descent into hell as
victorious, because it describes an action of the risen Christ. He, too, rejects
interpretations which suggest that Christ visited the depths of hell for purposes of
proclamation, liberation or binding the devil and his demons. For him, as for Von
Balthasar, the descent is a victory because Christ's suffering and experience of the
abyss into which all humanity is consigned because of sin, eliminates and destroys
sin.113 Barth moves beyond typical Reformed teaching here, regarding the descent as
belonging to the status exaltationis - the 'states' of Christ being considered, not as
successive, but as simultaneous.
Lochman seeks to reconcile the two contrasting emphases, in the context of the
opposing understanding of Luther's and Calvin's teachings. He has in mind the
ambiguity of the biblical evidence, and so, sees no reason to insist upon one
interpretation rather than the other. When one reads Luther, following in the patristic
tradition, one is led to appreciate the importance of the descent for a theological
understanding of liberation. When one turns to Calvin, it is the terrible estrangement
of hell which strikes one as important.114 There is, however, a danger with the
Lutheran emphasis, of undermining the finality and reality of Christ's humiliation in
the descent to hell, when it sees the descent as the beginning of Christ's triumphal
procession. This danger is very marked also in the thought of the Orthodox writer,
Georges Florovsky, who argues that Christ descends into hell in glory - "not in
humiliation, although through humiliation on the Cross." Florovsky certainly goes too
far and undermines the seeming finality of the death of Christ when he says - "the
descent into hell (or Hades) is already the resurrection."115 Calvin's emphasis on the
descent as being primarily separation from, and abandonment by, God is to be
preferred, when he interprets the words 'descended to hell' in the light of Jesus' cry of
112 The sense in which Von Balthasar's understanding of the descent can be described as a triumph is
helpfully explained in a recent book by David Lauber - "...Christ's descent into hell involves the pure
substantiality of 'hell' which is 'sin in itself (Mysterium Paschale, 173). This is a vision of Christ's
triumph, because it is a vision of the reality of sin separated from human beings, which is the result of
Jesus Christ's substitutionary and sacrificial death." - Lauber, D., Barth on the Descent into Hell,
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 72.
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dereliction on the Cross- "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? (Mark
15:34).
Lochman does, however, make an important point in support of the main contention of
this thesis when, in considering this article of the Creed, he refers to Christ's work of
liberation which it affirms, maintaining that no-one is excluded from or cast beyond,
"the pale of his salvation." This means that no person is "so remote from God as to be
'hopeless', irredeemable." Such a view augurs well for the final destiny of the
unevangelised.
The scope of the salvation achieved by Christ is immeasurably widened, if the
exegesis of such as Best, Cranfield and Hunter is accepted, for they maintain that the
descent conserves the truth that it has retrospective power. Those who died earlier can
also arrive at faith because Christ has come to them. This is Moltmann's point when
he says that the dead have Christ's time, the time of love - "the accepting,
transfiguring, rectifying love that leads to eternal life." Moltmann recognises here "a
true element in the doctrine of purgatory."116
Theologians, both in the Early Church and in modern times, have been much
concerned that those who were geographically or temporally disadvantaged, and
therefore, unable to live their lives in conformity with Christ during their time on
earth, might be confronted with his offer of salvation in some other form. The Spirit of
Christ was in the world long before the birth of Jesus. As St John's Gospel records, the
Word of God was lightening every man (St John 1:9). The descent into hell may
enshrine the idea that human spirits in other spheres have the revelation of God.
Pannenberg shares this concern when he raises the question ofwhether the nearness of
God is limited to those who make a conscious decision to believe in Christ. It could
be, in Pannenberg's opinion, that Jesus' descent and preaching to the dead in hell,
guarantees "an unconscious participation in salvation by men who never, or only
superficially came into contact with the message of Christ."117 The descent assures
that salvation is possible for those outside the visible Church.
None of this, however, implies that the dead are finally saved. Moltmann maintains
that, though the dead are not lost, they are not finally saved either. Together with the








This raises the question as to whether the descent supplies us with a hint of
universal ism. The widening of the scope of salvation in Clement of Alexandria, and
the universalist position of Origen in the Early Church have already been noted.
Macquarrie believes that the writer of 1 Peter comes close to universalism, because the
people of Noah's time were regarded as particularly wicked. If Jesus successfully
preached the gospel to them, who could be left out? And if the spirits in prison are
fallen angels, then the message is even more universalistic, because it means that even
the demons will be saved.119
The descent also raises once again the possibility of a so-called "second chance".
Paterson-Smyth is typical of many commentators when he says that the descent does
not offer any hope to wicked men who, with full knowledge of Christ, wilfully reject
him. It tells ofmen who have never known him and has hope only of those "who were
capable of receiving him"120. There is, therefore, nothing here to make light of the
responsibilities of this life. This would mean that the preaching to the dead offered a
'first chance', but not a 'second chance'. Barclay, however, in expounding 1 Peter 4:6
says that even though men had been judged by death, the dead still had another chance
to grasp the gospel and live in the Spirit of God, and he observes:
In some ways, this is one of the most wonderful verses in the Bible,
for it gives us a breathtaking glimpse ofnothing less than a gospel of a
second chance.121
It is doubtful if this can really be deduced from the passage. Commentators shy away
from what looks like a doctrine of a 'second chance'. For most it would be a 'first
chance'. The grace and love of God must have a modus operandi beyond death. The
doctrine of the "second chance" will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
Pannenberg, and a whole host of other theologians including Macquarrie, Lochman
and Barclay, base their opinion on the salvation of those 'extra ecclesiam' on the
traditional exegesis of 1 Peter 3:19 and 4:6, as found in scholars such as Cranfield. It
has, however, already been noted above that Selwyn, Kelly and Achtemeier support a
very different interpretation.
Pinnock - even following the traditional understanding ofCranfield - has to admit that
"the scriptural evidence for postmortem encounter is not abundant . It is far less
119
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abundant if one departs from Cranfield's view. A number of other scriptural passages
could be cited in place of the Petrine passages - such as Romans 14:9; St Matthew
27:52-53; Ephesians 4:9-10, but the principal foundation for a doctrine of postmortem
conversion are broader theological principles, governed by scripture. It would appear
from Romans 14:7-12, that every human being will be required to face Christ after
death. Any hope that the unevangelised would then have of forgiveness and eternal life
would depend upon the continuing grace of God towards sinners. There is a case for
believing that the modus operandi of such grace would apply to the dead as much as to
the living. Scripture affirms that God desires the salvation of all, and that everyone
should come to the knowledge of the truth. Also, the nature of God as a God of love
and mercy remains the same both before and after death.
Traditional theology based on a text like Hebrews 9:27 - "Just as man is destined to
die once, and after that to face judgment", has assumed that the fateful decision
determining our final destiny has to be taken in this life. Yet, it would appear that a
God of love, out of sheer justice, would afford a postmortem opportunity for decision
to those unevangelised who had been prevented from such an opportunity to respond
to Christ in this life.123
Ward, in attacking (as was noted earlier), the traditional doctrine of purgatory,
comments that if growth and purification is possible after death, it is likely that
genuine repentance is also possible. He also draws attention to the beliefs of Jews and
Moslems, many of whom "assert that hell is not permanent, and that God will finally
deliver all from its pains".124
It could, of course, be argued that through Middle Knowledge, God could predict what
our choices might have been in this life under counterfactual circumstances, and so
arranged the circumstances that opportunity would be given here and now to those
who would respond positively, but this is to anticipate the discussion of Middle
Knowledge in Chapter 5 below.
Despite, therefore, the ambiguous nature of the scriptural references to Christ's
descent into hell, it might still be possible to hold that a grace-filled postmortem
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encounter with Christ will enable some, at least, of the unevangelised to receive
salvation.
The foregoing study of Christ's descent into hell is of prime importance for the main
contention of this thesis. The traditional interpretation of Cranfield, Ward and others is
approved. The symbolic understanding of the descent as expressing the retroactive
power of Christ's identification with sinners and redemption of sinners, encourages
hope for the salvation of those who lived before Christ. The retroactive relevance of
Christ's redemptive activity for those who have no faith has also been stressed in the
modern period by Newlands, who notes the link "between Jesus and those who have
lived and died since the beginning of the human race".125 The redemptive efficacy of
Christ's death can then be extended to the unevangelised in all ages, as it has eternal
significance. The traditional view which locates the descent between Christ's death
and resurrection also supports belief in an intermediate state, when the saving
encounter between Christ and the unevangelised would take place. The fact that the
'spirits in prison' were the most notorious of sinners also tends towards the ultimate
conclusion of this thesis which favours a hopeful universalism.
The thesis must now investigate whether eschatology, both in traditional theology and
in modern thought, can support a hopeful outcome for the unevangelised. The
particular type of modern theology which will now be studied is opentheism, and the
enquiry will examine how it differs, in particular, from traditional views on the
doctrine ofGod, and how this affects the ultimate destiny of the unevangelised.
125 Newlands, G., God in Christian Perspective, op.cit, 278.
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CHAPTER 4
THE FINAL DESTINY OF THE UNEVANGELISED IN OPENTHEISM
A much more positive and hopeful view of the final destiny of the unevangelised
becomes possible, because of a relatively recent development in theology centring
upon the doctrine of God. This new cluster of ideas has been given several names,
such as free-will theism, and creative love theism, but the one which will be used here
is opentheism. It is associated particularly with the transatlantic theologians, Clark
Pinnock, John Sanders and Greg Boyd, but many of the ideas had already featured in
the work of a number of English philosophers and theologians, notably J.R. Lucas,
Richard Swinburne and Keith Ward.
It will be instructive, first, to enquire into the sources of opentheist thinking. It must
be recognised, at the outset, that the ideas which were beginning to be expressed in
opentheist theology, with particular reference to the doctrine of God, from the 1970s
onwards were not new. The earliest Christian exponent of ideas which have come to
be characteristic of opentheism appears to have been a theologian, named Calcidius,
in the fifth century. In a book written against fatalism and determinism, he says that
God knows necessary truths necessarily and contingent truths contingently.
Opentheism has a number of supporters in early Methodism, prominent among whom
in the 18th century are Adam Clarke, a Bible commentator who believed in an open
future, and Andrew Ramsay, one of John Wesley's contemporaries. On the American
continent there has always been a stream of opentheism running through the Churches
of Christ, the Christian Churches and the Disciples of Christ. The most notable
representative from these denominations is T.W. Brent (d.1905), who devotes entire
chapters in his published work to foreknowledge and predestination, and who takes
the biblical texts on divine repentance and change ofmind very seriously.
Opentheist views are particularly popular among 19th century Methodists. Mention
will be made below of the similarities between much modern Anglican theology and
opentheist ideas, and it is interesting to note that some of the concepts used by
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scholars such as Lucas and Polkinghorne are to be found earlier in the theologies of
Anglicans writing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Keith Ward, for example,
draws attention to the way in which H.H. Farmer and John Oman see God as a person:
an Other who encounters us in a personal way, who has a relationship
with us which is one of father (or mother) to child, or lover to
beloved.1
A similar understanding of God as a person rather than an impersonal force is to be
found in the Boston 'personalists' such as Peter Bertocci, and the Scottish theologians,
John and Donald Baillie. God is thought of in Martin Buber's terms as a 'Thou' who
relates to an 'I' evoking our love and respect. In addition, some Anglicans from
Charles Gore onwards speak of a kenosis, a self-emptying of infinite divine qualities
by the Word in the acceptance of the infinite limits of the incarnational life of Jesus.
Such a view anticipates the position taken, for example, by Polkinghorne in our own
day. When H.H. Farmer entitles one of his books Experience of God he is defending
the conception of a personal relation with God - the kind of interactive relationship
between God and his creatures described by modern opentheists. A number of other
modern thinkers, not normally described as opentheists, hold similar views - among
theologians, Jurgen Moltmann, Paul Fiddes, John Polkinghorne and Keith Ward; and
among philosophers, Richard Swinburne, William Hasker, J.R.Lucas, Peter Geach,
David Basinger and Peter van Inwagen; among biblical scholars, Terence Freitheim
has laid the best scriptural foundation for opentheism.
Despite, however, such widespread support, it would be difficult to identify a cohesive
school of opentheism. Leading exponents such as Clark Pinnock and John Sanders
appear to have arrived at their theological positions, at least initially, independently of
each other, and from different directions. Pinnock recognises an affinity between
opentheism and Wesleyan-Arminianism and Eastern Orthodoxy, whereas Sanders
traces some of his thinking to Dutch sources - particularly the theology of Vincent
Briimmer. Pinnock, as a Baptist, emerges from a clearly evangelical stable, and more
recently has gravitated towards pentecostalism. It is, however, from the conservative
evangelical wings of the Church that the most strident critical voices have come, as
will become evident towards the end of this chapter. The main focus of theological
1
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dissent from opentheism centres upon its belief in God's self-chosen limitation upon
the exercise of his omnipotence and omniscience. This has caused considerable unease
among many theologians. Questions may therefore be asked about the future of
opentheism. Its popularity, so far, has been found mainly in Canada and the United
States. The opentheist website reveals that a directory of scholars, pastors and leaders
ofChurch orgnisations, who are well-disposed towards, and supportive of, opentheism
has been opened. At present, 41 names are listed in this directory, and support on the
other side of the Atlantic continues to grow. It seems likely that it will become better
known and more widely advocated by mainline theologians, both evangelical and
liberal, in the United Kingdom also. This thesis accepts the main axioms of
opentheism, but with some reservations which will be pointed out below.
Modern opentheism has arisen out of dissatisfaction with, and in reaction to, a
tradition of thought, which had become dominant with the theology of Augustine and
Aquinas, and which was still prominent in the Reformation theology of Luther and
Calvin. It is difficult to attach an accurate name-tag to it, but it is frequently referred
to as classical theism or conventional theism. The main difference between this
traditional theology and opentheism concerns the divine attributes.
(a) The Attributes of God in Conventional Theism
The determining influences on the formulation of these attributes are two-fold -
classical pagan philosophical concepts and biblical ideas. The Early Church Fathers
seek to synthesise these two influences, but concern is now being expressed by
opentheists and others that the biblical component is under-emphasised at the expense
of too much weight being put on the Greek philosophical notions, partly through the
influence ofPhilo.
At this point it will be useful to give an overall survey of the list of attributes, while
noting their indebtedness to pagan philosophy, and indicating where opentheism
diverges from the tradition. The attributes of God will be important when considering
possibilities for the final destiny of the unevangelised.
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The central attribute from which all else is derived, is the idea of divine perfection.
The traditional view has been that divine perfection means that God is independent of
creation. He does not need the universe or the human beings within it, in any respect.
The roots of this notion can be found in the Parmenidean idea of the One as a pure,
undifferentiated and unchanging unity. More significantly, the idea is characteristic of
the thought of Plato2 and Aristotle3. It appears as if they conceived the idea from that
of human perfection, and deduced its implications. If God is perfect, there can be no
possible improvement or potential for change, as any change in God could only be a
change for the worse. Thus the notion of God's immutability emerges, and applies to
every aspect ofGod's being, for example, his knowledge and power.
The influence of this Greek idea upon Christian thought is clearly evident in the
thought, for example, of Anselm. His argument in support of God's immutability
states that if a being changes, it must either be changed by something other than itself,
or by itself, or by nothing.4
By the time of Abelard and Aquinas, the orthodox position has hardened. It is
maintained that all change in the person of Christ would have to occur in his human
nature alone. Incarnation, therefore, involves no change in God and adds nothing new
to him. God is unaffected by the world and change, unaffected even by the death of his
Son. The truth of God's immutability had been stated by Augustine in Platonic terms,
but Aquinas restates it in terms of Aristotle's contrast between potentiality and act.
God, being self-existent, is pure act {actus purus); he actualises all his potentialities
simultaneously. It follows from this that there is no form or degree of being that he can
acquire or lose. Edwards describes Aristotle's position on God's perfection as a "static
view." Although God was the ultimate mover of the world, he was himself unmoved.
2 See references in Pinnock, C H. (ed.), The Openness ofGod (Carlisle: Paternoster Press 1994), 170.
3
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capable of being changed by something other than itself, then it cannot be omnipotent, and must be
subject to control or corruption. Further, the being, whatever it is, which changes, must be greater than
it, in order to have tire power to change it; so God would not be tire greatest conceivable being, which
is unpalatable. If God is perfect, any change must cause some perfection to cease, or another perfection
to come into being; but then he either would have been, orwill no longer be, perfect, which is
contradictory. Thus God must be immutable.- Ward, K., Rational Theology and the Creativity ofGod,
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 150.
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In his unchanging perfection, he was concerned only with his "own unchanging
thinking in an unchanging way, but not about the changing world."5
It is interesting to ponder why Greek thought was so attractive to the Church
Fathers and to medieval theologians. David Runia suggests that it was partly
because of the Platonic emphasis on the immutability of the highest Being.
This coincided with Patristic belief in God's faithfulness and reliability, and
their faith that he will not abandon his creatures. It also cohered well with their
conviction of his eternity and transcendence.6
Conventional theism also maintains that, because God is immutable, he must also be
timeless. As Aristotle observed:
Time is merely the numbering of before and after in change, so what
cannot change cannot be in time
God is timeless, in that there is no before and after for God, only an eternal present.
As a direct result of the notions of God as a timeless, wholly immutable being, the
traditional beliefwas that in God there can be no changes of any kind. Even changes in
thoughts, wills or emotions are ruled out.
Divine immutability, if true, would mean that God would not react to human
behaviour, and that the destiny of the unevangelised would be fixed from all eternity.
This is reinforced by a further important consequence of the mainline classical
tradition, the doctrine of impassibility. If God were 'passible' - and by 'passible' is
meant that God is affected by creatures - then it would mean that God would be
changeable, and less than self-sufficient. Therefore God cannot be affected or
influenced in any way by creatures. This view is connected to the conviction that God
is incorporeal, and so he does not have any emotions. It is not surprising that the
doctrine of God's impassibility has occasioned much controversy, because one of its
implications is that our prayers cannot affect what God has eternally willed to bring
5
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about. Intercessory prayer then becomes a means by which God brings about what he
has eternally ordained. Since God is unchanging, and impervious to outside influences,
our prayers have no influence on his decisions. As will become evident, this position
causes difficulty for classical theists, because they want to be able to say that God does
respond to our prayers, which means that they have to find some way of explaining
how an immutable, timeless God can respond to a temporal event.
Further vitally important consequences flow from the immutability of God - for
example, in relation to providence. As the traditional view of God is that he is
sovereign, in total control of all that happens, he exercises what is called meticulous
providence. This means that he specifically ordains even the details of every event
which occurs. His overall control is so complete that everything which happens,
happens exactly as he wants it to happen. As his plan comprises everything, this
includes evil and suffering. Traditional theologies, therefore, have an awkward
problem of theodicy. The best answer they can give to the question why God ordains
evil events which cause suffering, is to say that they are justified in the course of
bringing about an ultimately good outcome, which at present is hidden from us. - an
answer which fails to convince in the light of the widespread occurrence of hideous
evil in human history.
Everything is therefore predictable, as the divine will cannot fail or be thwarted. There
is no such thing as God taking risks, or being prone to error. This doctrine has
repercussions for salvation, and therefore for the final destiny of the unevangelised.
God's meticulous providence leads to the doctrines of unconditional election and
irresistible grace. There is no input that we humans can contribute to our own
salvation, as this would deny the doctrines of divine immutability, impassibility and
self-sufficiency. If this view is correct, it must have been God's will that millions
should remain unevangelised in this life. The traditional view maintains that God's
glory is the ultimate purpose that all creation serves. Yet one fails to understand how
millions remaining unevangelised could serve God's purpose of glory. Also, if large
numbers are predestined for damnation, as the traditional view of, for example,
7
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Augustine and Calvin, proclaims, how could a God love be glorified by the rebellion
of sinners and the destruction of the wicked?
Yet another characteristic of conventional theology which has caused endless
controversy is God's knowledge of the future. There can be no change in the
knowledge of a timeless God from before to after. So, God's omniscience must
include exhaustive, definite foreknowledge of future, contingent events, that is, of
human actions. The entire future is certain for God. He knows the future as what will
actually happen, not what possibly might happen. He has this definite, exhaustive
knowledge, because he determines what the future will be. There is no way in which
what he might do in the future could affect God's knowledge, because that would
infringe his impassibility or self-sufficiency. As Millard Erickson, a conservative
theologian adhering to the traditional view has said:
What he has purposed from eternity will surely come to pass. He will
not change his mind, nor will he discover hitherto unknown
considerations, which will cause him to alter his intentions.8
This would mean that there would be no possibility of the unevangelised changing
their attitude towards God - for example, coming to faith in him - in the new
conditions of an intermediate state. God would know from all eternity how they would
respond, and indeed would have predestined their decision, thus depriving them of
free-will, reducing them to puppets, and making the whole concept of an intermediate
state superfluous. This last point would, of course, be contested by many classical
theists who affirm compcitibilistic freedom for humans, in that they are free, so long as
they act upon their desires This would, however, appear to make little difference in the
long run, as God would still be understood to determine human desires. According to
this understanding of freedom, God can perfectly guarantee that humans do exactly
what he desires in every situation. Further detailed discussion will take place in
Chapter 5 under the title - Divine Sovereignty andHuman Freedom.
Before leaving the classical, conventional viewpoint on the divine attributes, it would
be instructive to note some examples of how the Early Church Fathers appropriate,
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and introduce into their theologies, the God of the philosophers. Ignatius, for example,
describes God as timeless, invisible and impassible.9 Though he does allow suffering
in Jesus, he does not allow that God, as God, can suffer. Justin Martyr appears to be
quite happy to conclude that God is unchangeable, eternal, incomprehensible,
impassible, noncorporeal and anonymous.10 He seeks to combine this with the biblical
picture of God as patient, compassionate and loving. Although he declares that there
are no passions in God, he believes that God does care for us. God, after all, is 'not a
stone'.11 Tertullian, who seeks to break away from classical pagan ideas in the light of
biblical texts, elsewhere, however, writes that God is incapable of suffering - only the
humanity of Jesus suffered. God, being eternal, he maintains, must be incapable of
change, since a change would imply loss, which would be impossible for a perfect
being. 12'Eternity has no time. It is itself all time. It acts; it cannot then suffer'13.
Origen, follows Clement of Alexandria in believing that God is impassible,
immutable, uncreated, simple, all-powerful and all-knowing.14
The thought of Augustine is most important because of its influence upon later
Western theology. The neo-Platonism which he learned from Plotinus, he uses to
interpret the Bible.15 He retains the traditional list of divine attributes, describing God
as self-sufficient, impassible, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent, timeless, ineffable
and simple.16
Augustine rejects the universalist tendencies of Clement of Alexandria and Origen.
While he believes it to be true that all humans have knowledge of God's nature
through general revelation, he does not consider that this is sufficient for their
salvation. For salvation, they must have explicit knowledge of Christ.17 Augustine
8 Erickson, Millard J., Christian Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House,
1983), 1: 351-54.
9
Ignatius, Epistle to Polycarp, 3.2 andEpistle to Ephesians, 7.2.
10 Justin Martyr, FirstApology, 13,61 and SecondApology, 6.
11 Justin Martyr, FirstApology, 28.
12
Tertullian, Against ITermogenes, 12.
13
Tertullian, AgainstMarcion, 1.8.
14 Sanders, J. "Historical Considerations" inPinnock C.H. (ed.), The Openness ofGod, op.cit., 75.
15
Augustine, Confessions, 7.9.
16 ibid., 7,11; 11.18; 12.15; 13.16; The Trinity, 1.1.3; 5.2.3; 4.5-6; 7.5-10; City ofGod, 8.6; 11.10; 22.2.
As Sanders observes: "God's immutability implies that neither his knowledge, nor his will ever
changes. Augustine made God's immunity to time, change and responsiveness to his creatures,
axiomatic for Western theology." - Sanders, op.cit.,80.
17
Augustine, The City ofGod, 8.6, 10-12.
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concedes that Jews in Old Testament times could be saved through faith in the Saviour
who was to come. The rest of humanity, however, did not have the gospel preached to
them because God foreknew that they would not believe. They would suffer
condemnation. He believes that the whole of humanity deserves to be damned because
they participate in the sin of Adam. The elect are delivered from this fate by the grace
of God inspiring their faith in Christ. But the majority are left under punishment "in
order that it may thus be shown what was due to all."18
Such a restrictivist view bodes ill for the final destiny of the unevangelised, but could
it be, one might wonder, that Augustine's theory could be amended to argue that all, or
most, people are elected, thus providing a much better future for the unevangelised?
Universal election, however, smacks of God coercing humans into submission, thus
overriding libertarian freewill - a cardinal principle of this thesis. It could, of course,
occur if God were to nurture the desire for faith in accordance with a compatibilist
understanding of human freedom, a position which will be rejected below in Chapter
5. Oliver Crisp describes Augustine's belief that God elects a particular percentage of
the population for salvation, rather than a higher number, as arbitrary, and points out
that traditional Augustinians simply appeal to the inscrutability of the divine will in
fixing the numbers of elect and reprobate.19 Yet Augustinians would not agree that it is
arbitrary, because it manifests God's justice and holiness in the punishment of sin.
Limitations of space prevent a further survey of the traditional theology of the divine
attributes, through Aquinas and the medieval period, and then, into the Reformation
era of Luther and Calvin. Down through these centuries, a prolonged attempt is made
to reconcile Greek philosophical concepts with the God of the Bible. Pinnock,
however, maintains that the Hellenic and biblical ideas cannot really be combined. A
choice has to be made between philosophical concepts and the revelation of God in
Jesus Christ. Conventional theism stresses the absoluteness of God, but, in so doing,
denies the dynamism of the world.
(b) The Attributes of God in Modern Anglican Theology
19
Crisp, O., "Augustinian Universalism," in The International Journalfor Philosophy ofReligion, 53
(2003), 132.
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Before turning to the opentheists' rejection of some conventional beliefs, mention
must be made of some Anglican theologians who anticipate opentheist ideas. They
reject the strong sense of God's immutability, that is, that he cannot change at all. A
consequence of such immutability is that it would appear to rule out God's acting,
because, if God acts, he changes from not doing something, to doing it. One way
round this difficulty is to assert that God 'from all eternity' intends that certain actions
occur, including those of humans. This position, however, Richard Swinburne, for
example, regards as unsatisfactory because it would mean that God does not react in
personal ways to human behaviour with sympathy or anger, pardon or chastening. For
God to interact in these ways with humans, as the God of the Old Testament is said to
do, his actions could not be decided in advance. If the course of action of an
immutable God had been decided by his past choices, such a God would not be
perfectly free.20 This rejection of immutability is a very marked departure from the
thought of, for example, Thomas Aquinas. In Thomist theology, perfection cannot
embrace change, because that involves becoming worse. Keith Ward points out that
the Thomist God must be both immutable and supremely active at the same time.21
The immutability of God, Ward also notes, infringes his goodness because that calls
for acts of love which change according to circumstances. Rejection of God's
immutability, in the thought ofWard, does not mean that God changes as humans do
by loss or decay, and, there are respects in which God is changeless, as, for instance,
in wisdom and bliss.22 The changeability of God is also asserted by J.R. Lucas, in
response to the biblical record, which portrays God as caring and knowing about the
world. God also interacts with his creatures through intervention in the world - "doing
things, saying things, hearing prayers, and sometimes changing his mind."23
Another aspect of traditional theism from Augustine to Aquinas, rejected by those
Anglican theologians is God's timelessness, a doctrine which is thought to provide an
explanation for his being totally immutable. Swinburne regards the doctrine as
incoherent. The doctrine implies that God exists at all moments of human time
20 Swinburne, R., The Coherence ofTheism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 214.
21 Ward observes that for God to be both immutable and supremely active at tire same time is "a feat
beyond even tire capacity of omnipotence." -Ward, op.cit., 160-1.
22
Ward, K., "God as Creator" in Vesey G. (ed.), The Philosophy in Christianity, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 118.
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simultaneously. This would mean that yesterday, today and tomorrow, because they
are simultaneous, would be the same, which is "clearly nonsense."24 A second reason
for rejecting God's timelessness, according to Swinburne, is that, if God is doing
things, that involves things being true at later or earlier times. The result is that to say
that God "brings things about, forgives, punishes, warns etc., ...seems incoherent."25
The personhood of God, by contrast, means that he is temporal, and therefore, in some
sense, in time, not outside it."6 The fact that God is not outside the temporal process, is
also argued by some modern theologians, other than the Anglicans being considered,
notably Tillich and Barth.27 Newlands supplies a particularly attractive solution to the
problem when he suggests that God is "both involved in time and beyond time."28
The impassibility of God is also unacceptable to Lucas and Ward. Lucas makes the
point that as God is love, he is vulnerable. In contrast to the Aristotelian ideal of a
self-sufficient God, the Christian God is highly passible, and was hurt on the Cross.29
The denial by conventional theism that God can be affected in any way by his
creatures, and therefore lacks all feeling, would not appear to Ward to be a symptom
of perfection. Ward cannot conceive of a perfect being who is unable to appreciate the
beauty of his creation, nor take pleasure in well-doing or feel no sorrow at sin. Such a
being would lack the intrinsic value of happiness, and so could not be a perfect being.
The unsurpassable bliss which a perfect God would have would need to be a happiness
which includes and overcomes suffering and sorrow.30
23






27 Tillich claims that only a God who acts and chooses and loves and forgives is the God whom we
wish to worship and the pursuit of these activities, since they involve a change of state, means being in
time. - Tillich, P., Systematic Theology, vol.1, (London: Jas.. Nisbet &Co., 1953), 305. The same point
is made by Barth who argues also from the Incarnation, for tlus means that God acts at a particular
moment. - Barth, K., Church Dogmatics, 11,(1) trans. Bromiley G.W., and Torrance, T.F.,(London and
New York: T.& T. Clark International 1957), 620. The positions of Tillich and Barth are quoted by
Swinburne, op.cit., 218.
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"Compromise suggestions of a God who is both involved in time and beyond time appear more
satisfactory, though still including residual mystery... God, it seems to me, is best conceived as both




30 Ward. Rational Theology and the Creativity ofGod, op.cit., 133, 199.
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The theology of Swinburne, Lucas and Ward also anticipates opentheism in its
rejection of exhaustive divine foreknowledge and meticulous providence, in favour of
libertarian freewill, but this aspect of Anglican theology will receive more detailed
consideration in the context of divine sovereignty in Chapter 5. These Anglican
insights into the attributes of God are much more conducive to a positive destiny for
the unevangelised than an understanding of God as immutable, timeless and
impassible.
(c) Opentheist Views on the Attributes of God
The reaction against traditional concepts in the doctrine of God, which is to be found
in opentheism, must now be considered. But, first, earlier ideas prevalent in the Early
Church Fathers, and acceptable to opentheism, must be studied. Justin Martyr, for
example, as was noted above, while holding that God is immutable and impassible,
wishes to preserve the biblical concept of God as loving and caring. While he believes
that God foreknows all the decisions which humans will make, this does not lead to
determinism, because he bases his election on their choices - a view which is closer to
Arminianism than to Calvinism, and therefore more congenial to opentheists.31 God is
held to 'respond' to human decisions and so his relationality to humans opens up the
possibility of postmortem conversion for the unevangelised in a way which would be
impossible for Augustinian predestination, unless those unevangelised were already
numbered among the elect. Irenaeus follows Justin in allowing libertarian freewill to
humans, and rejects God's foreordination of human decisions.32
Tertullian is of the opinion that God can change his mind, and he instances the case of
God repenting of his decision to destroy Nineveh.33 God is responsive to human
decisions. Tertullian does not believe that God directs in detail everything that
happens, because his gift to humans of freewill means that they can either co-operate
with God's purposes or thwart his will. Tertullian's theology portrays a God who
interacts with his creatures, which is precisely the emphasis of opentheism.
31
Justin, 1 Apology, 43-45.
32




Anticipation of opentheism is even more marked in Alexandrian theology. As in the
thought of Justin, Origen holds that God has foreknowledge of the free choices which
humans will make, and, in his providence, plans what his responses are; yet Origen is
adamant that God does not cause human decisions.34 One can detect a loosening of
Origen's adherence to the classical position on God's impassibility, when he says that
God rejoices at human conversion, and feels sorrow for human sin.
It would, therefore, appear that the Early Church Fathers, prior to Augustine, maintain
that God freely enters into relationship with humanity, and that the ways in which he
responds to his creatures are sometimes conditioned by their actions. While, at least in
their language, retaining descriptions ofGod's attributes from Greek philosophy, they
are also anxious to uphold the biblical emphasis on God's love and grace. This is an
emphasis which is characteristic of opentheism, so that opentheist rejection applies,
not to conventional theism as a whole, but rather to certain aspects of its
Augustinian/Calvinist component.
As the name indicates, 'opentheism' portrays God as being 'open' to relationships of
love with human beings. He has created us in such a way that we are free to respond to
his love or to reject it. It belongs to the essence of love that it does not coerce or
manipulate, but seeks a free response. This requires us to believe that the future is not
completely settled. Pinnock uses the term 'root metaphor' to describe what God is
like. These influential portrayals of God strongly affect how we picture God, and
relate to him.35
Theologians of a more conservative kind often picture God as a monarch or judge.
Pinnock, however, believes that to describe God as a loving parent, is closer to the
biblical model. The text 'God is love' (1 John 4:16) has an important bearing on his
theology, and he believes that the love which is central to God's nature, and which
governs his relations with human beings, spills over, as it were, from the inter-personal
communion of the Trinity. Pinnock finds biblical warrant for the metaphor of God as a
'loving parent' in Jesus' use of the word Abba (Mark 14.36), in addressing God, and
34
Origen, On First Principles, passim.
35
Pinnock, C.H., in Pinnock, C.H. and Brown D., Theological Crossfire: An Evangelical/Liberal
Dialogue, (Grand Rapids:Zondervan, 1990), 66
97
thus expressing God's boundless grace and mercy. He also reminds us of our Lord's
Parable of the Prodigal Son (St Luke 15:11-32), in which God as the father has a
loving relationship with his two sons who enjoy real freedom.36 It is not difficult,
when we conceive of God as a loving parent, to imagine him welcoming
unevangelised prodigals in an intermediate state.
Pinnock's use of the concept of a 'root metaphor', however, has not gone
unchallenged. Nathan MacDonald, for example, believes that it runs counter to the
direction of much current Old Testament theology, 37He points to the wide range of
metaphors for God in the Old Testament, and believes that it is wrong to give one
dominance, and redefine all other metaphors in the light of it.38 The holiness of God,
for example, is avoided by Pinnock. Yet it is hard not to accept that Pinnock is right in
maintaining that the love of God is the most influential concept in the New Testament.
It is, after all, the driving force behind the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ.
Pinnock believes that there is a static quality about the traditional picture of God. He
rejects, for example, Aquinas's metaphor of God as a pillar around which everything
else moves, or Calvin's picture of him as (in Pinnock's words), "an all-controlling
despot who can tolerate no resistance.39
The ordinary Christian believer with no pretension to theological sophistication will
find opentheism's concept of a God who has reciprocal relations with humans very
meaningful (and, indeed, biblical). Furthermore, to view prayer as simply a means
which God uses to conform us to his preordained purposes, will appear to the average
Christian to be a serious impoverishment of prayer as it is envisaged in the Bible.
Conservative theologians tend to defend their position by treating many of the biblical
metaphors for God as anthropomorphisms, or as accommodations, God 'lisping' as
Calvin said to human weakness. They perceive a danger in our making God in our
own image. This, however, is not necessarily the case, and biblical
anthropomorphisms may still do justice to the nature of God in himself. The question








we try to apply our understanding of human love to the divine, or do we begin from
the unique nature ofGod s love?40 The second alternative seems infinitely preferable.
Many consequences follow from the idea of a God who experiences our love, or lack
of it, in dynamic, mutual relationships. Opentheists believe, for example, that he
cannot be timeless and immutable as the traditional concept entails. For opentheists,
God is everlasting. He experiences duration in ongoing relationships with his
creatures. They would say that he cannot be timeless, because of the reciprocal give
and take between God and humans in history. This point, however, is debatable, and
will be explored in detail in below.
In particular, God's potential for change in some respects, is important. Opentheists
believe that if God were totally immutable, and unable, or unwilling, to change the
details of his plans in response to human actions and prayers, then he would, in fact,
be less than perfect. Indeed, a God who, while his divine nature remains immutable,
changes his thoughts, will and emotions, appears to be omnicompetent, adept in
resourcefulness and superior, compared to a God who is eternally locked in a pre¬
ordained will and course of action.
The opentheist position on the notion of impassibility is that God can be influenced
and affected by our actions as well as by our prayers, but it is because he voluntarily
chooses to enter into relationships with humans, that he is passible.
Conservative upholders of the traditional doctrine of the impassibility of God once
again have to resort to maintaining that the Bible, when speaking of divine wrath,
anger, love and mercy, must not be taken literally. Many would claim that it detracts
from God's otherness and majesty to ascribe human characteristics to deity. Yet, ifwe
dismiss such descriptions of God, we lose much of the Bible, and are in danger of
misunderstanding the nature of God. The problem reaches critical proportions in
39
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relation to the incarnation, where, as Sanders observes, the ascription of human
characteristics to God does not seem to be a matter of concern to him.41
Many books have been written on the subject of divine suffering, and, the balance of
modern scholarship has swung away from divine impassibility, and much more in the
direction of opentheist views.
A further consequence of opentheism is that the freedom which opentheists believe
God's creatures have been given to accept or reject his initiatives, presents a strong
challenge to traditional views on God's sovereignty. As has already been indicated,
'classical' theology teaches that God wills and determines everything that happens in
the world. In such a case, postmortem conversions would be impossible unless
ordained beforehand by God, and even that would not occur, according to Calvinism
because fateful decisions regarding final destiny must be made before death.42
The openness model, however, conceives of a God who takes risks, as the title of John
Sanders' principal book indicates.43 The risk is that God's desires may be thwarted in
some cases - we do not always do what God desires. Opponents hold that such a belief
destroys confidence in God's sovereignty - how can he remain in control if he has
delegated so much responsibility to fallible mortals? Nevertheless, opentheists
maintain that he still retains ultimate sovereignty, because when his plan A is opposed
by human sinfulness, such is his competence, that he can adapt and bring into
operation plan B, enabling him to achieve his ultimate goals. Such a view of
providence is well-supported by the biblical evidence. An outstanding example is the
familiar Old Testament story of how Joseph revealed his identity in Egypt to the
brothers who had sold him into slavery, reassuring them with the words:
But God sent me ahead of you to preserve for you a remnant on the
earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance. So, then, it was
not you who sent me here, but God. (Genesis 45:7-8).
41
Sanders, J., The God Who Risks, (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 21.
42 As Calvin observes - "Whatever happens in the universe is governed by God's incomprehensible
plans (.Institutes ofthe Christian Religion, 1.17.2) God regulates all tilings according to his secret plan
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According to Calvinist theology, the whole saga was predetermined by God, but if,
with opentheism, we grant libertarian freedom to the brothers, then, once they had
sinned against God by their callous act towards Joseph, God was able to use their
perfidy in the working out of his ultimate purpose.44 The same working out of
providence can, of course, be seen in the crucifixion ofChrist. As St Paul expressed it:
And we know that in all things, God works for the good of those who
love him. (Romans 8:28).
Surely, "in all things" might be understood to include postmortem circumstances,
where God's providence would also be operative. The particular view of providence
taken by opentheists has been described as General Providence as opposed to the
Meticulous Providence of conventional theism. God has chosen not to control tightly
every detail of what happens, and so at times he allows the sinful actions of men and
women which are contrary to his will for us. Sometimes it is true that God alone
decides what will happen, but more usually, in allowing humans freedom of action, he
initiates and invites our co-operation. This notion of sovereignty has been described as
persuasion, rather than coercion or domination.
Opentheism involves a limitation on God's knowledge of the future, and this possibly
marks its greatest divergence from the conventional view, and has occasioned the
strongest opposition from neo-Calvinists. Since humans co-operate with God in the
working out of his plans, the future is not a prearranged blueprint. Instead, for both
God and his creatures, it is partly open rather than completely settled and certain. The
opentheist position that God is open to the future is sometimes called presentism.
According to this view, God has complete knowledge of past and present, but not of
the future. The opentheist understanding of God's omniscience also means that God
knows those aspects of the future that are determined to occur (such as those that God
has unilaterally ordained to come to pass). As far as future human free choices are
concerned, God knows them as possibilities rather than as certainties. God knows the
range of possible choices available to us, and, because of his intimate knowledge of
our past behaviour, and also of our inner inclinations, he is able to estimate the
44 Pinnock uses another biblical illustration to make this point, recalling that when God cannot persuade
Moses to accept tire call, he resorts to an alternative plan, calling Aaron into tire picture. - Pinnock,
C.H., The Openness ofGod, op.cit., 116.
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likelihood of each possible choice. Thus opentheists assert that God is omniscient, in
that he knows all that can be known, and has complete foreknowledge of all fixed
truths. In this matter, opentheism is, of course, sharply opposed to Calvinism which
propounds God's exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. His omniscience is the
direct consequence of his foreordination of everything that happens or will happen.
Opentheism is closer to Arminianism, but differs significantly from classic
Arminianism as held, for instance, by Wesley. Wesley and Arminius hold to the
traditional definitions of unchangeability, eternity and omniscience. They believe in
simple forektiowledge. According to simple foreknowledge, God previsions all future
contingent events, and so knows what definitely will happen, not merely what might
happen. This is an important step forward from Calvinism, because it allows human
beings libertarian freedom ofwill, and therefore an ability, with the help of prevenient
grace, to participate in their own salvation, whereas Calvinism states that the destiny
of humans is preordained. Opentheists, however, go beyond classical Arminianism,
which they think puts real interaction between God and human beings into danger.
The openness model, in advocating a limitation of God's knowledge of the future,
echoes the views of other contemporary theologians, not normally included in the
openness category. Jurgen Moltmann speaks of the divine self-limitation or kenosis,
whereby God freely chooses to allow the world to impact him without, however,
losing his lordship over it.45 Keith Ward is another who expresses a similar view.46
It will be clear from this survey and comparison of conventional theism with
opentheism, that openness views are much more favourable towards the destiny of the
unevangelised. If orthodox Augustinian/Calvinism is correct, then the fate of the
unevangelised is predetermined, and cannot be changed either before or after death. If,
on the other hand, human beings have freedom to make their input into their ultimate
destiny, the defining character of that input - whether it be in accordance with a 'faith-
principle' inclusivism before death, or through a postmortem encounter with Christ, is
worthy of closer examination. Before, however, a conclusion can be reached, further
consideration in greater detail will be given to those attributes of God which continue
45 See Bauckham, R., The Theology ofJurgenMoltmann, (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1995), 15-17.
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to be the source of controversy between conservative and opentheist theologians. It
will also be necessary to explore in greater depth, the Augustinian/Calvinist doctrine
of double predestination, and how theology has regarded it. Attention must now be
paid to the basic axioms of opentheism, and how they relate to the final destiny of the
unevangelised.
(d) Basic Axioms ofOpentheism
The first basic axiom is God's universal salvific will. The universality ofGod's plan
of salvation is already plain in the Old Testament, as far back as Abraham's call. God
calls Abraham and his seed after him to be a special nation. He is chosen not for his
own sake, but for the sake of the world. The election of Israel is a corporate call to
service as Isaiah makes clear - "I will also make you a light for the Gentiles, that you
may bring salvation to the ends of the earth." (Is.49:6). God is also concerned with
nations beyond Israel, as he interacts with pagan believers such as Abel, Enoch, Daniel
and Noah. (Gen.9:17). The call of Abraham implements the promise to Noah. Another
godly man of the covenant is Melchizedek, a Canaanite priest of a god called El Elyon,
God Most High. (Gen. 14:17-24). Abraham receives a blessing from this pagan priest,
and gives a tithe in return. God's global reach of salvation is obvious in the prophetic
literature of the Old Testament, and also in the Psalms (e.g. Ps. 102:15,22).
God's universal plan of salvation is also central to Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom
ofGod. Jesus makes it very clear that Gentiles are included as well as Jews, and that
all nations will have a share in God's salvation. St Luke's Gospel, in particular,
affirms that no group or nation has a favoured position in relation to salvation, and that
God is bringing his blessings to all people on earth. In the epistles, Jesus is depicted as
providing redemption for the sins of the entire human race. (Col.1:13-14; Heb.l: 3; 1
John 2:2; 2 Pet.3:9). Jesus is the Saviour of the world. (1 Tim.4:10); the one Mediator
between God and humanity. (1 Tim.2:4-6), and the one through whom God has
reconciled the whole world. (2 Cor.5:18-21). Above all, the all-embracing scope of
Christ's redemptive work is clearly expressed in Revelation, when John the Divine
46
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. pictures the promised reward, a renewed and transformed world, where God makes
all things new (Rev.21:5).
The second basic axiom held by opentheists is the particularity and finality of
salvation only in Jesus. John Sanders defines these terms as follows:
The term 'finality' refers to the unsurpassibility and normativity of
both the work (e.g. atonement), and the revelation of Jesus. The term
'particularity' refers to the fact that the salvation provided by God is
available only through Jesus. Jesus is the Saviour. There are no
others.1
Scriptural witness to Jesus' finality is found, for example, in Heb.l:3, and in Jesus'
own words - "He who has seen me has seen the Father." (John 14:9). Throughout the
New Testament, the particularity of salvation only through Jesus is plainly evident. It
is indeed the uniqueness and finality of Jesus which makes salvation available to
everyone. The second axiom identifies the basis of God's generous offer of salvation
to all the nations. The way in which the particular and the universal are held together is
obvious in such passages as John 3:16-17 and 1 Tim.2:3-6.
The exegesis of such passages by opentheists such as Pinnock and Sanders signals a
highly significant departure from the interpretation of Calvin who argues that the
verses ostensibly supporting God's universal salvific will do not refer to all human
beings, but only to those whom God has chosen to save. Terms such as 'world', and
'all' simply refer to the elect and to the fact that God saves from every group or class
of human. This is the view which involves the distinctive Calvinist doctrines of
predestination and limited atonement, to which opentheists are firmly opposed.
A third basic axiom held by opentheists is the necessity of human free choice.
Opentheists believe in libertarian freedom, rather than compatibilism,2 and so, this
axiom separates their position (as do many of their other beliefs), from the
Augustinian/Calvinist tradition, and from Barthian determinism. This axiom will be
given detailed discussion in the following chapter.
1
Sanders, J., No Other Name, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1992), 26.
2 A typical example occurs in W.G. MacDonald's The BiblicalDoctrine ofElection - "In a parable
(The Wedding Banquet for the King's Son - Matt.22:8-9) - he (Jesus) illustrated how the choice of
one's destiny was one's own to accept or decline." - MacDonald, W.G., "The Biblical Doctrine of
Election" in Pinnock C.H. (ed.), The Grace ofGod and the Will ofMan, op.cit., 212. "Nowhere in all
Jesus' parables and teaching does he portray a God-figure who compels compliance with his wishes, or
overrides individual freedom to force his good will on anybody." - ibid., 213.
104
The three basic axioms mean that salvation must be universally accessible, and that
there requires to be opportunity for all peoples to encounter Jesus Christ, and to
respond to him freely. It stands to reason that as God desires the salvation of all, he
will make the means of salvation available to all. It would seem unfair that many
millions of unreached people would be condemned by a just and loving God, even
though they had no chance to hear of Jesus. Opentheists differ as to how this is
effected. Broadly speaking, there are two positions. One maintains that people need
not be aware that their salvation is in Jesus Christ (inclusivism), and the other, that the
opportunity for salvation may be given after physical death, as well as, in some cases,
before it. (postmortem evangelism). Some opentheists, as, for example, Clark Pinnock,
seek to combine the two views and hold them together. The rest of this chapter will be
devoted to the elucidation and critique of these two beliefs.
(e) Inclusivism
By 'inclusivism' opentheists refer to the view upholding Christ as the Saviour of
humanity, but also affirming God's saving presence in the wider world, and in other
religions. The idea is that each religion can and should be appreciated as the
expression of a valid response to God, while conceding that there is much in the
beliefs and practices of other religions which would be unacceptable to those
practising Christianity. Proponents of inclusivism maintain that some of those who
never hear the Gospel may nevertheless attain salvation before they die, if they
respond to the revelation they do have. God judges them according to their response to
the light they have, not according to the light which did not reach them, and his
judgment takes into account what people are conscious of, and what they truly desire.
As already indicated, inclusivists affirm the particularity and finality of salvation only
in Christ, but deny that knowledge of his work is necessary for salvation. It is possible,
that is to say, to receive the gift of salvation without knowing the giver or the precise
nature of the gift. God will accept into his kingdom those who repent and trust him,
even if they know nothing of Jesus.
Inclusivists cite two types of texts to support their case. The first type deals with God's
character and will, and alludes to God's extension of grace to all who believe in him. 1
Tim.4:10 is typical - "we have fixed our hope on the living God, who is the Saviour of
all men, especially ofbelievers." This is understood to mean that the living God saves
all who believe in him, irrespective of the specific content of saving faith, as long as it
is grounded in an essential trust in God. Another popular text for inclusivists is John
1:9, affirming that Jesus is the light that came into the world and enlightens every
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man, so that everyone experiences the illumination of the Logos to a greater or lesser
degree. They maintain that through the agency of the Holy Spirit, the light of the
world is seeking to draw all people to himself. (John 12:32).
The second type of text is concerned with God's attitude toward, and relationships
with the Gentiles outside the covenant with Israel. As has already been noted in the
texts mentioned above supporting God's universal salvific will, the Old Testament
clearly witnesses to the fact that God is concerned with those outside the special
covenant with Israel. The same kind of evidence is found in the New Testament when
Paul emphatically declares that God is the God of the Gentiles, and not of the Jews
only. (Rom.3:29). Gentiles also are frequently lifted up as examples of faith. But the
example most frequently quoted by inclusivists is that of the Roman centurion,
Cornelius, in Acts 10. Cornelius, in the eyes of both Luther and Calvin3 was a "saved"
believer before Peter arrived. He had already been illuminated by the Spirit and
sanctified. He had already received the merits of Christ's objective redemption
through genuine faith in God. He had always been a person desirous of knowing the
truth, and God now made it possible for him, through Peter, to know the fullness of
salvation that comes through a personal relationship with Christ. But there are others
in whose hearts light has dawned, but who, unlike Cornelius, never receive the greater
light, and they are judged on the basis of the knowledge they already have. Paul, for
example, in Rom.2:12-16, says that because man is created in God's image, he has
God's moral law written on his heart. If he accepts the verdict of guilty handed down
by his conscience, then he is ready for an encounter with special revelation. This
consideration brings us into the realm of general, as opposed to special revelation.
God, the eternal Son and Logos, upholds all things by his power, and enlightens
everyone coming into the world. God the Spirit also proceeds from the Father, and is
present in the whole world. He is active in human culture, and in non-Christian
religions which reflect, to some degree, general revelation and prevenient grace. God
never leaves himself without witness, and reveals himself through the created order,
(Acts 14:16-17), which means that people always have divine light to respond to.
General revelation also bears witness to God's divinity (Rom. 1:20), and glory
(Ps.l9:l). Paul quotes from Ps.19 in order to confirm the universal extent of God's
redemptive grace. (Rom. 10:18).
3
Luther, M., Lectures on Galatians, vol. 26 of Luther's Works, ed. Pelikan J., (St Louis: Concordia
Publishing, 1963), 210; and Calvin J., Institutes ofthe Christian Religion, 3.17.4.
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If salvation can be enjoyed by non-Christian believers, through general revelation, the
question which now arises is - "How is this salvation appropriated by the believer?" In
order to find the opentheist answer to this query, we must turn to Pinnock's "faith
principle". The "faith principle", Pinnock contends, is what makes salvation accessible
outside the Church. He holds that people are saved when they fulfil the condition of
Heb.ll:6 — "And without faith it is impossible to please God, because anyone who
comes to him must believe that he exists, and that he rewards those who earnestly seek
him." Pinnock regards all such as "pre-Christian" believers in God, who are already
saved by grace through faith By 'faith', Pinnock does not mean that one must confess
the name of Jesus to be saved, and he cites the examples of Job, David and babies
dying in infancy, to prove his case.4 Nor does one have to be conscious of the work of
Christ, done on one's behalf, in order to benefit from that work. 1 Tim.4:10, for
example, states - "that we have put our hope in the living God, who is the Saviour of
all men, and especially of those who believe." Among those who have defended the
"faith principle", Pinnock lists Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Zwingli5 and
John Wesley. Implicitly there, as part of the "faith principle" is the need for repentance
at some level. This is particularly necessary as Pinnock concedes religions are often
paths to Hell, idols of our creation, and evil deceptions. It is when such believers cast
themselves into God's hands for forgiveness and safe-keeping, and call upon divine
mercy, that they are on the road to rescue. They are saved objectively on the basis of
Christ's work of atonement; they are saved subjectively in that God elicits a faith
response to the glimmer of light in general revelation. As they do not know about
Christ, their faith is implicit.
Pinnock's use of the 'faith principle' poses the question as to how it might relate to the
social and ecclesial dimension of postmortem existence. Much of the discussion about
salvation appears to neglect the social aspect, while putting the emphasis upon the
salvation of the individual. David Fergusson believes that this may be so, because of
"the tendency to consider the immortal soul as the essential person."6 If, as this thesis
contends, the personality is recreated in a new 'spiritual' body in the intermediate
state, and, if there is a transformation of the entire created order, then inter-human
relations after death are implied. As relationships here on earth between human beings




Zwingli makes the point in these words - "There has not lived a single good man, there has not been a
single pious heart or believing soul from the beginning of the world to the end, which you will not see
in the presence of God." The text is in Zwingli andBidlinger, trans. Bromiley Geoffrey W.,
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), 275-6.
6
Fergusson, D.A.S., "Eschatology" in Gunton, C.E.(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Christian
Doctrine, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 237.
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and downright selfishness, there requires to be a transformation of these relationships
beyond death. This will involve, for example, reconciliation between erstwhile
enemies. Even attitudes towards others which have been loving before death could be
deepened after it. Fellowship in the intermediate state would be inspired by the Spirit,
and would be a vital part of salvation.
To what extent, then, does this slant upon salvation appear in opentheist theology? The
most extended treatment would appear to be in The Biblical Doctrine ofElection by
William C. Macdonald. He describes the new community which Christ inaugurated as
bringing in the Kingdom of God. It would be 'in Christ', by means of spiritual union
with him. (Rom.8:19). Macdonald discerns the "corporate solidarity" principle,
particularly in Eph. 1:22-23 - where Christ becomes "head over everything for the
Church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills everything in every way."
Macdonald makes little explicit reference to the future life, but it is surely implied
when he mentions the -
eternal perspective of election that enables us to see that in the New
Testament the 'times will have reached their fulfilment - to bring all
things in heaven and on earth together under one head, even Christ.
(Eph. 1:10)7
Macdonald, therefore, points, not only to a social dimension in the corporate solidarity
principle, but also to an ecclesial dimension. The social and ecclesial dimension of
salvation would, however, appear to be underplayed in the thought of leading
opentheists such as Pinnock and Sanders. Pinnock does, nevertheless, acknowledge
that "conversion points, then, not only to individual change, but beyond, to the coming
transformation of the world," and he sees that "social sanctification and cosmic
renewal are ultimately part of God's plan."8 Yet, the question must arise as to how
Pinnock's 'faith principle' and his inclusivism relate to the corporate salvation of the
intermediate state.9 Those who, in his view, are saved by their response 'in faith' to
such light as they have received, issuing in virtuous life, are on the way to a fuller
dimension of salvation beyond death. This will happen only when they encounter
Christ for the first time explicitly in the intermediate state, and it will then incorporate





Pinnock, C.H., Flame ofLove, (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 146.
9 A clue is given in Pinnock's reference to faith assuming 'corporate form' - "Community is important
because God does not want faith to be expressed only in an interior way within tire hearts of individual
disciples. Human experience itself is social, and faith needs to assume corporate form. It needs to be
ecclesial, and to have public attestation." - ibid., 116-7.
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It is worth making two further points in connection with the 'faith principle'. Pinnock
uses Wesley s concept of prevenient grace" to describe how believers with a
consciousness of sin, respond to the Spirit who draws them to the light.10 Second, it is
not our own righteousness, but that of Christ. As Sanders points out, this righteousness
does not depend upon our knowledge, but upon our faith in God "whether that God be
known as Creator or as the Incarnate One." 1112
It is, important to understand that this does not mean that non-Christians may be saved
by being good people. Pinnock makes this point by noting, what the Epistle of James
teaches that faith without works is dead, and that genuine faith is made visible by
works. (James 2:14-26).13 What is all-important is the kind of faith which is revealed
in kingdom acts, and participation in Christ's loving way of life, manifesting itself in
the service of others.
Opentheists, such as Pinnock and Sanders, have been much encouraged by
developments in Roman Catholic theology on the final destiny of the unevangelised.
Pinnock, for example, links his idea of the Spirit offering prevenient grace to the
unevangelised, with the Roman Catholic concept of the "baptism of desire", an idea
first propounded in the Middle Ages, given formal ecclesiastical expression by Pius
XII in 1949, and picked up again at Vatican II. Here, acts of love and charity
demonstrate a desire for Christ which would be sufficient to be saved. Pinnock notes
that where there is such a desire for God, there is a "kind of rising to life and dying to
self', because the person decides to give himself or herself to God and neighbour. A
decision of this kind occurs as an enriching gift of God's grace.14
10 Pinnock says - "The Spirit challenges everyone to relate to God by means of his self-disclosure...
God is revealed in the beauty and order of the natural world, and is the prevenient grace that benefits
every person." and "Spirit prepares the way for Christ by gracing humanity everywhere. Spirit supplies
the prevenient grace that benefits every person".- Pinnock, C.H.,ibid., 61,63.
11 Sanders J., WhatAbout Those Who Have Ne\>erHeard? (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press,
1995), 43.
12
Although not strictly speaking to be classed as an opentheist, Pannenberg is certainly an inclusivist,
and his views ought to be included here, as follows - "In their case, (the unevangelised), what counts is
whether their individual conduct actually agrees with the will of God that Jesus proclaimed. The
message of Jesus is the norm by which God judges even in the case of those who never met Jesus
personally. As the parable of the Sheep and the Goats shows, this means that those who have never
known Jesus, but who have done works of love, that are in accord with his message, will in fact
participate in the salvation of God's kingdom, and will be pronounced innocent at the judgment of
God.. .Again, all to whom the Beatitudes apply (Matt. 5.3ff.) will have share in the coming salvation,
whether or not they ever heard of Jesus in this life." - Pannenberg W., Systematic Theology, vol,3
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1991), 615.
13
Pinnock, C.H., Response to Part 3 of Gray T. and Sinkinson C, Reconstructing Theology, (Carlisle:
Paternoster Press, 2000), 263.
14
Pinnock, C.H., op.cit., 206.
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The Roman Catholic position since Vatican II is as follows:
Those also can attain to everlasting salvation who, through no fault of
their own, do not know the gospel of Christ or his Church, yet
sincerely seek God, and, moved by grace, strive by their deeds to do
his will, as it is known to them through the dictates of conscience. Nor
does divine Providence deny the help necessary for salvation to those
who, without blame on their part, have not arrived at an explicit
knowledge of God, but who strive to live a good life.15
While considering Roman Catholic theology, attention should be paid to the thought
of Karl Rahner, who, although not normally regarded as an opentheist, holds
inclusivist views. Rahner's inclusivism arises out of his belief in the principle of
universal accessibility. He maintains that throughout the history of the human race, in
all times and places, every individual must have the possibility of a genuine
relationship with God. This must be true otherwise there could be no effective plan of
God for the salvation of humanity16. Rahner wishes to allow for the possibility that all
human beings may be saved by Jesus Christ. His well-known thesis of "anonymous
Christians" holds that people may in fact be saved by Jesus though they never realise
that fact during their lives. He describes his belief in these words:
Christianity does not simply confront the member of an extra-
Christian religion as a mere non-Christian, but as someone who can,
and must, be regarded in this or that respect as an "anonymous
Christian". It would be wrong to regard the pagan as someone who
has not yet been touched in any way by God's grace and truth.17
"Anonymous Christians," then, already have a measure of grace, and grace is always
the grace of God in Christ. This grace is God's self-communication to the human
spirit. The recipient has a supernatural capacity of responding to the divine offer, and
this response has the nature of an act of faith. The way in which the divine approach
reaches the recipient can be through an absolutely binding demand of conscience.18 As
15
Abbott, Walter, (ed.), The Documents ofVatican II, (New York: American Press, 1966), 35.
16".. .the individual ought to, and must have the possibility in this life ofpartaking in a genuine
relationship with God, and this at all time and in all situations of the history of the human race.
Otherwise, there could be no question of a serious and also actually effective salvific design of God for
all men, in all ages and places." - Rahner, K., Theological Investigations, 5, 128.
17
Ralmer, K., "Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions", in Theological Investigations, 5: 115-34,
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 75.
18 "The person who accepts a moral demand from his conscience as absolutely valid for him, and
embraces it as such, in a free act of affirmation - no matter how unreflected - asserts the absolute being
ofGod, whether he knows it, or conceptualises it or not, as the very reason why there can be such a
thing as an absolute moral demand at all." - Rahner, K„ Theological Investigations, 9.153 (London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 153.
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they follow the dictates of conscience, people are enabled to overcome their egoism,
and to love others as themselves. It can also come through an experience of great
beauty.19 These acts of grace and charity proceed from the grace of Christ, without the
person knowing him. It is worthy of note that the term "anonymous Christians"
includes not only those who are outside the Christian faith and who belong to other
religions, but also those who do not believe in God at all. The act of faith in which
they respond may not be religious faith in any sense at all. Yet, it is similar to faith,
because it occurs at a very deep level of human existence, and calls for trust and risk,
openness and love. Rahner believes that such an experience is a genuine encounter
with God, the mystery of being, and without it there can be no salvation or fulfilment
in life. It could be said that when this encounter takes place, God's approach happens
through Jesus Christ, who is the Mediator between God and man. (1 Tim.2.15). Jesus's
death is the final expression ofwhat God has always been doing in history.
Rahner maintains that God's presence in the transcendental depths of the religious
questings and experiences of all people is expressed in the rituals, ethics, communal
structures and world views of various religions, with varying degrees of adequacy.
Rahner's term for this encounter is a "supernatural existential." Rahner recognises a
non-Christian religion as a lawful religion (although in different degrees), without
thereby denying the error and depravity contained in it20. Such a lawful religion can be
a positive means of gaining the right relationship to God, of attaining salvation, a
means which is therefore positively included in God's plan. Rahner's most
fundamental conviction, according to Eamonn Conway 21is that those who do not
close themselves off to God through an ultimate act of free and personal sin, for which
they are culpable, find salvation. Rahner deduces this from the Church's teaching on
God's universal salvific will, and the Church's obligation to be optimistic about the
effectiveness of this salvific will.22. Rahner's combination of universal accessibility
for salvation with his inclusivism does, however, uncover one of the points on which
this thesis would take issue with his theology preferring instead to hold to the
universality of a postmortem encounter with Christ. Nevertheless, Rahner believes that
from the moment the gospel reaches anonymous Christians and is truly presented to
them, the anonymous must become explicit. It must find fulfilment in the Church,
since one who thus explicitly accepts Christianity has - to quote Rahner - "a still
greater chance of salvation than someone who is merely an anonymous Christian.
19
Raliner, K., Theological Investigations, op.cit., 6. 231-49.
20
Rahner, K., Theological Investigations, op.cit., 5. 121.
21
Conway, E., The Anonymous Christian —A Relativised Christianity, (Frankfurt am Main. Peter Lang,
1991), 109.
22
Rainier, K., Foundations ofthe Christian Faith, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1978), 148.
23
Newbigin, L., SignsAmid the Rubble, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2003), 68.
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Reservations about Rahner s thesis are recorded below after a more extended critique
of the opentheist views on inclusivism.
Weighty arguments have been advanced by conservative theologians against
Pinnock s inclusivism. Two recent books represent the kind of opposition which his
theology is having to face -Reconstructing Theology - A Critical Assessment of the
Theology of Clark Pinnock by Tony Gray and Christopher Sinkinson, and The
Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised., by Daniel Strange. The latter is a
particularly thorough and painstaking critique, but considerations of space here, will
confine reference to the main points of opposition to Pinnock.
Sinkinson considers Pinnock's theological framework to be seriously faulty, because
he empties such terms as 'faith', 'God' and 'salvation' of their scriptural meaning. He
believes that the 'faith' which Pinnock finds in non-Christian world religions is "little
more than general, moral goodness."24
A weightier objection is that common grace available through general revelation is
epistemologically inadequate and cannot be a ground of salvation.
One of the reasons why general revelation is insufficient, in the view of Christopher
Partridge, is because, when God personally approaches and encounters all persons,
including those in other faiths, the encounter is instantly distorted by sin.25 The natural
man, operating in the context of natural religion, and lacking special revelation, is
believed by such as Partridge and Bruce Demarest, "to possess a fundamentally false
understanding of spiritual truth."26 His critics believe that Pinnock confuses the
general and universal operations of the Spirit in creation, and the specific and
particular operations of the Spirit in salvation.
Daniel Strange criticises the pneumatological focus of Pinnock's thoughts on
salvation, believing that the redemptive work of Christ on the Cross is underplayed.27
Strange cannot understand why the Cross is needed if it is not the source of God's
24
Sinkinson, C., "Clark Pinnock and the World Religions" in Reconstructing Theology, op.cit., 182-3.
25
Partridge C., "A Christian Personalist Response to Pinnock's Inclusivism", ibid., 197.
26 Demarest B., GeneralRevelation: Historical Views and Contemporary Issues. (Grand Rapids,:
Zondervan, 1982), 259.
27
Strange asks - "IfGod's love is grounded in creation and the presence of the Spirit, then what
exactly is the purpose of the incarnation and the atonement? If the Cross is not the source ofGod's
saving grace, then why is it needed?...What are the benefits of Christ to the unevangelised if grace is
universally present outside the incarnation and has always been universally present?" - Strange D.,
"Deciphering the Conundrum ofPneumatological Inclusivism" in Reconstructing Theology, op.cit.,
248-9.
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saving grace, and he asks how Christ can benefit the unevangelised if grace has always
been universally present outside the incarnation.
Strange believes that, in Pinnock's thought, saving grace can be seen as divorced from
the Cross, rather than flowing from the Cross. This, however, is not necessarily the
case, as it is surely true, that where the Spirit is operating, there the Second Person of
the Trinity is also active.
Pinnock's attempts to draw a parallel between Old Testament 'pagan saints' and the
unevangelised in later eras, also proves to be unacceptable to such as Strange, who
maintains that Old Testament figures such as Abel, Enoch and Abraham, belong to the
line that was the precursor of Israel and the Church, and were the recipients of special
revelation "in embryonic form"28. Strange makes the same point with reference to
Cornelius whom Pinnock describes as "the pagan saint par excellence of the New
Testament, a believer in God before he became a Christian."29 But Strange contends
that Cornelius was the recipient of at least some special revelation through his Jewish
faith, and an angelic visitation, rather than simply through contact with general
revelation.30 The main difference between Pinnock and Strange centres upon Strange's
contention that personal confession of Christ is necessary for salvation, a position
which he maintains is based upon the New Testament , because the apostles in Acts
"constantly preach repentance and forgiveness of sin in the name ofChrist."31
Lesslie Newbigin indicates his opposition to inclusivism in a series of questions put
mainly to Rahner, but one of which, in particular, also casts doubt upon Pinnock's
view that the Spirit in other religions prepares people for the gospel of Christ which
then becomes a kind of fulfilment.32 Rahner also attracts criticism, even from an
28
Strange D., The Possibility ofSalvation Among the Unevangelised, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press,
2002), 169.
29




Strange, ibid., This view is also held by Richard R.P., in his book, The Population ofHeaven: A
BiblicalResponse to the Inclusivist Position on Who Will be Sa\>ed, (Chicago: Moody Press, 1994), 57-
60.
32
Newbigin's questions put to inclusivists such as Rahner, include these: (1) Does Christianity really
provide the explicit manifestation of that which is present in a hidden and anonymous form in the non-
Christian religions? At many points, Christianity, rather than being "The Crown ofHinduism",
contradicts its strongest affirmations, or answers questions which Hinduism does not ask; and this is
even more obviously the case with Islam. (2) If the fulfilmentmodel is the true one, why is it that the
most devout and truly godly among the non-Christians often oppose the preaching of the Gospel most
passionately? (3) Why is it that it is in the religions that we are to find anonymous Christianity? Why
not other forms of human society through which we receive the kindness of God? See Newbigin L.,
op.cit., 70. A similar critique is expressed by Vernon White - "While we may be encouraged to think
of Christ's anonymous reconciling activity within non-Christian contexts, it does not follow that the
religious truths found within those other religions and ideologies are ipso facto, essentially the same as
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opentheist like Pinnock, who believes that he goes too far, and further than Vatican II,
when he declares that religions like Buddhism can be vehicles of salvation, with good
Buddhists being anonymous Christians.33
Pinnock's own position seems to be that while God can call people to himself, and
prepare them for salvation from within other religions, as systems they are not reliable
vehicles of salvation.
While the grace of God is assuredly at work in non-Christian religions, this thesis
contends that the followers of these religions, when they respond to such light as they
have received, are on the right road, heading towards salvation. Di Noia puts forward
what would appear to be a preferable alternative to Rahner's view that non-Christians
can enjoy a hidden membership in the Christian community.34 Di Noia suggests that
the possible salvation of non-Christians should be described as their future or
'prospective' affiliation with the Christian community. He also demurs at the
application of the word 'faith' to the dispositions and conduct of the members of other
religious communities, and indeed, it does seem strange that a moral act when it is
salvific, can have the sufficient character of faith. But, while criticising what Rahner
would call an implicit faith in Christ, Di Noia, employing the concept of prospective
affiliation to the Christian community for members of non-Christian communities,
asserts that these non-Christians could have the opportunity to acknowledge Christ in
the future. This view is very much in line with the conclusion of this thesis, which will
promote the possibility of postmortem conversion
(f) Postmortem Evangelism
Postmortem or eschatological evangelism is the idea that people will receive an
opportunity after death to hear about Christ, and to accept or reject him. Proponents of
evangelisation after death agree with restrictivists, over against inclusivists, that
explicit knowledge of Christ is necessary for salvation, and that not everyone will be
saved. It is not, therefore, a variety ofuniversalism.
those found within historic Christianity; nor that such truths must naturally find their goal and
fulfilment in historic Christianity." - White, V., Atonement and Incarnation, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 23.
33 "The bishops of Vatican II did not say that Jesus is hidden in the religious history of humanity. These
are the idea of theologians like Rahner and others subsequent to the Council, and they represent large
steps beyond it that we should not be taking." - Pinnock, op.cit., 108-9.
34 Di Noia, J.A., believes, however, that "the idea that a non-Christian can be covertly Christian tends
to lead inevitably to an inappropriate underestimation of the distinctiveness and integrity of the patterns
of life fostered by other religious communities in their particular teachings. - Di Noia, J.A., "Implicit
Faith, General Revelation and the State ofNon-Christians," in The Thomist, V, 47 (1983), 211, 237.
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The biblical basis for the idea is found in texts which predict Jesus' descent into hell —
Matt. 12:40 and John 5:25-29. It is also mentioned in Acts 2:24,27,31; Rom. 10:7, and
perhaps 1 Cor.l5:54, but most certainly in Eph.4:8-10. Allusions are also made to the
descent in Phil.2:10; Rev.5:13 and 1:18. Prayers for the dead, including those who
died in sin were made by the Jews of New Testament times. Some New Testament
exegetes, including for example, William Barclay, believe that 2.Tim. 1:16-18 contains
a reference to praying for the dead: they maintain that the person, for whom Paul
prays, Onesiphorus, was dead. Liturgies, containing prayers for the dead, were
common over wide areas of the early Church. Leaders of the early Church, such as
Ignatius of Antioch, Irenaeus and Tertullian, restricted their prayers for the dead, who
benefited from Christ's redemptive work, to the Old Testament patriarchs and
prophets. Other theologians of the early Church, notably Clement of Alexandria and
Origen, believed that Christ released any who desired salvation from hell, including
Gentiles, who had no contact with the Jewish faith, and had no conception of a
Messiah. The most important texts for postmortem evangelism are 1 Peter 3:19 and
4:6, to the exegesis of which close attention was paid in Chapter 3 of this thesis. One
particular interpretation of these texts which seems especially relevant here is the view
- popular in the early Church - that during his descent into hell, Jesus preached the
gospel to all present, and then led all who accepted him as Saviour out of that prison.
This would strongly underline the universal reach of Christ's redeeming work, and
God's desire to make his grace universally accessible. Gabriel Fackre, a leading
modern exponent of postmortem evangelism, which he describes as "Divine
Perseverance", points out that these texts give us light on the subject because they are
"part of the larger sweep of the biblical story," and express God's indefatigable
purpose to ensure that "the last and least in time and eternity will not be overlooked or
35denied access to the saving Word of Jesus Christ."
Fackre, in promoting "Divine Perseverance", says that the poet Francis Thompson,
was right in contending that Christ is the "Hound ofHeaven", pursuing us to the end.
He goes on to say that God's goodness will not relent in face of the sinful limitations
• 36
which have restricted the Church's mission in time and space.
35
Fackre, G., "Divine Perseverance," in Sanders J. (ed.), op.cit., 86.
36 "The goodness of God will not relent in the face of these realities. And tire power ofGod breaks
through their limitations. The gates of death as well as the "gates of hell cannot prevail against tire
divine perseverance. The powerful love of God assures that the saving word will be proclaimed to
those who have not heard it, even beyond tire gates of death." - Fackre, G., ibid., 81.
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The biblical pattern of God s patient pursuit is taken up by believers in the early
centuries. The Church Fathers pay particular attention to texts pointing to an
intermediate state , and the descent of Christ into the realm of the dead — the latter
idea subsequently finding its way into the Apostles' Creed.
Fackre draws attention to the importance of postmortem evangelism during the
centuries of missionary expansion, and especially in the 19th century. Andover
Seminary, where Fackre taught, sent many graduates to the mission fields of the
Pacific, Asia and Africa, where they were made aware of the vast numbers who would
not hear the gospel. The question was often put to them by converts, concerned about
the fate of beloved ancestors, who had died before hearing the Word. The "Andover
Theory" was therefore propounded; it was based upon many of the texts mentioned
above, which were regarded as validating an eschatological option for those who had
not been confronted in this life with Christ. Fackre describes it as a theory of "second
probation".
Among the theological issues behind postmortem evangelism is the insufficiency of
general revelation. One theologian, who has written in this way, is Donald Bloesch,
who claims that to believe that all mankind can become aware of God by the light of
nature and conscience is "the basis for the misunderstanding of God", nor is it
sufficient for salvation.37
The insufficiency of general revelation has also been notably upheld by Lutheran
theologians, such as Paul Althaus who says that,
outside of Christ, there is indeed a self-manifestation of God, and
therefore knowledge ofGod, but it does not lead to salvation.38
Allied to this in much Lutheran theology, is the conviction that only an encounter with
Jesus Christ can lead to salvation. As God wishes everyone to be saved, it is argued
that an opportunity will be provided after death. Prominent among recent Lutheran
theologians espousing this doctrine is George Lindbeck. Fie believes that a primarily
futuristic eschatological theory is more congenial to the Protestant tradition. This is
due to the Reformation emphasis upon the fides ex auditu the faith which comes
through hearing the gospel proclamation. (Rom. 10:17). This idea assumes that explicit
37
Bloesch, D., The Future ofEvangelical Christianity: A Callfor UnityAmidDiversity, (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1983), 121.
38
Althaus, P., cited by Braaten C., in "Lutheran Theology and Religious Pluralism", in Lutheran World
Federation, 23-24 (Jan. 1988), 118.
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faith in Christ is required before men and women are redeemed. If this does not
happen in this life, then the beginning of salvation must be thought of as occurring
through an encounter with the Risen Lord in or after death. Lindbeck suggests an
interim period of darkness for non-Christians when they "are not headed toward either
heaven or hell."39
The conception of postmortem evangelism has also an interesting connection with the
heightened awareness of infant mortality which has come about through better
communication in the modern world. The Princeton theologians, Charles Hodge and
Benjamin Warfield, both ofwhom hold to predestinarian assumptions, declare that all
such progeny are saved "by the unconditional decree of God"40 But this contradicts
the beliefs of upholders of postmortem evangelism who believe that no-one is saved
without an act of faith, though the opportunity of responding to God's grace, they
maintain, will also be extended after death to infants who die prematurely.
In promoting postmortem evangelism, Fackre criticises some of the views held by
inclusivists - notably the "faith principle". As already indicated earlier, doubt has been
expressed about the conception of'faith' held by such as Pinnock and Sanders. Fackre
refers to the standard definition of faith in New Testament theology which includes -
(a) notitia, the knowledge of our minds of Jesus Christ; (b) assensus, the assent of our
wills to Jesus Christ; (c) fiducia, the trust of our hearts in Jesus Christ. Fackre
concludes that it is wrong to reduce faith to a "universal faith principle" without
knowledge ofChrist.41
The concept of postmortem evangelism presupposes that the after-life provides
opportunities for spiritual development. So far, attention has been focused purely on
the possibility of the conversion of the unevangelised. The question arises as to the
fate of the millions of people who die with characters that are unsettled. It would seem
that the vast majority, even of Christians, die with characters which are far from
39
"Perhaps we could say that in terms of the basic New Testament eschatological pictures, the 'non-
Christians (Gentiles) are not headed toward either heaven or hell. They, as yet, have no future. They are
still trapped in the past, in the darkness of the old age. Only through the message of the coming
kingdom of God's Messiah, does the new age, the true future of the world, become real for them, and
only then, do either redemption or damnation become possible." - Lindbeck, G., "Unbelievers and the
Sola Christi, in Lindbeck, G. (ed.), The Church in a Postliberal Age, (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Eerdmans, 2002), 80,82.
40
Hodge, C., Systematic Theology, vol. 1, (New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1872), 26-27.
41
Fackre, G., op.cit., 57. Fackre launches a further salvo against Sanders' position when he points out
that: "Sanders has slipped in through the back door, the necessity of some saving knowledge - the
knowledge of a personal God. This contradicts the trust-without-knowledge refrain, and also limits
salvation to religions that teach belief in a personal God, thereby excluding the hundreds ofmillions
who espouse nontheistic Buddhism, Confucianism and so on. How is this consistent, and how is it
'inclusivism'?"-Fackre, ibid., 58.
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perfect. Few people, even although they have encountered Christ in this life, and have
found salvation, die without scope for spiritual improvement. Many a one might have
matured into sainthood if they had lived longer. The same is true of someone born into
a life of deprivation. If such a person has drifted into a life of crime, that would not
necessarily mean rejection of God, for God has not been presented to him in
favourable circumstances. In different circumstances such a person could have become
a devout believer. One would speculate that God might provide the favourable
circumstances beyond death, when he could make a fully decisive response to God.42
It would seem quite unjust for such a person to be condemned to hell because he has
had to live in unpropitious circumstances beyond his control. He ought to receive as
much opportunity for salvation as anyone else has had. In such a postmortem
encounter, it would appear that God would not expose the person to such an
overpowering sense of his majesty and power that the person's freedom to decide
would be overcome. In order to count as genuine acceptance of God's grace and
commitment to his will, the person's reaction would require to be made freely out of
faith and love. In other words, God could reveal himself only to enable such a free
response.
These beliefs have also been held by a number ofAnglican theologians who, although
not normally considered to be opentheists, hold similar views on eschatology, for
example, Richard Swinburne43 and Keith Ward.44 The idea of personal fulfilment in
42 The point is well made by Jerry Walls as follows - "Further spiritual growth could occur after death,
for one whose initial response to grace in this life was negative, but who might have become a saintly
person if she had lived longer. The same is true of a person bom into a life of deprivation. His life of
crime does not constitute a decisive rejection of god in the most favourable circumstances, and, he
would, moreover, have become a devout believer in different circumstances. God, we may assume,
could bring about the appropriate favourable circumstances during the passage of death, thereby
making up for his previous deprivation. Then he could make a fully decisive response to God." -
Walls, J., Hell and the Logic ofDamnation, (London: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1992), 90.
43 Swinburne speaks of postmortem spiritual development of those of unsettled character in these terms
- "God could allow them, or perhaps, those of them whose will was more settled towards the good, but
who remained beset with bad desires, the benefit of doubt, by making them such that they could never
lose their good will, but such that the perfecting of character remained in their own hands. In that way,
God would, as it were, respect the extent of their prior choice of the good, by giving it permanent
significance, but also respect their freedom, by leaving open to them how much they would build upon
that choice." - Swinburne R., Responsibility andAtonement, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 197.
44
Ward, perhaps, makes die point most clearly when he says - "In that sense, final salvation comes
only after death, in die resurrection life. But diere are many paths that will eventually lead to salvation
- 'In my Father's house there are many resting-places.'(John 14:2). - for those who continue to trust in
the highest insights they have. What this suggests is that there will be the possibility of progress, of
learning and growing after death, and before die resurrection kingdom is finally realised. Catholic and
Orthodox Christians have long felt that few of us will be ready for the kingdom when we die. There
will be much for us to unlearn, before we are ready to live unrestrictedly in the pure love of God. Those
who have known something of Christwill learn more ofwhat Christ truly is. We will all learn more of
die harm we have done, of selfish desires not yet overcome, and of the depths of love we have not yet
begun to explore." — Ward, K., God, Faith and the NewMillennium, op.cit., 191-2.
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Christ in the after-life, for men and women of different faiths is also suggested, from
outside the Anglican communion, by the Presbyterian theologian, George Newlands.45
It is important to distinguish these ideas from the Roman Catholic doctrine of
purgatory. This doctrine affirms that believers of basically good will, but imperfect
character, will have the opportunity of purification as a temporary punishment in
between death and final resurrection. This period can vary in length according to the
individual, and can be lessened or hastened by the prayers of the Church. The doctrine
does entail that once you get to purgatory, you will eventually, sooner or later, get to
heaven. Although it is a state of healing, it is not an opportunity for the unrepentant
sinner to turn to God. Karl Rahner describes the punishment of purgatory as
medicinal, if the sin is acknowledged, and the consequences accepted and endured to
the bitter end 46 He describes purgatory frequently as "integration". The distortion of
the individual is the contradiction between how one is intended to be by God, and
what one has allowed oneself to become47. The integrative nature of purgatory
reverses this distortion. But this is possible only for those who have made a decision
for God in their lifetime. The decision is described as "the love that is based on faith
and hope" - and therefore it is possible that this might include the unthematic decision
made by an "anonymous Christian"48.
The Roman Catholic doctrine of purgatory needs to be extended to embrace the full
width of the redeeming love of God, so that, even in hell, the possibility of repentance
is not closed, and the hand of God is extended to all who will take it without
exception. This raises the difficult question of "the second chance". Opentheists such
as Pinnock and Sanders say that postmortem evangelism is not to be confounded with
the doctrine of a second chance. What it affirms is the universality of a first chance.49
But it might then be asked who has heard the gospel fully and adequately, and what
would qualify a person for postmortem evangelisation. Stephen Davis asserts that it is
possible that people who have 'heard' the gospel, but have not responded positively to
it before death, will respond positively after death.50 He contends that only God knows
who will receive an opportunity after death to receive Christ.
45 "... the uniqueness and finality of Christ is an eschatological affirmation. Though men and women
live and die in different faiths, yet they will come, after this life on earth, to see that in eternity Christ is
tire fullness of the peace ofGod. This is the position which I myselfwould favour." - Newlands, G„
God in Christian Perspective, op.cit., 187.
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Sanders, J., op.cit., 192.
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Davis, S., "Universalism, Hell and the Fate of the Ignorant," inModern Theology, 6 (Jan. 1990),
183-4.
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Lurking behind the whole question of postmortem spiritual development is the
problem of whether this-worldly categories of time (and, indeed, of space), apply
beyond death. This is a profound philosophical problem, and limitations of space will
prevent a detailed treatment of it here. If there is to be postmortem spiritual
development, as envisaged above, it would seem that temporality must continue after
death in an intermediate state. Even Karl Rahner who believes that death is to be seen
as a moment in which a person is fixed in a state, either of "entrance into God's
presence", or of "closing oneself against" God, is forced to concede that progress of
the person to full glorification involves temporal categories.51 This exposes the real
problem of 'eternalist' accounts of immortality. They allow no time for progress in
understanding, for the development of potentialities, which may have been frustrated
on earth, or for a new and more vivid experience of God than was possible on earth.52
It has to be said that Rahner is ambiguous on this subject. The idea of an intermediate
state, while not necessarily a false concept in his eyes, is described by him as just an
"intellectual framework", which contains, as he puts it, "a little harmless
mythology".53 Also, it carries implications about time, which are unwelcome to him.
He finds it difficult to understand what time and temporality mean for a departed soul,
when, on the one hand, the soul is already with God, but on the other hand, "has to
wait for the reassumption of its function towards its own body.54
He assumes that a temporal human existence entails human freedom, and that freedom
after death threatens his firmly-held belief that a decision for or against God, can only
be made in this life. The findings of further research into the decisiveness of death in
Rahner's theology will be incorporated in the following chapter of this thesis.
There is a great diversity of opinion among theologians as to whether temporal
categories apply after death. Polkinghorne believes that they do, but points out that
this view is not the prevalent one. He believes that it belongs essentially to humanity
that we are embodied, and are temporal beings, but notes that much eschatological
thinking believes otherwise. He mentions Pannenberg as one among others who holds
that "temporality is of a piece with the structural sinfulness of time".55 The result is
that for Pannenberg, there is no fulfilment possible "without an end of time."56
51
Rahner, K., Foundations ofthe Christian Faith, op.cit., 442.
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Ward, K., Religion andHuman Nature, op.cit., 313.
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Pannenberg, W., op.cit., 3.561,587.
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Polkinghorne, J., The GodofHope and the End ofthe World, (London: SPCK., 2002), 117-8.
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This, of course, leaves open the question of temporality in an intermediate state which
would be before the end of earthly time, but in advance of the final consummation.
Moltmann is more favourably disposed towards temporal categories. He uses the
concept of the fullness of times , which includes the continuation and progressive
fulfilment of process, acknowledging that the incompleteness of our present lives,
makes us think of an ongoing history after death with our lives as we
have lived them.57
Macquarrie has some interesting observations to make on this problem. Even in our
experience, he says, we can give some content to the transcending ofmere transience,
and he makes use of the understanding of time which has emerged in modern science,
especially relativity theory.58
The concept of postmortem evangelism has been criticised from two main
perspectives - first, by restrictivists, and second, by inclusivists. Restrictivists question
whether 1 Pet.3:19 and 4:6 in fact contain references to Christ's descent into hell, and
his preaching to sinners. Full consideration has already been given to the exegesis of
these passages in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Restrictivists also oppose the idea that the
only reason anyone will be condemned to hell is for explicitly rejecting Christ. Louis
Berkhof, for example, is of the opinion that because the sinner is by nature guilty of
actual sins, as well as of original sin, he is worthy of condemnation. While he writes
that rejection of Christ is certainly a great sin, it is nowhere regarded as the only sin
that leads to destruction.59 Upholders of postmortem evangelism would respond that
God does indeed judge us for our sin, but that this judgment occurs in this life, and not
at the final judgment, and that at the final judgment, the issue will be our response to
Christ.
The most widespread opposition to postmortem evangelism (PME) comes from
restrictivists who believe that physical death marks the end of any human opportunity
to receive the gift ofGod's salvation. The Western Church, after Augustine, - as noted
above in the theology of Aquinas - makes this a dogma which is seldom questioned
until the 19th century. This is a matter of crucial importance to this thesis, because, if
the restrictivists are correct, postmortem conversion of the unevangelised is not
possible. The deciding factor hinges, not only on the interpretation of particular texts,
57
Moltmann, J., The Coming ofGod, op.cit., 116.
58
Macquarrie's conclusion is - "We can say either that God occupies every point in space-time, or we
can say that he is 'outside' of the space-time continuum, and perhaps we have even to say both, if he is
both immanent and transcendent. What we cannot say is that he is at some particular time here - now
and nowhere else — that is excluded by the logic of God-talk, for it could be said only of a particular
being, and God is simply Being itself." - Macquarrie, J., The Christian Hope, op.cit., 126.
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Berkhof, L., Systematic Theology, op.cit., 693.
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but also on what deductions can be legitimately drawn from the nature of God as
revealed by scripture.
The scriptural case against PME is set out in detail by Ronald Nash.60 He launches an
attack on the view of advocates ofPME that people are lost because they have rejected
Christ. This assumption leads to the conclusion that the unevangelised will, beyond
death, be given the opportunity to accept or reject Christ, which they did not receive in
this earthly life. Nash argues, as Berkhof does above, that the assumption is false,
because people are lost, not because they have rejected Christ, but because they have
sinned. (Rom.3:23,10), - an argument advanced centuries before by Augustine. St Paul
tells us in these verses that "All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God."
Everyone therefore requires the redemption which only Christ can bring. Some receive
the offer of redemption in this life, but countless millions require to await a
postmortem encounter with Christ, before the chance of redemption comes their way.
Nash then lists a series of texts which, he claims, imply that "physical death marked
the boundary of human salvific opportunity." - Matt.7:13-14, 21-23, 24-27; 13:24-30,
36-43, Lk. 16:19-31. It could, however, be convincingly argued that these teachings
and parables of our Lord do not expressly limit salvation to decisions and actions
taken in this life, nor is Nash's argument based on their silence regarding postmortem
opportunities convincing. While Jesus's main concern, certainly, is to win men and
women to the life of righteousness before death, and to warn them of the consequences
of rejection, he makes no mention of the fate of those who lack such an opportunity
for decision in this life. Divergent interpretations of scripture are again obvious in
relation to Nash's final text - "It is appointed for mortals to die once, and after that the
judgment." (Heb.9:27). There is no mention in that text of how long after death, the
judgment occurs. An intermediate state could provide the opportunity for PME
between the individual's death and the final judgment
Nash quotes from 2 Clement which states that "after we have gone out of the world,
no further power of confessing or repenting will there belong to us." (8:3), and avers
that this reflects the thought of the early Christians during the Church's first century.
This is an assumption advanced without proof. Furthermore, Nash suggests that
similar comments are absent from the New Testament - because they are unnecessary,
as the prevailing opinion in these communities is that death marks the end of decision
regarding final destiny. But it could be that the writer of 2 Clement simply interprets
scripture in a restrictivist sense.
60
Nash, R.H., "Restrictivism" in Sanders, J. (ed.), op.cit., 132-4.
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The PME response to the restrictivist position is based upon the justice and love of
God. A just God will ensure that those who, often through no fault of their own, never
have the chance of hearing the saving Word and deciding for Christ in their earthly
lives, will not be excluded from the possibility of repentance and salvation after death.
Very often the reason why they do not hear of Christ in this life is because the
Churches fail to reach them with the gospel. God is omnipotent, and therefore it
cannot be beyond his power to confront them with the gospel in an intermediate state.
From what is known of the love of God revealed in the teaching of Jesus in the
parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin and the Prodigal Son, and in the lengths to
which that love went upon the Cross, it can be safely concluded that death will not
obstruct or defeat the patience and persistence of such almighty love. Everything
possible will be done by God to save souls in this life or the next.61
The second source of criticism of postmortem evangelism comes from inclusivists,
who maintain that God wants to see a faith response in this life. According to
inclusivism, there will be a postmortem encounter with Christ for those who exercised
faith in God as he has made himself known to them in this life. But the postmortem
encounter will be to confirm their faith and introduce them to the One who saved
them. In Pinnock's view, sinners on the other hand, are not likely to respond to God
any differently from their response here on earth. While they would have the chance to
repent, they would not necessarily desire to do so. But this ignores the very real
possibility that the manifestation of God to sinners in postmortem conditions might
well be much more vivid and persuasive than here on earth - as St Paul observes -
"Now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face."
(1Cor. 13:12a).62
Pinnock holds that those who trusted God on earth, but without knowing Jesus, will
meet the God they love in the fullness of his grace after death. For them a postmortem
opportunity is firmly established.
In conclusion, reference should be made to what one might describe as "reverent
agnosticism", on the final destiny of the unevangelised. One who felt this way is C.S.
Lewis. He came to feel that we should just recognise our ignorance in this area,
61 Fackre's response to Nash's restrictivism includes these words — Divine perseverance means not
only a wideness to God's mercy, but also a length to it. Jesus Christ, breaching the veiy boundary of
death will patiently pursue the last and the least, proclaiming the Word to the unreached. - Fackre, G.,
"Response to Nash", in Saunders J. (ed.), ibid., 153. A similar position is taken by Ward in Religion
and Human Nature, op.cit., 273.
62
Pinnock, C.H., op.cit., 172.
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because God has not told us what his arrangements with the unevangelised are. We
know, he said, that no-one can be saved apart from Christ, but not that only those who
know him explicitly can be saved by him.63 Pinnock is impressed by the wisdom of
Lewis s approach because it recognises God's love for all sinners, which guarantees
that he will be fair and generous in his actions towards them. Lewis's meaning is "that
God had not shut the door to the unevangelised, and neither should we."64
A theologian who also holds to a position of reverent agnosticism is Lesslie
Newbigin. He responds to the question, - What happens to the non-Christian after
death by saying that this is the wrong question, and as long as it remains the central
question, we shall never come to the truth. He offers three suggestions as follows:
1. It is a question to which only God has the right answer.
2. By concentrating on what happens to the soul after death, we are
dealing only with an abstraction.
3..The question starts with the individual, and his or her need...of
ultimate happiness, and not with God and his glory.65
This point of view is unsatisfactory. It is surely not sufficient to limit the quest for
truth to the relations which God has with his creatures in this life. While conceding
that the ultimate questions governing human destiny are in the hands of God, and that
a certain mystery must surround the inscrutable workings of God's wise providence,
the faith with which believers trust God for the destiny which awaits them after death
longs for deeper content and greater assurance. In particular, doubts which many
entertain about the truth of traditional doctrines of election and predestination could be
dispelled by further research. A more hopeful outcome for the destiny of the
unevangelised could greatly benefit those who face death with imperfect or non¬
existent faith, and also their loved ones who are about to be bereaved. These practical
implications will be addressed in the final chapter of this thesis. The advantages which
they bring far outweigh a position of reverent agnosticism.
The foregoing chapter has demonstrated the relevance and attractions of opentheist
views on the interactive relations which God has with his creatures, and his universal
desire for their salvation. The conclusion reached so far is that these aspects of the
doctrine of God hold out the prospect of postmortem evangelism offering salvation to
the unevangelised. The nature of the freedom which humans have to respond to the
approach ofChrist in the after-life will now be studied in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN FREEDOM
(a) Libertarian Freewill in Opentheism
The context of opentheism, within which attention is being directed in this thesis to
the final destiny of the unevangelised, includes as one of its key concepts, libertarian
freewill. One of opentheism's foremost critics, John M. Frame, describes it as -
"perhaps the central issue in the debate concerning opentheism." JIn his view,
opentheists will only seriously consider those doctrines that are compatible with
libertarian freewill.
The concept is referred to by a number of titles. Clark Pinnock uses the term
"significant freedom".2 Others, for example, the philosopher David Basinger, also
refer to it as "freewill theism"3.
The definition most frequently quoted is that ofWilliam Hasker:
An agent is free with respect to a given action at a given time if at that
time it is within the agent's power to perform the action, and also in
the agent's power to refrain from the action.4
It is sometimes described as an 'incompatibilistic' understanding of freewill, as it is
not compatible with determinism. By the phrase 'within one's power', which Hasker
uses in his definition, he means that there are no extraneous influences, or internal
predispositions which would prevent the agent from exercising the power to perform
the action. The decision to act, or to refrain from action, depends solely upon the will
of the agent.
Before enquiring into what this concept of freewill entails, it is worth noting its
antiquity, and, in particular, its scriptural basis. John Sanders traces it back to Philo,
1
Frame,J., No Other God, (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P.&R. Publishing, 2001), 119.
2Pinnock, Clark, The Openness ofGod, op.cit., 7.
3
Basinger David, The Cose for Freewill Theism, (Downers Grove, Illinois. Inter-Varsity Press, 1996).
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who, in rejecting the determinism of the Stoics, affirms libertarian freedom in human
beings, for they can produce events which God did not determine.5 Sanders continues
to trace the history of the concept in the theology of the Early Church Fathers. Justin
Martyr, he notes, addresses the issue of divine foreknowledge and human freedom — a
problem which will be discussed, in full, below. Justin regards libertarian freedom as
one of the distinctive marks of human beings in God's creation; and, in particular, it
means that in God s sight, we are morally accountable. Yet, although God foresees
which choices humans will make, he does not determine these choices.6 Irenaeus also
holds to libertarian freedom, rejecting any divine foreordination of human choices.7
Tertullian, too, believes that God grants humans freedom, so that they can either share
in, or oppose God's purposes in the world.8 Origen follows in the same tradition of
thinking, believing as Justin Martyr before him, that God has foreknowledge of human
decisions, but that he is not their cause. He does not necessitate what will happen.9
It would appear, therefore, that libertarian freedom is well established in early
Christian tradition. Is the concept, however, derived from scripture, or does it have
some other source? Sanders interprets Genesis 3, the account of the temptation of
Adam and Eve, as showing that God's work and words from the beginning of creation,
are open to question, and therefore open to being accepted or rejected. He pictures the
interchange between Eve and the serpent as demonstrating that God has created the
world in such a way that the divine wisdom can be questioned. While he has so
arranged things that there is room for humans to trust him, this means that they can
also doubt. His creatures are given by the Creator the ability to challenge his will. His
purpose is to seek the highest good of his creatures in such a way that they will freely
respond to the overtures of his love.10
Richard Rice, in the opening chapter of The Openness of God. seeks to find biblical
support for the whole opentheist position. Biblical quotations, too numerous to
mention here, indicate that it lies within God's purpose to allow humans the freedom
4
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to make significant decisions for which they are morally responsible. Large swathes of
the Old Testament, in the prophetic books, portray the unfaithfulness of Israel.11
Rice s interpretation of Jeremiah s parable of the potter is particularly instructive, as
this is a passage which supporters of God's exhaustive sovereignty interpret very
differently. Rice says that the fate of nations does not depend on God alone. God
issues threats and warnings, and how humans respond to these, influences the way
God decides to act.13
The interpretation of Jeremiah 18 by both Rice and Sanders is convincing. The
repentance of the nation following upon the warning of God (v.8), while being
influenced by this outside agency, (that of God), would appear to be an instance of
libertarian freedom; the decision to repent, while within God's overall purposes, is
surely the consequence of human wills acting independently. This conclusion,
however, is opposed by compatibilist thinking, and will require fuller investigation
below.
Examples, mentioned by Rice, from the New Testament, indicate at least significant
freedom possessed by humans. These would include the freedom to love God (1 John
4:8), and the acknowledgement that Jesus is the Son of God (1 John 4:9); the Prodigal
Son who "came to his senses", and decided to return to his Father's house (St Luke
15:17ff); human beings setting themselves against God for eternity (St Matthew
21:41-46; Revelation 20:14-15), and Jesus' battles with temptation (St Matthew 4:1-
ll)14. Rice concludes his chapter by deducing from these passages that God is active
within human history. He carries out his purposes, taking the decisions and actions of
11
e.g. Hosea 2; Jeremiah 3:1-3.
12 An example of this would be John Frame (op.cit. 116), who criticises the opentheist position held by
Sanders. Sanders holds that "the potter-clay metaphor must be understood in terms of the give-and-take
relationship that God has sovereignly established. It should not be understood as teaching divine
control of all tilings" (op.cit.87). Frame rejects this view in these terms: "However, the potter's total
control over the clay is implicit in the metaphor itself and explicit in Romans 9:19-21, where it is the
potter's initiative to 'make out of the same lump of clay, some pottery for noble purposes, and some for
common use,"'
13
Rice, R., "Biblical Support for a New Perspective," in Pinnock, C.H. (ed.), The Openness ofGod,
op.cit., 32.
14 Rice comments: "The biblical references to Jesus' temptations thus indicate that his moral victory
was a genuine achievement, not just a foregone conclusion,... This supports the conclusion that the
fulfilment of God's plans for humanity generally requires the co-operation of human agents. It is not
something that God's will unilaterally brings about." (ibid.44). This appears to be a clear expression of
belief in libertarian freedom.
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humanity into account. This means that he is flexible in adjusting and changing his
plans in response to how humans behave.15
Two other opentheists who also base their belief in significant human freedom on
scripture, are Clark Pinnock and Gregory Boyd. Pinnock, like Rice, emphasises that
the nature of God, as scripture reveals him, is personal and loving. Relationships
between God and humans have to be freely chosen. While it is true that God takes the
initiative in loving us first, he looks for our response. As Pinnock says "God wants us
freely to accept his invitation."16
This is the scriptural witness of, for example, 1 John 4:19 and 2 Corinthians 1:19.
Pinnock also mentions Hebrews 11:2,6,39, where believers are commended for their
faith because of freedom.17
He cogently points out that if they did not possess freedom, their faith being
inevitable, they would not be praised for it, nor would sinners be condemned for not
exercising faith.
Gregory Boyd's belief in libertarian freedom is illustrated by his interpretation of
Ephesians 1:4:
For he chose us in him before the creation of the world to be holy and
blameless in his sight.
This is a text which on first sight might appear to support a Calvinist doctrine of the
elect! Boyd's opinion is that "Paul does not say that we were individually predestined
to be 'in Christ'". God's desire is to save everyone (1 Tim.2:4; 2 Pet.3:9), but he has
given us freewill, and what Paul says here is that "whoever chooses to be in Christ is
55 18








Boyd, G., God of the Possible, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2001), 46-7. Boyd uses an
interesting analogy here, to buttress his interpretation. He asks us to imagine a seminar to which we
have been invited, and where we might ask the instructor - "When was it decided (predestined) that
we'd watch this video?" Boyd comments: "Note that it was not decided six months ago that you
individually would watch this video. What was decided was that anyone who took this seminar would
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Boyd then turns to the Old Testament and points to God's regret at making Saul king:
I regret that I made Saul king, for he has turned back from following
me (1 Samuel 15:10).
This makes Boyd wonder how God could be sorry that he had made Saul king, if he
was certain beforehand that Saul would act the way he did.19
The Lord's uncertainty can be explained by the fact that Saul had libertarian freedom,
so that it was possible for him to act wickedly. In the event, he did freely choose
wickedness, thus causing the Lord regret at his appointment of Saul as king. A similar
implication of libertarian freedom occurs in Isaiah 5, where Boyd draws attention to
the Lord's surprise as owner of the vineyard - "he expected it to yield grapes, but it
yielded wild grapes." (Isaiah 5:2).20
Boyd again turns to scripture, in order to explain ihe relationship between grace and
freewill. He maintains that scripture clearly teaches that we have to choose between
accepting or rejecting God's grace - "I have set before you life and death, blessings
and curses. Now choose life." (Deuteronomy 30:19).
With reference to the influence of the Holy Spirit on decision-making, Boyd says that
it is clear from scripture that people do in fact sometimes resist the work of the Holy
Spirit, (e.g. Isaiah 63:10; Lk. 7:30; Acts 7: 51; Heb. 3:8,15; 4:7), so while the Holy
Spirit makes it possible for us to believe, he does not make it impossible not to
believe.21
It would appear, therefore, from the foregoing, that opentheists claim that their belief
in libertarian freedom is based on scripture.
watch this video. Now that you have chosen to be part of this seminar, what was predestined for the
seminar applies to you.. .This is what Paul meant. Now that you are a believer who is in Christ, what








The relationship between divine sovereignty and omniscience and libertarian freedom
in opentheism must be the next subject for study. Sanders describes this relationship in
the context of creation. God grants dominion to his creatures as a gift, and looks for
mankind to give him service and obedience. In order that this might be possible, God
delegates some responsibility to humans and shares some of his power with them.
God, in his sovereignty, decides to leave some important matters in human hands.
God s creatures become co-creators, collaborating with him in the carrying out of his
22
projects.
Pinnock's understanding of divine omnipotence is along similar lines. He believes that
omnipotence does not mean the power to determine everything. Human beings can
sinfully oppose God's will, and God will not override their freedom by imposing his
will upon them. But, in his omnipotence, he has the power to deal with any situation
which arises.23
This view regards God as limiting his own power in order to allow the free co¬
operation of his creatures. Pinnock regards sovereignty of this kind as more admirable
and attractive than that which would exert total control over human beings, and indeed
subjugate them to his will.24 This is far removed from a Calvinist doctrine of
exhaustive divine sovereignty, but is close to Arminianism. If the word 'risk' is not too
anthropomorphic a term to use in description of God's plans, we might call it a 'high-
risk' strategy - the risk being that human beings will sometimes thwart his will by
sinning. The fact that we do sin, opentheists (though not compatibilists), would regard
as evidence that God does not exercise total control over all events in the world. God's
willingness to take risks is well expressed by David Basinger in this quotation:
God adopts certain overall strategies - for example, the granting of




Pinnock, C.H., The Openness ofGod, op.cit., 114.
24
Boyd also considers this view ofGod's sovereignty to be more admirable when he asks: Does this
view demean God's sovereignty? On tire contrary, it establishes it... Why should we consider control
the most exalted view of divine sovereignty... God demonstrates divine power when he empowers
others to make choices to either enter into a loving relationship with him or not... Most importantly he
demonstrated divine power when Christ came to earth, and allowed himself to be crucified for sinners.
This is what it is for God to have power and authority." (op.cit., 148-49).
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individual instances of evil which are, as such, pure loss and not a
means to any greater goods.25
One might imagine that, if humans have freedom to thwart God's will in this way,
God s ultimate purposes are left in disarray and impossible of fulfilment. This
conclusion, however, Pinnock, for example, would completely reject. He uses the term
'omnicompetent to describe God's ability to deal with whatever circumstances come
along. Although he does not cause or control everything, nothing can ultimately defeat
his purposes.26 That is to say, there is a flexibility about God's working. When he
adjusts his plans, it is because he is responding to human activity. The most important
interacting from the divine perspective is that which arises out of love. God, in his
love for humanity, looks for the response of love from his creatures. As love cannot be
forced, God's sovereignty cannot be one of domineering manipulation, but rather one
that seeks to advance his purposes by persuasion.
We turn now to the relationship between opentheist views on libertarian freedom and
divine omniscience. Opentheists typically hold a limited view of divine omniscience,
as Pinnock notes. After explaining that God knows everything that has existed,
everything that now exists and everything that could exist in the future, he describes
the limitation by saying that God cannot know beforehand exactly what free agents
will do, "even though he may predict it with great accuracy."27
It is obvious that opentheists have to hold such a restricted view of omniscience if they
are to preserve libertarian freedom. The fact that God is infinitely resourceful also
means that he does not require to have meticulous foreknowledge of the future in
every detail. As has already been noted, he adapts his strategy as situations change and
develop. Once again Pinnock finds scripture warrant for this position, giving examples
ofGod being in the process of deciding exactly what he will do in matters of detail, as
28
must happen if the future is partly open.
25
Basinger David, "Middle Knowledge and Divine Control," in International Journalfor Philosophy
ofReligion, 30 (1991), 135.
26
Pinnock, C.H., MostMovedMover, op.cit., 94-5.
27
ibid., 100.
28 The biblical texts quoted by Pinnock are: the dialogue between God and Abraham over the fate of
Sodom, (Genesis 18); the conversation between God and Moses over what to do with Israel in view of
her resistance to grace (Exodus 34), and God asking himselfwhat he is going to do next in Hosea 6.4.
(ibid., 102.)
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Critics might point to predictive prophecy in the Bible as proving God's complete
foreknowledge, but many of the prophecies are announcements ahead of time ofwhat
God intends to do, or conditional prophecies which leave the outcome open. It is clear,
also, that where God has foreordained certain events, he knows with certainty that
they will come to pass, but these situations do not 3.pply where humans have free
decisions to take.
Important distinctions are made by philosophers between "present knowledge" (PK),
"simple foreknowledge" (SFK) and "middle knowledge" (MK). According to SFK,
God knows everything that creatures with freewill are going to do in the future. This
view is characteristic of Arminianism, and is sometimes called "timeless knowledge".
Its philosophical antecedents go back at least to Boethius 29who holds that God is
timeless, and a timeless being cannot know the outcome of human actions in advance
of their performance. In this view, God is outside time, and simply 'sees' all of history
or time at once. There is no past or future for him. Everything is an eternal present to
God who therefore has exhaustive, definite knowledge of all future events30. Arminius,
however, is unable to explain God's knowledge of future contingents that depend on
free choice. He believes God's will to be responsive to human activity, but finds it
difficult to reconcile human freedom with divine foreknowledge.31 A helpful
contribution to this problem has been made by Newlands. Reference has already been
made above to his view that God is "both independent of time and...operating in
time." As a consequence, Newlands is able to affirm that:
God's knowledge is not bound to space and time as ours is. This does
not however entail that man's freedom is limited, because God knows
in advance what will take place. God's knowledge is an informed
32
knowing, and his concern for creation is an informed concern.
29
Boethius, The Consolation ofPhilosophy. Pt.V, Sec.III.
30 See Hall, Christopher A., and Sanders J., Does GodHave a Future? (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker
Academic, 2003), 139. Futhermore, the view that God is timeless is unacceptable to opentheists.
Pinnock, for example, asks: "How could a temporal flow be timelessly known or postulated ahead of
time if freedom is involved? In fact, God as temporal, knows the world successively and does not know
future acts, which are freely chosen in a libertarian sense, (ibid., 101).
31 "The knowledge of God," Arminius states, "is eternal, immutable and infinite.. .and extends to all
things, both necessary and contingent.. .But I do not understand the mode in which He knows future
contingencies, and especially those which belong to free-will creatures. - The Writings ofJames
Arminius, trans. Nichols J., and Bagnall, W.R., 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1956), 3:66.
32
Newlands, G., God in Christian Perspective, op.cit., 101.
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It would appear that whether God has limited omniscience (as opentheists claim), or
not, is not of vital significance to the conclusions of this thesis. What is of greater
importance is that God has granted libertarian freedom to his creatures.
The difficulty which Arminius faces has relevance for his views on salvation. He lists
his views on predestination, which he inherits from Thomism and the early Reformed
orthodox position (in its general outline) in four Articles.33 His fourth Article concerns
the decree that determines the salvation and damnation of'certain particular persons'.
This decree has its foundation 'in the foreknowledge of God.' By this foreknowledge
God knew -.
from eternity those individuals who would through his prevailing
grace, believe, and through his subsequent grace would
persevere...and he likewise knew who would not believe and
persevere.34
Arminius's problem is that, in departing from Calvinism by making salvation
dependent on personal faith in Christ, then, a person exercising such faith will be
saved, whether or not there is a divine decree respecting his salvation. While he is
certain that God's foreknowledge does not mean his foreordination (as in Calvinism),
he does not seem to have faced the question that a decree based only on
foreknowledge is not strictly speaking a decree. He speaks of the "decree to bestow
faith,"35 but one wonders how this relates to freewill.
In an attempt to escape from his difficulty, Arminius uses the concept of "Middle
Knowledge" or "Molinism". This medieval concept is so named after its proposer, a
Spanish Jesuit of the Counter-Reformation called Luis Molina (1535-1600). It is so
called because Molina believes that it stands between God's knowledge in the first and
third moments of creation. In the first unconditioned moment, God is said to know all
possibilities, including all possible worlds. He knows every contingent state of affairs,
which could possibly obtain, including what any free creature could freely choose to
33
Arminius, Works, I, 589-90.
34 ibid.
35
"Predestination ... is the decree of the good pleasure of God in Christ by which he resolved within
himself from all eternity to justify, adopt, and endow with endless life.. .believers on whom he had
decreed to bestow faith." - ibid., II, 226-7, 235.
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do in any set of circumstances which could become actual. In the second moment, God
knows not just what creatures could do, but what they would do in any set of
circumstances. Therefore, God knows that if he were to make actual certain states of
affairs, then other contingent states of affairs would obtain. This knowledge is known
as counterfactual knowledge, and is termed "middle knowledge" by Molina. God can
arrange which states of affairs occur in such a way that his purposes are forwarded
despite, or even through, the sinful choices of his creatures.36 Arminius defines MK as
"that by which God knows that, if this occurs, that will happen."37 Yet, this means that
God has only a conditional knowledge of future contingents. God does not, in other
words, have absolute foreknowledge. MK seeks to introduce into the divine mind an
element of potency, or knowledge of possibility that is actualised by something
external to God. As it would be outside the divine willing, it would seem to be an
uncertain and indeterminate knowledge.
Opentheists reject MK, as there is doubt as to whether it is really possible. How can
God know what every possible creature would do in any possible set of circumstances,
if the agent is genuinely free to do otherwise?38 The only possible way in which he
could know is if he had timeless knowledge. Also, whereas MK suggests that God
knows everything that will happen in the actual world, because he selected and created
it out of all possible worlds, this ignores the fact that which possible world is
actualised, depends on free human decisions as well as God's.
Opentheists, then, like Pinnock, claim that God has only PK, otherwise, ifGod knows
what is going to happen in the future, then the future is fixed in every detail, and
human freedom is infringed. 39God's omniscience, however, is still very considerable,
because he knows every possible choice, and every possible consequence. He also
possesses unrivalled insight into human character and behaviour. This limited
36 A full philosophical description ofMiddle Knowledge is given in Craig, W.L. The Only Wise God:
The Compatibility ofDivine Foreknowledge andHuman Freedom, (Grand Rapids, Michigan. Baker,
1987), 237-78.
37
Arminius, Disputationes Publicae, IV, xliii, xlv.
38
MK is also rejected by Nelson Pike - "I think that the doctrine is incoherent. If God knew (and thus
believed) at tl, that Jones would do X at t2,1 think it follows that Jones was not able to do other than X
at t2. Thus ifGod knew (and thus believed) at tl that Jones would do X at t2, it would follow that Jones
did X at t2 but notfreely." — Pike, N., "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action in Fischer J.M.
(ed.), God, Foreknowledge andFreedom, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1989), 68.
39
Pinnock, C., The Openness ofGod, op.cit. 121.
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omniscience is sometimes called presentism. It has the great advantage, from a
religious point of view, that it allows for genuine dialogue between God and ourselves,
including his response to our prayers. It is significant that Pinnock and other
opentheists, with their belief in limited omniscience, go beyond the typical Arminian
position. Most Arminians, as has been noted, believe in the absolute foreknowledge of
God. They assert that God chooses us because he knows in advance that we will
choose to believe in him, thus impairing human freedom to choose.
A response to Pinnock's belief in God's limited omniscience is made by Robert
Picirilli, who speaks from within the Arminian camp.40 He maintains that God's
knowledge of all things must be certain; some of these certainties are necessary, while
others are truly contingent. That means that God knows all future events perfectly,
including the free, moral choices of human beings. The freedom which human beings
have is a relative freedom, and is entirely subject to God's government of all things for
the accomplishing of his will. It is very difficult, however, to distinguish Picirilli's
view from Calvinistic compatibilism, except that, although his view involves an
element of foreordination, it is foreordination by permission. This permission does not
make moral choices necessary, and it is the foreknowledge, rather than foreordination,
that makes them certain.
Opentheists, however, redefine God's foreknowledge to mean that God knows all that
it is possible to know, and the future free acts of moral agents cannot possibly be
known. Hence, this view has been termed "the limited foreknowledge" or the "limited
omniscience" view. It is preferable to Picirilli's position, which appears to
compromise the genuineness ofhuman freedom to choose.
There are other respects in which opentheism is much closer to Arminianism than it is
to the Augustinian/Calvinist tradition. The Arminian does not believe that there is an
exhaustive divine plan for this world. In his view, God, in creating free persons, has in
effect created co-creators. Events occur which are consequent upon the human will,
and which God does not will or want. Opentheists agree with this limited view of
God's omnipotence.
40
Picirilli, R.E., "Foreknowledge, Freedom and the Future," in JETS'43/2 (June 2000), 2591-71.
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Arminianism also departs from Calvinism in rejecting irresistible grace 41 In so doing,
Arminius s chief concern is to defend the justice of God. If the sinner cannot respond
to the gospel without irresistible grace, and if this grace is not given at all, then, how
can God justly condemn those to whom he has not given it? Opentheists also subscribe
to this denial of irresistible grace, believing that any man may reject grace 'to his
eternal ruin.'
The Arminian concept of human freedom being able to resist God's will also
highlights the significant difference between Augustinian/Calvinistic monergism on
the one hand, and Arminian and Opentheist synergism, on the other hand. The
Reformed monergistic view of regeneration makes the sinner, not only able to will the
good, but also willing it. The sinner wills because God changes the disposition of his
heart. Synergists, by contrast, hold that one can 'choose Christ' or 'believe in Christ'
prior to regeneration. The grace of regeneration is offered to all, but it is 'efficacious'
only in the case of those who first accept the offer, or act in faith to receive it.
Furthermore, Arminians, followed by opentheists, also depart from Calvinist views in
holding that the true believer can fall from grace, and lapse into final apostasy.42
(b) Libertarianism in Recent Anglican Theology
A number of prominent Anglican philosophical theologians have recently considered
the theme of divine sovereignty and libertarian freewill. In this section of the chapter,
the thinking of J.R. Lucas, John Polkinghorne, Richard Swinburne and Keith Ward, in
particular will be studied and it will become obvious how close some of their ideas are
to opentheism.
41
Arminius declares, "All unregenerate persons have freedom of will, and a capability of resisting the
Holy Spirit, of rejecting the preferred grace of God, of despising the counsel of God against
themselves, or refusing to accept die Gospel of grace, and of not opening to Him who knocks at die
door of the heart; and diese diings diey can actually do, without any difference of the Elect and the
Reprobate. - Arminius, Works, 2: 721.
42
Pinnock rejects the Arminian view in diese terms - "I found I could not shake off the intuition that
such a total omniscience would necessarily mean diat everything we will ever choose in die future will
have been already spelled out in die divine knowledge register, and consequendy the belief that we
have truly significant choices to make would seem to be mistaken. — Pinnock, C.H., From Augusdne
to Arminius: A Pilgrimage in Theology," in The Grace ofGod and the Will ofMan, op.cit., 25.
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Hasker s definition of libertarianism, quoted above, does not mention the causation of
humanly free actions. He would seem to imply that the decision of the agent is the sole
factor in human choices and resultant action. Yet, enquiry must be made into who or
what influences the agent s will. Lucas includes various factors in the causation of
human actions. He is in line with libertarian thinking in identifying one's own decision
to act or to refrain from acting as the free choice of the individual, yet he recognises a
"causal complex . While the agent's decision is the most significant factor, there is a
"conjunction of other circumstances". These could include other people, and he gives,
as biblical examples, the interaction of Solomon and his workers in building the
temple, or the dialogue in Genesis 3, between the serpent and Adam and Eve43. Lucas
goes on to consider the input ofGod into human decision-making, and finds himself in
agreement with compatibilist thinking. In Lucas's view, the responsibility for human
actions rests with both God and human beings, and he gives, as an example, the
conversion of Augustine. Though it may be said that God was primarily responsible, it
is true that Augustine was free to reject God.44
Richard Swinburne also holds that where an agent has libertarian freewill, there is:
a totality of causes that influence him (making it easier for him to
make a particular choice), but do not totally determine how he will
choose45.
Later in the same work Swinburne pins his flag firmly to the libertarian mast. After
exploring the possibility of "brain indeterminacy, sufficient for human free choices to
produce physical effects", he affirms libertarian freewill because the ways in which
humans decide to act do not necessarily mean that they are caused by physical events.
There could, of course, be non-physical causes which explain their decisions, but, if
there are none, humans form their intentions by libertarian freewill. The most likely
non-physical cause is God. The extent of human suffering at the hands of other
humans would seem to indicate, however, that God does not form human intentions
for them. Humans are free agents with libertarian freewill.
43




Swinburne, Richard, The Existence ofGod, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, rev.ed.,2004), 113.
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Outwith Anglican theology, similar libertarian views to those of Lucas and Swinburne
are held by Vincent Brummer. He distinguishes between the sufficient conditions for
someone s action, and the necessary conditions. Only the agent himself can bring
about the sufficient conditions for his action. No-one else can do this for him. Other
people, however, can provide some of the necessary conditions which the action
requires, such as the means or the motive. The choice to perform the action remains
that of the agent alone. Brummer then applies this explanation of the causation of
human actions to the relationship between divine and human agency. Human beings
can freely choose actions which further God's purposes, availing themselves of his
grace to enable them to do so. In this way, they are instrumental in carrying out God's
will. God may provide the necessary conditions for the action to occur - such as
revealing his will, and motivating and inspiring the agent to perform them. Without
these conditions, the human agent may not find it possible to realise God's will, but
the agent still has freedom to choose to defy God's will.47
Views such as these are at odds with a determinist theology which believes that an
omnipotent God has control over human intentions and actions. It is therefore a
notable feature of the thinking of all the theologians who are being considered here, (in
common with opentheists), that God voluntarily restricts the exercise of his
omnipotence, in order to allow humans freewill. The granting of such freedom to
creatures by God, would, according to Ward, be conditioned on their power being
finite. God could annihilate this power whenever he wished to. He can also set limits
to human freedom, and the alternatives between which humans would require to
choose.48
It is important, then, to realise that the ultimate sovereignty remains with God, in that
he retains the power to determine everything if he so wills. When thinking of the
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Ward, K., Rational Theology and the Creativity ofGod, op.cit., 82.
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There are significant connections here with the Process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, as
Ward points out when he refers to that part ofGod's threefold nature which Whitehead calls God s
primordial character: "The primordial nature sets out all the possibilities, but is deficiently actual ...
History is now created by an infinite number of free creative events. In this process, God is confined to
influencing or 'luring' their decisions in a specific direction. But God does not determine tire future, or
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power to intervene directly in human affairs in order to prevent some particular evil, or
guide matters towards an appropriate end. Yet this would be occasional, and would not
be done in such a way that human freedom and autonomy would be infringed. 50As
well as requiring us to believe in a kenosis of God's omnipotence, human freedom
requires us also to believe in a kenosis of God's omniscience. Indeed, Swinburne
draws a comparison between the two, on the analogy of Aquinas's doctrine of
omnipotence. According to Aquinas, omnipotence does not mean the ability to do
anything, but rather the ability to do anything which is logically possible. Likewise,
omniscience could mean knowledge of everything true which it is logically possible
to know'. It would be possible to know future states which are physically necessitated
by events in the past or present. But where there is no necessary physical causation,
then of logical necessity, no person can know with absolute certainty that it will
happen.51
This point of view marks another deviation from theological determinism, which
maintains that as God is omniscient, he knows everything infallibly, including the
future in all its detail. This means that our future acts are already preordained and
fixed, so that human freedom is ruled out. Various attempts have been made to avoid
this incompatibility, including the view that God's foreknowing is not a cause of the
predicted actions taking place. It has been held that although God foresees our actions,
humans, and not God, are responsible for them (the compatibilist position). It is indeed
true that, to predict an action, is not to cause it, but, as Lucas observes, if this
prediction is held to be infallible, and if it is perhaps made long before the agent is
born, then there is no way in which he could be responsible for the action.52
Nevertheless, the limitation on God's omniscience is not absolute. There is a great
deal which God does know about the future. He knows what will happen as a matter of
necessity from his own laws of nature. Furthermore, even as humans can sometimes
accurately predict what other humans will do, so can God — and indeed, more so, as he
has a deeper knowledge of our past behaviour, our present motivation and the likely
even have very great control over it." (Ward, K.,A Guide to the Perplexed, (Oxford. One World,
2002), 172.
50 This point is made by J.R. Lucas in The Future (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 230.
51
Swinburne, R„ The Coherence ofTheism, op.cit., 175. This view also recalls opentheist thinking as
in Pinnock, C.H.MostMovedMover, (see footnote 27).
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predisposition of our characters. His foreknowledge, although not infallible, enables
him to predict the likely course of events, and to act in response to the free decisions
of humans in such a way that everything works out for the best.
The central point, however, to be made here, is that omniscience is incompatible with
future free choices of humans . The question which now calls for an answer is — why
does God so ordain creation that he restricts his omnipotence and omniscience in such
a way that humans have room and freedom to act with relative independence? The
answer would seem to be that only in this way could humans be morally responsible
for their actions.
Among the causes which can be listed as explaining human actions are a person's
brain state, or his genetic make-up, or his upbringing.54 These are certainly factors
which do influence human attitudes and decisions, but if these are considered to be the
prime motivators operating on a person's will, as a matter of physical necessity, then
that person cannot not be blamed or praised for his action. In making this point,
Swinburne also applies it to the influence of some other person upon the agent's
action. If the other person's influence determines the person's decision, that person
cannot be held morally responsible. 55Ward finds scripture warrant for the same point,
concluding from texts such as Ezekiel 3:16-21 and Jeremiah 18:7-11, that human
beings are responsible for choosing righteousness or sin. Frequently, in the Bible, God
invites people to choose between a way of life and a way of death. For humans to be
responsible for such choices, God has to give them freewill.56
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actions, it is noteworthy that he concludes that human choice is ultimately inexplicable: If the agent
accepts a reason for acting, does he do so freely, or is he determined by his mental make-up to accept
it? One must say that it is just an ultimate human choice about what one is to do (e.g. act selfishly or
altruistically). Therefore, freedom, by its essential nature must be inexplicable." - Ward, K., Ethics and
Christianity, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1970), 223.
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The biblical witness underlines the high-risk strategy of God in giving human beings
freedom, as was noted, in particular, when studying the opentheism of Sanders. The
gift of freedom means that God s purposes (at least in the short term) can be thwarted.
His creatures may not do what he wants them to do. Ward notices that this result of
libertarianism contradicts the traditional theology of, for example, Aquinas - "God's
will inevitably is always fulfilled" (S.T.qu.l9,art,6). Ward deals with this by
distinguishing between divine intentions and permissions. There is an inevitability
about what God intends, but God cannot intend the decisions of another rational
creature. He can only hope, wish or desire the creature to act accordingly, but these
hopes can be, and are frequently thwarted, which is what happens when humans sin.57
God's permission of human beings to sin is sometimes advanced as a partial answer to
the problem of evil. It is certainly easier to reconcile this point of view with God's
love and justice than the theological determinism which believes in a God who
controls everything - good and bad alike.
The theology of the Anglicans which is being considered, and also opentheism,
believes that God limits his omnipotence in order to allow human beings freedom to
act. God's general providence permits everything which happens, without exercising
detailed control. This means (as was noted above), that not all that happens is in
accordance with God's will, as it would be, if God exercised meticulous providence in
the way that determinists believe. This is in keeping with an interpretation of
evolutionary history, mentioned by Polkinghorne, which understands creation as
'making itself.'58 The problem of evil is therefore eased for theodicy, because God
does not directly will or cause human crime. It results, instead, from the exercise of
sinful human wills. This way of thinking is known as the freewill defence, and is to be
preferred to a determinist position, which, instead of creating humans who are capable
of responsible action relegates them to the level of 'blindly obedient automata.
Polkinghorne uses a similar line of thought to account for natural evil (disease and
disaster). He advocates there a free-process defence, whereby the processes of the
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world are allowed by their Creator to be themselves - hence the event of an earthquake
or the incidence of cancer.60
One might wonder whether the permission which God gives to his creatures, allowing
them to sin freely, might imperil his long-term designs for his Creation. If he has
created a world in which he looks for human co-operation to help in bringing his plans
to fruition, what happens ultimately when his creatures fail to co-operate? We saw in
opentheism, that when God's plan A fails because of human sin, he falls back upon
plan B. The same divine strategy is recognised by Lucas who finds the answer in
God's infinitude and infinite resource. When we fail to fulfil God's plan for us, there
is brought about a new situation, which may not be foreseen, and is certainly
undesired. This calls for new remedies from God, for which he may once again require
our co-operation if his adjusted purpose is to be carried out.61
This adaptation of divine planning in response to human sinning, Ward also finds in
the Bible in 1 Kings 21:17-24,27-29; Jonah 3:7-9; St Luke 13:3,5. These texts provide
examples of how God can change his mind, when humans repent. Our repentance
wipes out the past, and we escape the consequences of our evil acts which would
otherwise follow.62 While it is true that God's plans can be thwarted in the short term,
requiring him, in his infinite resourcefulness, to resort to back-up plans, his final
purposes cannot be ultimately frustrated. This would appear to be the gospel of the
Resurrection and Ascension ofChrist, that the evil manifest in the crucifixion does not
have the last word, and that God's ultimate victory in the vanquishing of evil is
assured.
The final achievement of the goal of creation is linked by Ward to evolutionary theory,
and his thinking here is in line with that of Polkinghorne. The process of evolution is
non-deterministic, and contains an appropriately random element, which fits in well
59
Polkinghorne, J., Science and Providence, (London: SPCK., 1989), 65.
60
Polkinghorne quotes as an example of the free-process defence, Austin Farrer s explanation of the
Lisbon earthquake of 1755. Farrer wrote - "The will ofGod in the event is his will for the elements of
the earth's crust or under it: his will is that they should go on being themselves and acting in
accordance with their natures." (Polkinghorne, J., ibid., 67). God deliberately restricts his power in both
cases - moral and natural evil - in order to give his creatures space to act freely.
61
Lucas, J.R., Freedom and Grace, op.cit., 30.
62
Lucas, J.R., "Foreknowledge and the Vulnerability of God" in Vesey G. (ed.), The Philosophy in
Christianity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 119.
142
with the freedom which God gives to his creatures. Ward identifies purpose almost
everywhere in the universe, and he believes that purpose involves the communities
where self-aware, self-directing, sentient beings" are able consciously to relate to the
Creator.63
As was noted in the study of opentheism, these Anglican scholars believe that the
biblical testimony is that God looks for a response of love from his creatures. He
wishes them to share in his purposes for Creation, and this is only possible if they are
free beings, nearer to the divine nature, and able to interact with him.64
(c) Libertarian Freewill and Compatibilism Compared
Of the main types of freewill known to theology and philosophy, the principal
alternative to libertarianism is compatibilism. This kind of freedom is so-called
because it is compatible with determinism. Determinism is defined by Richard Taylor
in these terms:
The general philosophical thesis which states that, for everything that
ever happens, there are conditions, such that, given them, nothing else
could happen.65
There are three kinds of determinism as outlined by RoyWeatherford:
Physical determinism asserts that natural laws are strictly
determinative of future consequences, so that, given one initial state of
a physical system, at a definite later time, there is one and only one
outcome possible.
Psychological determinism restricts itself to the consideration of
human beings and their actions. It contends that all our actions are the
result of genetic and environmental conditioning. It places the sources
of our actions within our own psyche, while denying that we are really
in control.
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Theological determinism asserts that the existence of God might be
said to guarantee that the future of the world is fixed because of (1)
God's decrees, and (2) God's foreknowledge.66
Physical causation clearly affects all human actions, simply because our actions flow
from our intentions, and our intentions are causally necessitated through the brain. As
Swinburne observes, when human beings have certain beliefs and desires, this happens
through the brain when "stimuli.. .land on the sense-organs or stimulate the peripheral
nervous system." 7
The key question to be considered is where these stimuli originate. There would be
general agreement that our free choices are influenced by our heredity and genetic
make-up, also by the environment, and by conditioning, for example, educational
nurturing. Full-scale 'hard' physical and psychological determinism would limit the
origination of human decision-making and action to these controlling influences and
this would lead to outright denial of libertarian freewill. Humans would simply be
puppets, the strings ofwhose actions would be pulled by their biological make-up and
by the environment. Hard determinism means that our moral choices would be fixed
and predictable. Such a conclusion is unacceptable to most Christian opinion which
finds in scripture strong evidence that, even in a world controlled by divine
sovereignty, humans are called upon to take moral decisions, and are able to make
choices for good or evil for which they can be praised or blamed.
The type of determinism which is principally to be considered here is 'soft'
determinism or compatibilism. This is defined by Hasker as follows:
An agent is free with respect to a given action at a given time, if, at
that time, it is true that the agent can perform the action if she decides
to perform it, and she can refrain from the action if she decides not to
perform it.68
David Hume gives classical expression to the position in these words.
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By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting,
according to the determinations of the will... Now this hypothetical
liberty is allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner in
chains.
Hasker draws attention to the difference between libertarianism and compatibilism in
that in the former, the agent, in order to be free, must have it in her power without
qualification to perform the action, whereas in the latter, she need only have the power
to perform it if she chooses to do so. Such freewill is thus said to be compatible with
one's choices which determine one's actions. This leads us back into enquiring into
the sources of our choices. Obviously, our desires have a part to play, and also,
perhaps more significantly, our characters and dispositions, for sometimes our desires
conflict with each other, or with our sense of duty. It could be said that when a
person's desires are controlled by a "sinful nature", the person will want to sin, and is
free to do so. Her sinful nature might be described as the remote cause producing her
desires, whereas her desires function as the proximate cause of her willing.
The compatibilist view has been formalised from Hobbes onwards in a conditional
sense:
You would have done otherwise ifyou had willed or chosen or wanted
to do otherwise.
Conditional analyses have been rejected over the past few decades on two grounds -
one, suggesting that conditional analyses do not provide necessary conditions for the
possession of powers or abilities, the other, that they do not provide sufficient
conditions.70
The compatibilist position has been defended in recent years by Daniel Dennett.
Dennett cites Richard Dawkins in holding that, although we are born with built-in,
biologically endorsed sets of biases, we can overthrow these innate preferences.
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Dennett then goes on to describe other influences which affect our human decisions,
such as the mutual, persuasion, reflection and instruction that come from our place in
society. These influences create values which replace the cruder ones inherited from
our ancestors. These persuasions are then built into an ordered system of moral codes
and principles.72
The prospect that determinism might erode control", says Dennett, is what arouses
our concern, but he maintains that there is nothing in our past which controls us —
indeed Mother Nature has designed us to fend for ourselves. Compatibilists, then,
believe that, despite outside influences, we retain the power to will our actions.
Dennett, however, fails to identify the source of our free action. He points out that
because we do not know the source, we imagine it to be "a rather, magical, mysterious
entity, the unmoved mover, the active self."73
We have the power to develop "the self' through social interaction, and, indeed, we
have the capacity for significant self-improvement through learning. One's character,
however, is not solely the accumulated results of free choices, because of the chance
possession of initial strength or talent, and also of the chance encounters one
experiences during the period of self-creation. The more talented we are, the more we
are able to control our destiny, and the greater are the responsibilities entrusted to us,
and then our moral choices and actions are regarded as due to much more than luck.
The most important point in the controversy between libertarianism and compatibilism
centres upon the attribution of moral responsibility. The typical libertarian position is
expressed by Peter van Inwagen:
Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding
an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have
refrained from performing that act74
nature... We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators, quoted by
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This is the principle which holds that one has acted freely (and responsibly), only if
one could have done otherwise. Dennett holds that this principle is simply false, and
marshals a number of arguments in support of his view75. Dennett also uses the
historic illustration of Luther s Here I stand. I can do no other", to show that Luther
was still responsible for his stand, despite his conscience making it impossible for him
to recant. Dennett also instances the function of parental training and moral education
in making us unable to do the things we would be blamed for doing if we did them.
Dennett's conclusion is that it would not do us any good to know whether or not, on
some occasion, an agent could have done otherwise than he did. For, we would learn
nothing about his character, or likely behaviour on similar occasions. Ultimately, for
soft determinists like Dennett, the freedom of the agent to control his moral decisions
and actions is all-important. This, he can do, despite the determining influences of his
current state, and features of the environment over which he has no control. Dennett's
claim is that the only kind of freewill "worth wanting" is where agents are capable of,
and wish to initiate projects and deeds for which they will be responsible. Dennett
believes that we have freewill of this kind, and that it results from "our biological
endowment, extended and enhanced by our initiation into society.76
The most persuasive account of the indeterminist position, in Dennett's eyes, is that of
Richard Kane in his The Significance ofFreewill, but, as will become obvious Dennett
remains unpersuaded. In outlining his indeterminism, Kane uses two fundamental
concepts - the first of these is "alternative possibilities" (AP), where the agent has the
power or ability to do otherwise, and, this, Kane regards as a necessary, although, not
a sufficient condition of freewill. The other concept he uses is that of "ultimate
responsibility" (UR). The basis for this is that, when an agent's choice issues from his
character and motives, there are choices or actions in the past, which have causally
contributed to the agent's having the character and motives he now has — and for these
past choices, he is ultimately responsible. Kane holds that UR is a necessary condition
of freewill. Kane's belief that AP is incompatible with determinism is in line with the






If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws
of nature, and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us, what
went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws
of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including
our present acts), are not up to us.77
Kane claims that this argument shows that if determinism is true, no agent could have
done otherwise, which would imply in turn (given the AP condition), that no one has
freewill. Kane s incompatibility thesis" of freewill exercised by finite agents with
UR, requires that these agents perform undetermined self-forming actions (SFAs).
Kane says that Luther's "Here I stand" would have been an affirmation for which he
was UR, even if it was determined, and even if he could not have done otherwise, so
long as it was a willed action (issuing from his character and motives), and he was
responsible for earlier undetermined SFAs for the character and motives from which
the affirmation issued.79 Kane goes on to list a number of good reasons why we should
want UR. These include moral responsibility in an ultimate sense, and genuine (freely
given) love and friendship between persons, and towards God. A further important
value is mentioned by Ted Honderich, who thinks that, if all our actions were
determined, something important to our sense of individuality would be lost. If all of a
person's actions were determined, then the explanation of these actions would not be
80"individual to, or peculiar to the person ."
Honderich also argues that an open (indeterministic) universe rather than a closed
(deterministic) one, means that we can have what he calls "life-hopes" for the future.
These are hopes for a future which would not be fixed, nor dictated by our
81
environment, nor by the way our natures disposed us to act.
We can rise above the conditioning and influence of the past to produce something
new by our own efforts. This list of goods ensured by an incompatibilist position has
relevant applications to the final destiny of the unevangelised, as will be explained
below.
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In seeking the fundamental cause of SFAs, Kane resorts to mentioning quantum
indeterminacies in the brain, which are experienced by people as the "efforts ofwill",
which they are making to resist temptation, for example, in ethical situations82
Critics of libertarian theories challenge this view on the grounds that such
undetermined actions would be arbitrary', 'capricious', random' or 'irrational'. But
defenders of the theory claim that actions originating in this way would not be
arbitrary, since the agent would have a reason for his action, and would be intending,
and trying to perform it for that reason. Kane, however, puts his finger on one of the
imponderables underlying his theory, when he asks, how perceptions and various
conscious events ofwill, or choices can at the same time be physical processes of the
brain. He notes that this is a problem for compatibilists, incompatibilists and
determinists alike. There are difficulties in understanding both consciousness and
quantum indeterminacy. But the mysteriousness surrounding them is created
particularly by libertarian theories of freedom.83
Dennett has responded in detail to Kane's theory in his book Freedom Evolves. He
maintains that, even in a deterministic world, there can be "self-generated
improvement":
Our natures aren't fixed because we have evolved to be entities
designed to change their natures in response to interactions with the
rest of the world. It is confusion between having a fixed nature, and
having a fixedfuture that motivates the anguish over determinism.84
According to Dennett, there are real options, even in a deterministic world. The
variability in the output of our faculties ofpractical reasoning, arises, he claims, from a
varied input from our memories, current state and circumstances. We need never make
the same decision twice, because time marches on, and the system never faces exactly
the same input on two occasions. This is a deterministic arrangement, whereas Kane
claims that our faculty of practical reasoning is equipped with indeterminism
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upon Kane s theory focuses on the nature of the quantum indeterminacy. As this is not
determined by anything, the agent cannot influence the indeterminate event. Dennett
wonders, therefore, how the decision can be "up to you", if it is undetermined. You
would have "to co-opt it or join forces with it," Dennett believes. But, in order to do
that you would have to be someone. Your identity would comprise "memories,
plans,beliefs and desires acquired in your past life. These would be causal influences
taking over control of your decision-making.85
In defence of Kane's view, it can be said that he holds that the outcomes of inner
conflicts in the will, are influenced by, but not determined by, past motives and
character. So, it could be argued that even with the indeterminacy of the neural
processes, it is this element of character influence which supplies the personal
component of the decision.
Dennett also maintains that:
there is no way to tell a genuine SFA from a pseudo-SFA, an impostor
bout of reasoning that never actually availed itself of quantum
indeterminism, but just cranked out a pseudo-random and, hence,
deterministic result.86
A number ofKane's other critics focus upon the indeterminate nature of the process of
the effort of the will, and wonder how the indeterminacy makes the agent truly
responsible for the outcome; and indeed, whether the outcomes can be choices at all.
87But Kane's response is that the indeterminate process in the agent's brain, preceding
the choice, is experienced by him as an effort of will, not merely as a random
88
occurrence in his brain, that happened to influence the outcome.
The relationship between libertarian freewill and moral responsibility is also explored
by W.S. Anglin. He describes 'metachoices', when we choose which things we will
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In his view, choosing values, in this sense, transcends one's previous values, culture
and other determining factors." Whereas compatibilists would argue that
metachoices are based on psychological needs, Anglin believes that they presuppose
libertarian freewill.89
Anglin also makes the same point, as was earlier noted in Kane's thought, that
unconditional love presupposes libertarian freewill.
A key question in deciding for libertarianism against compatibilism is one's estimate
of the role which character plays in moral choices. Compatibilists like Frederick
Vivian typically emphasise the influence of the climate of opinion in the surrounding
society, which moulds our interests and hopes and ideals. In a strong phrase, he even
describes us as "to a large extent, prisoners of our environment"90. Vivian holds that in
most cases, where a person acts virtuously, it is because his conduct is "motivated by
his acquired disposition or character."91
When discussing Kane's thought, the importance of SFAs (self-forming actions), was
noted, but Vivian dismisses such concepts as the 'will', or 'self, believing that we
cannot explain the origin of the 'self or the 'will', and that such faculties or powers
cannot arise out of nothing. While we can talk meaningfully of an individual being
free, there are no such things as free actions. A person's actions are not uncaused or
fortuitous. Vivian's conclusion is that the majority of our choices are determined by
our desires, which are a function of our character. We have a feeling of freedom when
we are making choices, and this feeling arises out of introspection, but when we let
this feeling be divorced from our characters, freedom becomes synonymous with pure
chance. The feeling of freedom which we have when we deliberate, and make
decisions follows from our motives and desires. It is important to note that
compatibilists like Vivian, in giving such a causal explanation for human conduct, still
insist upon applying moral sanctions to our human choices and desires. Although we
inherit certain physical and mental endowments, we still have the incentive to improve
them, and with them, the moral side of our nature. We remain responsible to our
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fellow citizens and to ourselves. Vivian draws attention, here, to a common
misunderstanding concerning moral responsibility. It is often maintained, he says, that
people are only morally responsible when their wills are free, but the opposite is true.
No philosopher has yet shown how free acts - i.e. acts which are spontaneous and
uncaused — are compatible with moral responsibility. His conclusion is that we are free
when our choices determine our actions, and are themselves the expression of our own
fundamental natures.92
The opposing incompatibilist view is well stated by Swinburne, who holds that
humans have freewill in the sense that they are not causally necessitated to do the
actions they do by brain events or any other events. His thesis is that humans have the
power to choose between desires of equal strength, and the power to resist desire, and
do what they believe more worth-while.93 Swinburne (as, for example, Kane) believes
that character does not determine an agent' choice, but simply makes certain choices
easy and others hard.
The foregoing comparison between libertarian and compatibilist positions has not
yielded any incontrovertible answers to the quest for the origin of human decision¬
making. It could well be that in the present state of knowledge, Lucas's conclusion
may be the wisest one- that if men have freewill, it is not possible to give a full
explanation of their decisions. These decisions can fly in the face of reason, and what
is right, making "the fundamental fact of freedom seem mysterious."94
(d) Theological Determinism
Augustine
It is the relationship between divine sovereignty and human freedom which is of
greatest importance in this chapter, and, therefore, attention must now be paid to
theological determinism in the Augustinian/Calvinist tradition. This will begin with a
study of Augustine's theology ofGod's sovereignty. His understanding of sovereignty
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do "whatsoever he pleases, nor can the almighty power of his will be "hindered by
the will of any creature."95
As the first cause, in Portalie's words, God is the "author of all good, of all moral
perfection, of all salvation."96 Augustine comes to this view as a result of his
controversy with Pelagianism. He believes that the Pelagians are wrong in thinking
that the human will, even in fallen man, is essentially free from the corruption of sin,
and that men are able of themselves to choose and perform good works. His beliefs
about the Fall of man are described by R.K. McGregor Wright, who indicates that
Augustine held that before the Fall, Adam was able not to sin {posse non peccare), but
also able to sin (posse peccare). This can be known because Adam in fact sinned, and
chose to do so of his own freewill. His descendants are now unable not to sin (non
posse non peccare). Believers who have been renewed in Christ, are back in Adam's
position, being both able to sin, and able not to sin, and our choice depends on our
level of sanctification and the means of grace.97
Augustine is clear that, both before and after the Fall, humans have freewill, and, by
freewill, he means the ability to make voluntary decisions without any coercion or
constraint from outside forces or persons. He believes that it is only because we have
such freedom to choose, that we are morally responsible. There are, however,
occasions when he seems to deny freedom of the will to fallen man,98 and this could
be explained by a hardening in his attitude in his later years, caused by his controversy
with Pelagianism. His final position appears to be that the sinner sins because he
chooses to sin. As he is a fallen creature, he is not able without grace to choose
righteousness. He is free to act in accordance with his desires, but these desires are
only evil. His will is corrupted by his sinfulness, but he still retains the power to
choose. The consequences of this choice and the responsibility for it, then, are due
95
Augustine, "Enchiridion," in Nicene andPost-Nicene Fathers, vol.3 (ed.). Schaff, P., (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956), 267.
96
Portalie, E., A Guide to the Thought ofStAugustine, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
I960), 192.
97
Wright, R.K. McG., No Placefor Sovereignty: What's Wrong with Freewill Theism? (Downers
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 22.
98
Augustine writes — "...when man by his own freewill sinned, then sin being victorious over him, the
freedom of his will was lost" - "The Enchiridion" in Basic Writings ofStAugustine, Oates, W.J. (ed.),
2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980), 1:675 (Chap. 30). Elsewhere, he describes this understanding of
153
entirely to the sinner. Yet this view conflicts with his belief in the total sovereignty of
God, and with the eternal decision of God. It also conflicts with Augustine's doctrine
of the immutability ofGod - a point to which Ward draws attention."
Augustine is a compatibilist, endeavouring to reconcile theological determinism with
human freewill. The early Augustine believes that human beings are the efficient
causes of their own actions, through the efficacy of their wills.100
The problem arises in Augustine's mind out of a consciousness of sin, coupled with
his belief in a God who is wholly good, and to whom we are responsible for our sins.
He is not prepared to sacrifice either of the two incompatibles. He considers all acts of
will to be subject to the will of God "because they have no power but what He gives
them."101 Although our wills are determined by God, we still have a feeling of
freedom. One can see the conflict in Augustine's mind when he asks:
How then can that set order of causes in God's foreknowledge deprive
our wills of power, seeing our wills bear such a sway amongst the
very causes themselves?102
The freedom thus allowed to humans is a very limited kind of freedom. He makes his
choices in such a way that, unless God intervenes, he cannot be saved. He is in
bondage to his own sinful impulses, and can only escape when liberated by the grace
of God.103 The paradoxical nature of Augustine's understanding of human freedom is
described by R.C. Sproul, who maintains that Augustine considers that the sinner "is
freedom paradoxically as follows - "Man is free (liberum) to do what he likes, but he is notfreed
(liberation,)from sin." - Augustine, Rebuke and Grace, 13.42.
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subsequent events into being. So, if God left the choice truly undetermined, God would have to let the
subsequent creation depend to an indeterminate extent upon some creaturely act. That, God cannot do,
since God is unaffected by creatures in any way, being wholly immutable.-! Ward, K., Religion and
Creation, op.cit., 235).
100 "For a man does not therefore sin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be
doubted but that it is the man himselfwho sins when he does sin, because He, whose knowledge is
infallible, foreknew not that fate, or fortune, or something else would sin, but that the man himself
would sin, who, if he wills not, sins not." - Augustine, "Freewill and God's Foreknowledge" in Dewey,
R.E., and Gould J.A., (eds.), Freedom, its History, Nature and Varieties, (New York: Macmillan,
1970), 110.
101
Augustine, Confessions, Bk.V, ix.
102 ibid.
103
Augustine, Rebuke and Grace, 13.42.
154
both free, and in bondage at the same time."104 He is free in the sense that he can act
according to his own desires. The trouble is that "his desires are only evil."
Lucas attempts to resolve the conflict between freewill and determinism, while
surveying the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius. lu;He notes that in
ordinary life, we regularly hold more than one person responsible for the same action
— as, for example, in the Genesis account where the Fall ofman is attributed to Adam
and Eve and the serpent. Accordingly, Lucas says, we can ascribe to God the
responsibility for man's actions without denying man's responsibility too. What we
cannot do, is to say that both are primarily responsible. Lucas concludes:
We can allow to Pelagius, human freedom, while conceding to St
Augustine that it is nevertheless God who is primarily responsible for
man's turning away from error and towards truth.106
In the heat of the controversy with Pelagius, Augustine forges a..strong doctrine of
grace. Every good and salutary act by humans is the fruit of grace, a gift from God -
as he says: "We know that grace... is given to adults for each and every act".107 This
grace precedes and prepares everything, since good desires, faith and prayer must
come from it108. Augustine, however, is anxious not to compromise freedom of the
will, by exalting grace. He knows, rightly, that without the power of choice, there is no
responsibility, no merit, no demerit. The choice of the good is nevertheless directed by
God, who has prepared the agent's will to make the right choice. Whether a man
believes or does not believe, is not the choice of a man's freewill. When he believes, it
is because he is one of the elect, whose will is prepared by God.109
This grace of God is efficacious and works infallibly. Augustine does not use the
adjective, 'irresistible' because he wishes the human will to remain master of itself.
The soul remains master of its determination, but because God prepares it by various
illuminations and enticements, it is always inspired to give its consent. The favourable
decision is assured, because God, in his foreknowledge, knows who will respond
104
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favourably, and bestows upon them, thus making them 'elect'. Only those will be
saved, whom God knows will wish to co-operate with the grace decreed for them.
Augustine's doctrine of grace therefore involves predestination.
Before examining predestination, it should noted that Augustine's compatibilism is
regarded by many theologians as unacceptable today. Sanders, for example, comments
on the dual causation to which Lucas referred above, where both Augustine and Calvin
distinguish between remote and proximate causes. In their view, God was the remote
cause, and so humans are still morally responsible, and free, as proximate causes. Yet,
because the actions of the proximate cause are solely determined by the remote cause,
"soft determinism is actually a determinism in freewill clothing."110
Swinburne also rejects Augustine's compatibilism, because he finds God's omniscient
foreknowledge of all future actions incompatible with human freewill. If God
foreknows anything, then it is certainly going to happen, and if it is certain that a
human is going to act in a particular way, then the action cannot be free.111
Swinburne also believes that if soft determinism were true, it would not be appropriate
to apportion blame or praise, "because a man could not have done otherwise."112
God's foreknowledge also highlights a further difficulty. Augustine says that God
foreknows future evil by knowingly and willingly permitting particular evil actions:
In a way unspeakably strange and wonderful, even what is done in
opposition to His will, does not defeat His will. For it would not be
done, did He not permit it, (and, of course, His permission is not
unwilling, but willing); nor would a Good Being permit evil to be
done only that in His omnipotence, He can turn evil into good.
This view poses very pointedly the age-old problem of evil, and the view that the evil
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(e) The Doctrine of Predestination in Augustine and Calvin
It is time, now, to consider the topic of predestination. In his treatise on the
Predestination of the Saints, Augustine writes that many people hear Christian truth
expounded to them, and while some believe, others do not114. The reason for this is
that God has prepared some, but not others. Those who receive the truth are the elect,
and those who do not, have not been chosen to be Christians. G.R. Evans identifies
two reasons for Augustine's belief - First, no-one deserved to be saved, and so, when
God saves anyone, it is an act of mercy. Second, God 'foresees' those who will not
believe, and so it is not a case of their being unjustly deprived of an opportunity for
salvation. God knew who were potential believers, and these were the people "he
prepared for the Kingdom ofHeaven, and the company of the angels."115
This means that election is based, not simply on foreknowledge, but on foreordination.
The later Augustine comes to this conclusion because he comes to see that election by
foreknowledge is election by works, even if one calls the work 'faith'. In his
controversy with Pelagius, he is anxious to ensure that there is no element of
synergism in salvation. It must all be of grace. Grace is, in this sense, an effect of
predestination.116 Augustine also believes that the predestination of the elect to eternal
salvation is infallibly efficacious in achieving its effect117. Augustine believes that the
saved as well as those predestined to damnation deserve to be damned, and why one
should receive grace and another not receive it, he regards as a mystery. He defends
this position by quoting Rom 11:33, to those who wish the mystery to be resolved -
Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!
• *118
How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths beyond tracing out.
David Fergusson finds Augustine's doctrine of predestination to be unscriptural:
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It seems to reach the conclusion that God has saved some and passed
over others through the observation that some men and women
respond to the call of the gospel while others fail to heed it. Yet this
does not seem to be the basis upon which the Bible presents the idea
of divine election. The election of Israel and of the church is
predicated upon the freedom and love of God. The scope of God's
love is not to be determined by observation of human choices.119
The other difficulty centres upon the effect this doctrine has upon human freedom.
The earlier Augustine, following Justin Martyr, believes that God knows how
freedom will be exercised, and that how God determines human destiny is influenced
by this foreknowledge. Thus, human freedom is preserved. The later Augustine,
however, as has already been noted, prepares the wills of those he foreordains for
salvation. We are saved only by the unmerited bestowal of grace, and it seems
irrelevant whether our actions are free, in a compatibilist sense or not. It is difficult to
see how humans can merit either praise or blame, when their wills are determined by
God. Again, this view is unscriptural, because scripture teaches that although God
ordains everything which comes to pass, men and women are nevertheless
accountable to God for their actions and omissions. (Acts 2:23).
There is a clear divergence, here, between compatibilist and incompatibilist views.
According to incompatibilism, the divine grace and action is causally necessary, but
never causally sufficient for salvation. Although faith is a gift of God's grace, it has
to be appropriated by the believer, if it is to be a free act. According to libertarian
views, the would-be Christian, in his choice, has the power to resist or frustrate
God's grace. For the incompatibilist, this grace is not irresistible. The opposing
Augustinian, compatibilist position is described by Helm who believes it to be based
on scripture. It states that only grace is causally sufficient for faith, and it denies the
libertarian conception of freedom. But there is another sense of freedom involved,
because, when a person faithfully appropriates Christ, he is granted spiritual
freedom, being freed from slavery to sin. One can only enjoy this freedom, when one
120has received grace.
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The libertarian account is to be preferred. It is difficult to see how one could be praised
for the appropriation of irresistible grace. People can and do resist the Holy Spirit, and
thereby thwart the will of God for their lives. (Isaiah 63:10; St Luke 7:30; Acts 7:51;
Ephesians 4:30; Hebrews 3:8,15; 4:7). Boyd points out that even although humans can
and must choose to accept God's offer of salvation, it may still be affirmed that
salvation is completely a matter of God's grace. He indicates a confusion in Helm's
thought in these words, between a condition of salvation, and a cause of salvation. We
do not cause God to save us by having faith, for that would mean that we acquired
merit, and our salvation would not then be solely by grace. Boyd believes that freewill
theists have scripture on their side, in holding that salvation is given "on the condition
that one places one's trust in the one giving it." Then, it is a matter of grace, and not of
a merited reward.121
It is noteworthy that, in order to reconcile God's omniscience with human freewill,
Augustine has to invoke the classical view of God's timelessness. The idea is that God
transcends the category of time, rather than simply being everlasting. Augustine uses a
striking illustration as an analogy.122 He pictures God as an infinite and eternal sea, in
which the whole created order is immersed like a sponge. The sponge is both utterly
surrounded and utterly penetrated by this sea. Moreover, the sea is measureless. Since
God is an eternal being, he does not really foreknow anything. He simply knows
eternally. From God's vantage point, he simply knows (not foreknows), what we are
doing with our free choices. For what we have, are and will choose is present to God
in his eternal now123. Compatibilists will assert that God is not therefore foreordaining,
but simply ordaining what humans are doing freely. Yet, the triple identification of
predestination, foreknowledge and grace to be found in Augustine's writing on
predestination implies that omniscience is omnicausality.
The findings of opentheists and Anglican scholars such as Ward, that we should
renounce the idea of God's foreknowledge of free creaturely acts, should be accepted,
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otherwise it would mean in Ward's words - "that creatures have no contra-causal
freedom."124
The subsequent history of the Early Church indicates that there is considerable
reservation about double predestination, which is largely ignored in the Eastern
Church. In the Western Church at the Synod ofOrange (A.D. 529), and afterwards, a
more moderate predestination becomes the official teaching. While continuing to
affirm election to salvation, it does not affirm predestination to perdition.125
Calvin follows the Augustinian tradition closely. In his theology, God's sovereignty is
total, and his majesty is awesome. The omnipotence and omniscience of God is the
foundation on which his whole system of doctrine is built. In his thought, God is the
originator of all things, and also determines and controls them at every moment. His
omnipotence is continually active and effective, governing heaven and earth by his
Providence. Nothing happens by chance; everything occurs in accordance with his
knowing and willing decree.126 From all eternity, he determines what should come to
pass, and now by his power he effects what he has decreed.127
Like Augustine, Calvin is certain that human beings are completely dependent upon
God for the restoration ofwhat has been lost. His attitude to the problem of freewill is
that whereas we are free to will whatever we may wish, we are not free to achieve
what we need most of all, the restoration of the freedom to live before God as those
knowing the salvation that is God's greatest gift.128 Calvin adopts Augustine's position
that we are "indeed free, but not freed"129 - "free of righteousness, but enslaved to
124 "In Augustine's scheme, God's foreknowledge did not depend on any creaturely act, and could not
be changed by any such act. The price to be paid is that creatures can have no contra-causal freedom."
- Ward, K., op.cit., 238.
125 These developments are explained by Paul Jewett who describes the official teaching as suggesting
that "the reprobate are condemned to eternal death, not because of God's decree, but because their
resistance to the grace of God proves, in tire end, to be incorrigible. Furthermore, in the case of the
elect, though their faith is the gift of grace, this grace is not so irresistible as to violate tire freedom of
tire creature who persists in sin." - Jewett, P., Election andPredestination, (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Eerdmans, 1985), 7.
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sin . The will, according to Calvin, was not destroyed by the Fall, but it was entirely
conquered by perverted desires, and so could not desire anything right.131
Man, because of this perversion of the will, is unable to do good works without the aid
of the special grace given to the elect by regeneration. Calvin says, referring to the
Fathers, and especially to Augustine, that they all give praise for man's good to the
Holy Spirit.132
Yet, Calvin himself holds to freewill, believing that, although man sins necessarily, he
also sins voluntarily. He is in bondage to the devil, but it is he himselfwho sins. He is
not forced to be the servant of sin. Yet he is so completely a sinner, that he not only is
unable to redeem himself, but indeed does not wish to do so. Calvin, therefore, teaches
a compatibilist doctrine of freedom.133 Causally, the will is bound by the slavery of
sin, and by the directing act of God, who moves our wills and deliberations, wherever
and however he pleases. A person's character, desires and volitions are worthy of
praise or blame, irrespective of how they are acquired. Freedom is compatible with
necessity. A free act is one that a person does voluntarily, under no external coercion
or compulsion. It accords with his wants and desire. T.H.L. Parker draws attention,
here, to the distinction which Calvin makes between necessity and compulsion, the
former being inward, and the latter, outward.134 Only for free acts can the person be
held morally responsible.135 In reaching this compatibilist conclusion, Calvin makes
use of the concept of 'proximate' and 'remote' causes, rather as was noted above in
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Lucas's thinking about double agency. As J.K.S. Reid observes, the proximate cause is
man's, whereas only the remote cause is attributable to God's ordination. All the
blame is attached to the proximate cause, endorsed by the "internal feeling of the
heart" or "sense of sin."136 The regenerated will turns towards God, but the
unconverted will is disposed to evil. In succeeding, however, in attributing sin wholly
to sinful persons as the proximate cause, Calvin appears to regard human sinning as a
means to bringing about God's will - an evil means to a good end? Nor does Calvin
make any exception for the 'virtuous heathen', whom Erasmus considers worthy of
salvation. Calvin acknowledges that such good people exist, and that God's grace is
present within them. But, as Parker observes, "this is not saving grace, but grace given
for the sake of society."137 - a view which would not hold out any hope for the final
destiny of the unevangelised. Indeed, Calvin rejects any idea that virtuous people who
lived before Christ's death and resurrection might be saved, although he believes that
Jews living before Christ are in a different category because their hope always rested
in Christ alone, rather than in their own law.138 Some Calvinists, however, do believe
that some of those who do not hear the gospel are brought to repentance and faith
solely by general revelation.139
Calvinists resort to a number of devices in order to reconcile the sovereign decrees of
God with human freewill. They are listed by Jack Cottrell140. The first of these is a
redefinition of freewill. The type of freewill promoted by libertarianism, that is, the
power of contrary choice, is rejected, and instead, freedom is defined as the ability to
choose voluntarily and without coercion, as influenced by one's desires and
motivation. A person is free as long as he is able to do what he wants to do. Yet what a
person wants to do in any given situation is determined by outward circumstances and
inner motivations. We can desire good things, for example, happiness, but, without the
Holy Spirit, we cannot aspire to the good which is required for salvation. The Spirit is
not given without the person first receiving the grace of regeneration.141 It is very
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doubtful whether such a restricted view of freedom is worthy of the name. Townley
Lord describes it as right will, rather thanfree will142. The second device is the idea of
second causes to which reference was made above by Reid. The weakness of this view
is that man's will can never operate independently of God, but works only as moved
by God, although in the second stage of conversion (after the initial step of
regeneration), Calvin affirms, man is active, for it is man who does the believing. The
third device is the concept of divine permission which was also used by Augustine.
God sovereignly permits man to will and to do certain things. This is a modification of
God's decree, because this is one area in which the decree is permissive, rather than
efficacious. The permissive decree is limited only to sinful actions. The aim of this
device is to relieve God of the actual responsibility for sinful acts, but, as was noted
above in relation to Augustine, it still leaves God with the ultimate responsibility for
evil. Cottrell rejects all three devices as inadequate, concluding that "Calvinism is a
true determinism, and has no place for genuine freewill."143
Calvin again follows the later Augustine, in his doctrine of predestination. He deals
with it in order to answer the puzzling question why anyone at all responds to
preaching - the seed of the Word coming to fruition in some, but not in others.144 His
answer is that some are adopted by his eternal decree, to the hope of life as his
children, and heirs of the Kingdom, whereas the rest, by the same divine counsel, are
non-elect and therefore reprobate, adjudged to eternal death145. The elect display
God's mercy and grace; the reprobate, his wrath and justice. Furthermore, Calvin also
believes in certainty of salvation for the elect. Their election cannot be lost, and is as
sure as God's eternal wisdom.146
142 "Calvin was more concerned with right will, rather thanfree will. Right will is the result of divine
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The earlier Augustine links predestination with God's foreknowledge, but Calvin
stands squarely in the tradition of the later Augustine in believing that election is prior
to faith and repentance. Election and knowledge are in the last resort identical. As
Reid notes, a good will is the gift of God, who works in us both to will and to do; and
a good will is essential to salvation. But this good will results from the working of
God's mercy, or grace. It is not a condition of the bestowal of that grace.147
Calvin's doctrine of predestination is conceived in terms of justification.148 It is quite
clear that his doctrine of justification concedes no place for human co-operation. All
that is required of those whom God regards as righteous and receives into grace is that
they respond to their election, with the justifying faith that works by love. But it is all
initiated and carried through by God.149 His view is paradoxical in this sense - that,
although the gospel is to be proclaimed to all, it is not in the strictest sense for any
except the elect.150
There are two ways, according to Calvin, in which God achieves this separation.
Sometimes, he does not give people the chance to hear the gospel. The other way is
that God blinds some of those who hear the gospel. In defence of his doctrine, Calvin
draws attention to the many examples in scripture where God hardens men's hearts,
notably Pharaoh (Exodus 4:21). He also refers to Christ's teaching in parable - "in
order that seeing, they might see, and not perceive, and hearing, they may hear and not
understand" (St Matthew 13:13), whereas to the disciples, "it was given to know the
mysteries of the kingdom of heaven." Yet Calvin adds that it was still their own fault
for not understanding. Even in parables they were given enough light to convict their
consciences of ungodliness; but they rejected the light. One may well ask - why does
God act in this way - in effect subordinating his love to his sovereignty? Ultimately,
because the rejected:
147
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are raised up by God's inscrutable judgment to illustrate his glory by
their condemnation.151152
Calvin's final word is to quote Romans 9:20 - "Who are you, O man, to contend with
God?"
The lasting influence of Calvin, particularly in Scotland, is due to the Reformed
tradition, and, in particular, to the Westminster Confession of Faith. The emphasis on
divine sovereignty, linked to a compatibilist understanding of freewill is evident:
God, from all eternity, did by the most wise and holy counsel of his
own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass;
yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence
offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of
second causes taken away, but rather established.15
Donald Macleod, who claims to reject determinism, and considers himself to be a
Calvinist and a libertarian at the same time, interprets the Confession as saying that
although God foreordains the action of men in coming to moral decisions, he
foreordains them as free actions. They are done "by their own personal volition."154
The Confession also follows Calvin in supporting the decretum horribile:
The rest of mankind, God was pleased... to pass by, and to ordain
them to dishonour and wrath for their sin.155
Macleod attempts to soften the hard edge of double predestination, by referring to the
element of'pretention', focusing on the phrase, 'pass by':
Fie finds them sinners. He passes them by. (St Matthew 11:25). There
is a not-revealing. There is a not-enlightening... This sovereign
151 ibid., 3.24.14.
152 As Walls observes: "Luther and Calvin attempt to vindicate their conception of predestination by
appealing to the main principle of the traditional divine command theory ofmorality: that God's will is
the ultimate standard for right and wrong. This requires us to believe that God is right in
unconditionally damning whoever he will, even though this deeply offends our sense ofjustice." -
Walls, J., "Divine Commands, Predestination and Moral Intuition", in Pinnock, C.H., (ed.), The Grace
ofGod and the Will ofMan, op.cit., 264-5.
153 Westminster Confession ofFaith, III. 1.
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element in reprobation is not effective or effectuating. It does not
change people at all. It leaves them.156
Macleod confesses to being unhappy about the double decree, as is Calvin himself. He
believes that it distorts the biblical perspective, and that there is no theological solution
to the dilemma of how to reconcile election and reprobation with the free offer of the
gospel. It should also be concluded that Macleod's attempt to combine Calvinism with
libertarianism is incoherent. If God has foreordained the moral decisions of humans,
they cannot be free.
(f) Opentheism's Reaction to the Augustinian/Calvinist Tradition
The reason why the Augustinian/Calvinist tradition has proved unacceptable to many
modern theologians, and in particular to opentheists, must now be examined. Several
theologians find Calvin's doctrine unscriptural. Fritz Guy, for example, disputes his
interpretation of Romans 8:28-30, on predestination. Calvin describes the double
decree as follows:
God's eternal decree, by which he determined with himself, what he
willed to become of each man... eternal life is foreordained for some,
eternal damnation for others.157
Guy maintains, however that this is not a case of God imposing his will upon man, but
simply a declaration that God is present in every situation, and co-operates with those
who have chosen to act with God's love at the centre of their lives.158
Guy continues to interpret some of the words Paul uses in Romans 8, in ways which
are diametrically opposed to Calvin's understanding.159 'Foreknow' means "God loves
man before man loves God", 'predestine' means "God takes the initiative to remedy
the human predicament", and by 'call', Paul means that "God, through the
proclamation of the gospel invites human beings collectively and individually, to
156 Macleod, D., op.cit., 48.
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participate in the actualisation of the divine intention for them"160. Moreover, Guy
notes that this predestination takes effect in different ways, depending on whether
there is a response in faith. He also draws attention to the vulnerability of God's love,
noting that God's will can be frustrated by humanity, and that therefore, grace is not
irresistible, as Calvin asserts, because it is not the imposition of another's will, but is
in the nature of a free gift which can be rejected.
Cottrell questions the unconditional nature of God's decree or will in Calvinism,
including a specific purpose for every specific moment in creation. Cottrell's point of
view is that most of God's dealings with specific parts of the universe, such as his
foreknowledge, plan of redemption, acts of judgment, and answers to prayer, are
conditional.161
This position requires a limitation upon God's sovereignty, making the world
relatively independent of God, in order to leave human beings with an innate power to
initiate actions. This freedom includes man's proneness to sin, for which God makes
provision in his plan of redemption. This plan is not predetermined in detail, but is
implemented by God in response to human sin. This understanding would appear to be
more biblical than a predetermined foreordination which deprives humanity of liberty,
and therefore, of moral responsibility. It allows for God to intervene in prudential
ways to advance his sovereign purposes.
The idea of a God who interacts in response to human actions also runs in opposition
to the immutable, timeless nature of God, as advanced by Augustine. If God sees the
entire future because he stands outside time, viewing all of reality in a single eternal
moment, this raises the question of whether an utterly changeless being could have
perfect knowledge of a changing reality. According to Calvinism, of course, a
timeless, immutable being would not require to intervene or respond to the changing
flux of worldly events, simply because he would determine the ultimate destiny of
every human being, and there would therefore be nothing left for men and women to
161 Cottrell says - "his foreknowledge is conditioned on the actual occurrence of the events themselves
(as foreknown), the entire plan of redemption is conditioned on (is a response to) man's sin; acts of
judgment and wrath, including hell, are likewise conditioned by sin; answers to prayer are conditioned
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decide. They would merely fulfd their preassigned roles, and free choice would be an
illusion.
Further problems with Calvinism are listed by Rice.162 These include the difficulty of
reconciling it with God's desire to save all people, expressed, for example in 1
Timothy 2:4 and 2 Peter 3:9. Why would the Bible portray God as desiring universal
salvation, if he had already decided from all eternity, whom he would elect for
salvation, and whom for condemnation? There are also frequent warnings about falling
away (1 Corinthians 10:12; Hebrews 6:4-6; 2 Peter 2:20-21), and many calls to
repentance (Ezekiel 33:11; St Matthew 3:2; Acts 2:38; 17:30). All of these would be
superfluous and meaningless, if destiny is foreordained. Calvinists would, of course,
maintain from a compatibilist viewpoint that humans are free to sin, and are therefore
culpable, but this is unacceptable to libertarians, as was noted above. Rice also
remarks that love involves sensitivity, and that a God of love would be infinitely
sensitive to our daily experiences. The classical picture of an impassive God, who
does not interact with humans, does not allow for the sensitivity of true love. Again,
the Calvinist picture turns out to be unscriptural.
The typical opentheist reaction to Calvinism would be that of Pinnock. He takes issue
with the view of divine sovereignty which believes God to have complete control of
all things. Pinnock feels that such a view is biblically unjustified and theologically
destructive. Pinnock has come to believe that Augustine, heavily influenced by Greek
philosophy, had long ago distorted the biblical portrait of a personal, interactive and
self-giving God to one of a timeless, changeless, unmoved and unmoveable sovereign.
Pinnock is anxious to distance himself from this inert and immobile God, and to
substitute for that, a personal agent, who desires loving relationships with fallen
creatures, choosing the risks and costs of dynamic give-and-take interaction.163
by the prayers themselves (as foreknown). But in all of this, God is no less sovereign than if he had
unconditionally predetermined each specific component of the whole." - Cottrell, J., op.cit., 107.
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Rice, R., 'Divine Foreknowledge andFreewill Theism, op.cit., 132.
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Barry Callen describes the change in Pinnock's thinking in these words - "In 1970, Pinnock realised
that there is a biblically revealed reciprocity between God and the world, which classical theism had
diminished. He came to believe that God is interactive with humans in the midst of history, responding
to what happens, even altering the divine course of action in response to human actions. He found
himself being drawn to love-centred theology that makes room for real human freedom and joyfully
affirms a divine providence that is prepared by sovereign choice to take real risks on behalf of ultimate
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Another facet of the Augustinian tradition to which Pinnock takes exception is its
divine monergism. Augustine believes that sinners are not free to love unless their will
is replaced. Pinnock describes this view as sinners being "reprogrammed to respond."
Irresistible grace compels them to have faith, and they cannot respond positively to
God because they are not aware of God's initiative. Pinnock regards it as "salvation
without faith." He rejects the Calvinist claim that grace is irresistible, believing that,
while God initiates salvation, "it does not take hold apart from our response."164
Critics of Calvin would accuse him of entertaining an unworthy idea of God. Calvin
does not believe that reprobation contradicts the love of God,, because he could, with
equal justice, have condemned the whole race of fallen man. The reprobate, in fact,
glorify God by testifying to his justice. Yet, Charles Partee draws attention to Calvin's
failure to resolve "the rational antimony between God's love (the doctrine of election),
and justice (the doctrine of reprobation)". 165But, as to the reasons governing God's
election of the chosen ones, and his condemnation of the others, all we can do, in
Calvin's view, is simply and humbly refer to God's inscrutable wisdom, assured that
the cause is "just, though unknown." It would certainly appear as if Calvin
subordinated God's love to his sovereignty and justice. The unworthiness of this
conception has been forcibly expressed by Aubrey Moore. Indeed, he regards it as
immoral because it makes the distinction between right and wrong, "a matter of
positive enactment." What would be immoral for man, then becomes "moral for God,
because he is above morality."166
The doctrine also appears to cast doubt on the significance and efficacy of petitionary
prayer. If God's sovereignty is, as Calvin claims, in complete control of all that
happens, is there any point in requesting in prayer that certain results come to pass?
Such prayer could, of course, be regarded as a means of accommodating one's desires
to God's will. Yet, as Partee observes - "it seems both odd and futile to request what
goals." - Callen, B., Clark Pinnock: Journey Towards Renewal, (Nappance, Indiana: Evangel
Publishing House, 2000), 115.
164 Pinnock, C.H., Flame ofLove, op.cit., 159, 161.
165 Partee. C., "Calvinism and Determinism," in Gamble, R.C.,(ed.), An Elaboration ofthe Theology of
Calvin, op.cit., 352.
166
Moore, A., Science and Faith, cited by Hardman, O., The Christian Doctrine ofGrace, (London:
Unicorn Press, 1960), 143.
169
will be forthcoming anyway."167 Calvin, however, would see prayer as God's response
to his own initiative in the elect.168
Calvin, would seek to defend his doctrine of predestination, by claiming that it is
wholly faithful to scripture, but many would agree with this sentiment of J.S. Whale:
The unflinching logic of double predestination is not typical of
scripture taken as a whole. The Bible nowhere directly asserts the
decretum horribile.169
(j) The Impact of Libertarianism and Compatibilism on Final Destiny
The question now arises as to whether libertarian freewill is possible after death. Is it
possible for the dead to choose between options? This would not be possible if destiny
is finalised in this life - a question to be pursued in the next chapter. If it is possible,
then we have to ask in what circumstances? - would a second chance be given, or
would it be confined to a first chance for those deprived of an opportunity in this life?
For libertarianism to operate, there would require to be no internal predisposition
preventing the agent from a decisive choice. It could be that a hardening of the heart,
resulting from habitual wrong-doing, would determine the will, thus preventing a free
choice. On the other hand, the encounter with Christ might be so transforming in the
afterlife, that a change for the better might prevail in the agent's soul. Again, however,
for libertarian freewill to operate, the revelation arising from a direct encounter with
Christ would not require to be so overwhelming that the will was irresistibly
determined.
The question might well be asked - Will libertarian freewill be enhanced in the
intermediate state? Under the providence of God, the intermediate state will provide,
as has been stated earlier, an opportunity for conversion to Christ, for those for whom
this has not been possible in their earthly lives. For such an opportunity to be fairly
presented, there would require to be fewer counteracting influences, than might obtain
on earth, militating against a positive decision for Christ. Circumstances which
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suggest injustice and undeserved suffering, and which, before death, could encourage
rejection of God s love, might well be absent beyond death. Also, any limitation upon
libertarian freedom would detract from the moral value of a responsible decision.
James F. Sennett has written an article, entitled Is There Freedom in Heaven?170 His
conclusion is that there will be compatibilist free actions in heaven. The actions of
human agents in heaven will be determined by the agent's character. According to
Sennett, libertarianism only applies to actions contributing to the agent's character
while here on earth. The contention of this thesis, however, is that enhanced libertarian
freedom will be present in the intermediate state, if not in heaven.
The question as to whether God would have foreknowledge of human choices in the
afterlife, might not arise if God is timeless, surveying postmortem activity in the
intermediate state in one eternal present. The very idea of choice and activity for
humans, however, would seem to indicate that, at least for them, temporal categories
would still apply, otherwise postmortem spiritual progress would not be possible.
The scriptural evidence advanced above by Rice, illustrating libertarian freedom,
implies certain truths about God's attitude towards his creatures. It would be strange,
indeed, if the freedom which we enjoy here and now, to love God, were to be cut short
at death. It would also be disconcerting if the Heavenly Father, who welcomed back
his repentant, prodigal son in our Lord's parable, in this life, were not to afford him a
similar opportunity to "come to himself' in the far country of an intermediate state.
Also, some human beings are said in St Matthew 21:41-46 and Revelation 20:14-15 to
set themselves against God for eternity, but who is to say, that in the changed
circumstances of an afterlife whether these humans would be debarred from a change
of heart or persist in their intransigence. Surely the God who patiently pursues his
objectives for his creatures in this life, will not abandon them as lost causes in the
hereafter. God's plans could well be flexible enough to respond to changes in human
behaviour. Also, if God's omnipotence means as Pinnock observed above "that God is
able to deal with any circumstance that may arise," we can well conceive of the
omnipotence continuing to operate - probably with even greater efficacy, in the
changed circumstances beyond death. This need not, commit one to a universalist
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Sennet, J.F., "Is There Freedom in Heaven?" in Faith andPhilosophy, vol.16, No.l, Jan.1999.
171
position, as libertarianism requires that, even beyond death, humans will have the
freedom to reject the divine overtures, thus consigning themselves, either to hell, or
more probably, to further spiritual diminishment and ultimate annihilation.
The liberty which God allows humans to possess, means that he permits them to sin
freely. This liberty must surely persist beyond death, for it is essential if human beings
are to be worthy of praise or blame. Our eschatological state will not be that of non
posse peccare. The conception of a realm where there is no more sin, is a vision of
heavenly bliss, rather than that of an intermediate state, where a process of purification
will surely be under way. Such is the imperfection which even the best of us feel in
this life, that an instantaneous transition at death to a fully perfect state seems highly
unlikely. Spiritual growth is a much more gradual process, and for it to take place at
all, liberty is a sine qua non.
The opentheist belief in the openness and responsiveness of God to human actions has
the great advantage that it allows for genuine dialogue between God and ourselves,
including his response to our prayers. This point has an important relevance, because it
leaves the way open for prayers for the dead. If the final destiny of the unevangelised
remains open after death, there must surely be envisaged, not only the possibility, but,
indeed, the desirability of prayers being offered for the salvation of those who have
died without commitment to Christ. This thought will recur in the final chapter of the
thesis in the context of the pastoral opportunities, which will present themselves, when
we are called, say, to comfort a bereaved wife on the death of her agnostic or atheistic
husband.
Allusion has already been made to various factors in the causation of human actions -
Lucas's "causal complex". Lucas gives scriptural evidence for the influence of other
people, in decision-making in this life. Neither should the influence of other people, be
discounted in the afterlife. There must surely be a social dimension to life in the
intermediate state. In a recent essay, Miroslav Volf argues that, if the world to come is
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to be a world of love, then, it must have "an inter-human side." It will be part of the
work of the Spirit to effect "the final social reconciliation."171
He imagines, for example, a meeting ofCain and Abel in the world to come, and what
would need to happen before a reconciliation could take place. Volf s thesis refers to
the final consummation, and he makes no mention of an intermediate state, but the
reservations already expressed about instantaneous sanctification would apply also to
inter-human reconciliation. In an intermediate state with countless humans still "on the
way" with their spiritual development, there would obviously be much work to be
done. It would appear likely, that as God has enlisted his Church to prosecute his
mission here on earth, so he will continue to enlist believers in the ongoing work of
conversion in the world to come., and this will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 6 below. Nevertheless, there is no way in which the influence of others could
be determinative, if the agent is to be held morally responsible, as Swinburne observed
above.
If moral responsibility depends, as has been suggested, on libertarian freedom, the
issues of right and wrong must be clearly distinguished and presented. It could well be
that, although humans, according to Romans 1, have an innate sense of moral
judgment, the cultural and religious environment surrounding an agent in this life, may
have dulled his moral sensitivity (his conscience) - hence the need for a clearer
challenge in an intermediate state where moral responsibility can be more fairly
apportioned.
The goal of creation, as envisaged by Ward and Polkinghorne, was seen to involve:
the generation of communities of free, self-aware, self-directing
sentient beings, capable of conscious relationship to the creator.172
It is difficult to imagine this goal being realised on this earth. The evidence of history
reveals an ongoing state of affairs where rampant evil continues to flourish alongside
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the good. Indeed, our Lord's teaching in the Parable of the Wheat and the Tares leads
us to expect that this will always be the case. The ultimate goal, therefore, would seem
to call for an otherworldly consummation through the medium of an intermediate
state.
In turning from libertarianism to consider compatibilism in the context of final destiny
- there is little that can be said about either physical or psychological determinism. It
is idle to speculate on physical laws which would be completely different in the world
to come. Psychological determinism would be equally problematical - certainly as
regards environmental conditioning, as the other world's environment could be
unrecognisable after this world. Genetic conditioning, however, might have a part to
play, as even with the new creation of spiritual bodies, there must be some continuing
link to preserve personal identity. The type of determinism, however, which has the
greatest relevance, is theological. Soft determinism might be relevant, as we would
carry forward our characters and dispositions into the future life. If, however, the
intermediate state is to be a sphere of continuing progress, then we shall require to be
free to make decisions which may conflict with our characters and inherited
dispositions. For this, we would require libertarian freedom.
It could be that Dennett's compatibilist insight into "the communal activity ofmutual
persuasion, reflection and instruction, creating values that take precedence over the
cruder instincts of our ancestors"173 may impact upon postmortem development, and
decision-making. But although, as has just been explained, the influence of others may
be of importance in the afterlife, the requirements of moral responsibility mean that
the crucial decisions must be "up to" the individual. Dennett was unable to pin down
the origination of the power to will our actions, and alluded to the mysterious entity,
the "active self." It would appear that it is this very entity which must survive death,
and be capable of further improvement, the entity which traditionally has been called
"the soul". Dennett also says that "the more talented we are, the more we are able to
control our destiny". The interesting possibility suggests itself that the God who has
endowed some people with ten talents and others with only one, may, in a future life,
re-allocate our talents on a more equitable basis! Dennett's claim is that the only kind
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of freewill "worth wanting" is where we want agents to be free, capable of initiating
and taking responsibility for projects and deeds. The final destiny of the unevangelised
would require them to be agents in this sense, although it might preferable to qualify
Dennett's statement by saying that the initiating would come as a response to God's
grace, without being determined by it.
Honderich's "life-hopes", where he argues for an open (indeterministic) future, rather
than a closed (deterministic) one, has an obvious relevance to the theme. It is to be
hoped, indeed, that the unevangelised would be able in Honderich's words - "to rise
above the conditioning and influence of the past to produce something new by our
own efforts"174. Kane, building on Honderich's views, lists a number of goods, which
are assured, if indeterminism rather than determinism is true - many of them relevant
to questions of final destiny. Included among these are the sense of individuality and
uniqeness peculiar to the person, if his actions are not determined. It would certainly
be true, that if an unevangelised person is to saved, it would require, on his part, an
individual decision, independent of conditioning influences external to the agent.
There is also a certain dignity or worthiness, which a person aspiring to salvation
would hope to achieve, and which God, and other humans ought to feel able to accord
to him. Also, as already indicated in the context of scriptural references to 'love', love
and friendship only attain their value in an environment where they are undetermined
and spontaneous. Such love would be one of the hall-marks of an advanced state of
spiritual maturity in an intermediate state. As "God is love", the more clearly one can
respond to God with an answering devotion, freely given, the closer one advances to
the complete fellowship of love in heaven.
Kane's perplexity about how thoughts and efforts of will can at the same time be
physical processes of the brain is compounded by St Paul's imaginative concept of the
"spiritual body" with which God may endow us in the new creation after death.
In considering Anglin's compatibilist understanding of "metachoices" in the choice of
values, it was concluded that choosing values is a matter of transcending one's
previous values, culture and any other determining factors. This has an obvious
174 Honderich, T., op.cit., 22.
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connection with the final destiny of the unevangelised, who will normally be called
upon to commit themselves to Christ despite, and, indeed, often in opposition to, the
values and culture, which have prevented an encounter with Christ in this life. Such a
change in the choice of values would presuppose libertarian freewill.
The compatibilist position becomes even more inopportune for final destiny, when it
emphasises, as in the thought of Vivian, the moulding influence of the climate of
opinion in surrounding society. If we are, as he avers, "to a large extent, prisoners of
our environment", one would have to hope that the postmortem environment for the
unevangelised would be so different, as to enable them to break free from their former
prisons! Also, if most of their virtuous actions were motivated by their acquired
dispositions or characters, as Vivian also believes, one would need to hope that the
changed environment of the intermediate state would enable them to act 'out of and
'above' their previous characters.
Swinburne's opinion that character does not determine an agent's choice, but simply
makes certain choices easy and others hard, is much more conducive to the
postmortem opportunities, which will sometimes require individuals to choose
between desires of equal strength, or indeed resist desire altogether, and do what they
believe is more worthwhile.
It is time, next, to consider the impact of theological determinism in the
Augustinian/Calvinist tradition upon thoughts of final destiny. Augustine, as noted
above, believes that, without grace, fallen man lacks the ability to choose
righteousness. This position would straightaway rule out of court, the view that the
unevangelised might be saved by responding favourably to such light as they have
received in this life. They would require to encounter the grace of God in a
postmortem encounter with Christ. This, however, would not be possible in the
Augustinian system, where, immediately after death, one's eternal destiny is fixed.
Augustine's belief is that guilty souls are enclosed in a place of torture; the just in
regions of repose and happiness. In the interval which separates death from
resurrection, souls are either tortured, or find rest, according to what they did on this
earth. This period "contains souls in hidden places of rest or anguish, as each one
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merits". 175Augustine does believe in the existence of purgatory, just as his teacher,
Ambrose, does, distinguishing so clearly, the fire of purgatory from that of hell. 176The
teaching of a period of expiation after death is clearly linked in Augustine's thought to
prayers for the departed.
The real divergence between the Augustinian/Calvinist tradition and this thesis is
uncovered by the doctrine of predestination. According to Augustine, God prepares
some - the elect - for the truth, and others not. He would presumably, therefore,
number the unevangelised among the non-elect. Augustine would reject the charge
that God was unjustly depriving them of the opportunity for salvation. Those, in his
view, to whom the faith was never preached at all were those God knew would not
believe. It would be possible to hold this belief, only if one believed in God's
foreordination. If humans had freedom to choose without determination of their wills
by God, then God would not know in advance, whether they would believe or not. If
God foreordains that millions reject him, he would appear to be depriving them of the
opportunity to hear the gospel, because of accidents (although Augustine would not
regard that word as appropriate!) of history or geography. This would appear to be
flagrantly unjust.
As noted above, Calvin stands squarely in the Augustinian tradition. God's
sovereignty, for Calvin, is total, and, therefore, the final destiny of the unevangelised
is fixed from all eternity. Even if one were to grant Calvin's compatibilist contention
that humans are free to choose, such freedom is illusory, and the fate of the
unevangelised would be sealed from day One. What the unevangelised need most of
all is the restoration of the freedom to live before God in a way which would enable
them to receive God's greatest gift - salvation. This is precisely what they are
prevented from receiving, because the special grace needed for regeneration is
reserved for the elect. That the non-elect should be singled out for condemnation, quite
irrespective of their deserts, seems quite unjust. The idea that God permits the sinner,
in effect, to sign his own death warrant, seems to be particularly pernicious, when, in
his omnipotence, God could easily intervene to direct the sinner's will in another




millions - as he either deprives some of the opportunity to hear the gospel, or, if they
do hear it, blinds them to its significance.
The modern Calvinist, Loraine Boettner, advances the very doubtful argument that:
if God had intended to save them (the unevangelised), he would have
sent them the means of salvation.1
But this need not be so. God might either save some by their response in this life to
such light as they received, or provide them with a postmortem saving encounter with
Christ. But the former of these alternatives is clearly rejected by the Westminster
Confession of Faith which, after stating that those who reject Christ cannot be saved,
adds:
Much less can men, not professing the Christian religion, be saved in
any other way whatsoever, be they never so diligent to frame their
lives according to the light of nature, and the law of that religion they
do profess.178
Boettner then proceeds to make a grudging concession with the view that if the
heathens are lost "they shall suffer relatively less than those who heard and rejected
the gospel (Lk. 10:12-14; 12:47-48)." But he then describes the condemnation of the
non-elect as meant "to furnish an external exhibition before men and angels, of God's
hatred for sin."179
This is a singularly unattractive idea, suggesting, as it does, that God would use the
heathen as a means to an end - the publicising of his justice, thus making them an
example for the deterrence of others.
Calvin himself, is uncommunicative on the possibility of an intermediate state, saying:
176 Ambrose, Expositio in Psalmum, 118, sermon 3,17.
177 Boettner, Loraine, The ReformedDoctrine ofPredestination, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans,
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It is not right to enquire into the state or place of souls between death
and resurrection. It is sufficient to know that the souls of believers
'retire' into blessed rest, where they await happily and joyfully, the
fruition of the promised glory.180
The conclusion of this chapter must be that the Augustinian/Calvinist tradition holds
out no hope for the salvation of the unevangelised; overemphasises the sovereignty of
God at the expense of human freewill, and fails to express adequately the justice, love
and mercy of God. The libertarian understanding of human freedom is to be preferred
to the compatibilist view, as it enables a person to transcend the determinism of
character and disposition. The opentheist contention that God limits his sovereignty,
and interacts with the free response of humans, adapting his plans accordingly, appears
to be best suited to a positive outcome for the final destiny of the unevangelised.
The thesis argues that libertarian freewill continues into postmortem existence, but
how will the unrighteous and the unevangelised respond? Will there be further
opportunities of salvation for those who rejected Christ in this life, and what will be
the ultimate fate of the stubbornly impenitent? These questions lead the discussion in
the direction of a study ofuniversalism and conditional immortality.
178. Calvin, J., op.cit., 3.2.25-6
CHAPTER 6
UNIVERSALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
(a) The Value of Libertarian Freedom
One of the main attractions of opentheism in the promotion of this thesis is the scope
which it gives to the individual, either to respond to the grace of God in Christ by
accepting the offer of salvation, or to reject this offer. This becomes possible when the
individual possesses libertarian freedom. The traditional Augustinian/Calvinist
position is unacceptable, because it leaves the destiny of the individual entirely in the
hands of God, who predestines some of his creatures to salvation and others to
condemnation. Divine election of this kind removes from the creature the dignity of
moral responsibility. While it is true, as Augustinians assert, that all humans sin and
are therefore guilty, the fact that some can be regenerated through divine election,
while others cannot, reduces humans to the level of pawns under the control of a
divine chess-player. No virtue can then be attributed to the human being. The view
put forward in this thesis may be criticised as synergism, but it is important to retain
choice for the individual. Even if, the initiative in conversion is taken by God in his
gracious overtures to the person, and, even if the person's faith is itself a gift of God,
the response of accepting in faith must be freely taken, without external compulsion.
It appears that a God who limits his omnipotence in this way, as opentheists claim, in
order to encourage human response is a more admirable God than one who exercises
his almighty power in an irresistible, manipulative manner. It is also much more in
keeping with the nature of a God who is Love. An essential and obvious characteristic
of love - whether human or divine - is that it does not compel a response, but rather
seeks to win a free response. These considerations would appear to apply especially to
the death of Christ upon the Cross. The crucifixion directs its appeal to the heart.
Indeed, if the final decision in determining human destiny lay with irresistible election
by an omnipotent God, there would seem to be little point in a divine plan which
required the crucifixion of God's Son. The question - "Is it nothing to you, all you
who pass by?" could only be given one answer - "Precisely nothing". The paramount
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will of an almighty manipulator could effect the separation of the elect from the non-
elect without the appeal of suffering love directed at human hearts.
The requirement of a completely free human response raises questions regarding the
circumstances which would need to obtain in order to allow such a response to be
made. This thesis asserts, as a basic truth, the finality of Christ as the sole source of
salvation. Inclusivists maintain that the unevangelised may be saved by responding to
such light as God affords them through general revelation, or through conscience. It is
maintained here, however, that the freedom to choose good rather than evil, while it
would indicate that the individual was heading in the right direction, could never
equate to the experience of repentance, following upon judgment of sin at the foot of
the Cross, and the surrender of the heart and will issuing in the individual's rebirth.
Nor does the kind of faith in the reality of God to be found in the beliefs of faithful
devotees of the other great world religions seem to present the same depth of
challenge as that posed by the life and death of Christ. Accidents of history and
geography often prevent the non-Christian believer from making the kind of well-
informed choice which truly libertarian freedom requires. Similar factors also restrict
the freedom of the unevangelised, living in a Christian or post-Christian society, as
will be noted in the following chapter, when the kind of social deprivation which can
militate against a truly free acceptance ofChrist as Saviour, is described.
It is for these reasons that the likelihood of postmortem evangelism should be
promoted, when God may make available to the unevangelised the kind of
opportunity to respond to Christ which they have been denied in this life. A number of
related questions then arise. First, will the postmortem environment be suitable for an
individual to make free choices beyond death? This would not be possible if the only
postmortem existence could be described as a kind 'soul-sleep' as in Lutheran
thought. The individual would require to have all his or her mental and spiritual
faculties wide awake. A number of Pauline passages , for example, Phil 1:23, would
imply that this would be so. What would be the point of 'being with Christ' if one's
soul was to be asleep? There would be consciousness, although perhaps to a reduced
extent, compared with the eventual sensitivities of the final state of heavenly
existence. It is also difficult to imagine free decisions being taken by a disembodied
soul. Paul should, therefore, be followed when he envisages the deceased 'putting on'
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meaning of aionios ('eternal'), in, for example, Matt. 25:46 where, at the conclusion
of his Parable of the Sheep and the Goats, Jesus says of the unrighteous - "Then they
will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life." Packer also
refers to its use in 2 Thess. 1:9 - "everlasting destruction." Packer claims that aionios
means 'fixity' and 'finality', that is to say, 'endlessness'.3 He also refers to its use in
Rev. 20:10, with reference to the devil, the beast and the false prophet being
"tormented day and night for ever and ever", commenting that it "is presumably the
knowledge of God's own ill-desert and displeasure, and of the good that one has
lost."4
These texts, in Packer's opinion, speak of continued existence in an experience of
retribution. Packer also claims that apollumi does not mean 'annihilation'. Here, he is
following the opinion of R.A. Morey, who draws this conclusion from the rabbinic
meaning of the word, its lexigraphical significance, and the way the New Testament
uses it.5
Supporters of this position are in the habit of inserting the word 'conscious' into their
description of everlasting punishment. This is unwarranted and inadmissible. Matt.
25:46 can be interpreted to mean 'irreversible destruction' rather than 'everlasting,
conscious torment',6 and this is certainly to be preferred. Despite Morey's
lexigraphical evidence, it should be held that if 'destruction' is an accurate translation
of apollumi, it is much closer to common parlance in English to understand its
meaning as 'non-existence'.7 In regard to interpretation of aionios, annihilationists,
who assert that it communicates the idea of 'that which pertains to the age to come',
and that the "adjective refers to an eternal result of the punishment rather than an
incessant process." would appear to be right.8 Passages in the Book of Revelation
which can be understood as describing an endless condition of torment are also open
3
Packer, J.I., Celebrating the Swing Work ofGod, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1998), 165.
4 ibid., 174.
5
Morey, R.A., Death and theAfterlife, (Minneapolis: Bethany House Publishers, 1984), 90.
6 See, for example, Pinnock, C.H., 'Tire Destruction of the Finally Impenitent,' in Criswell Theological
Review, 4, Sept. 1990, 256.
7 This is Jolm Stott's view "It would seem strange.. .if people who are said to suffer destruction, are in
fact not destroyed; and.. .it is difficult to imagine a perpetually inconclusive process of perishing". -
Stott, John and Edwards, David L.,A Liberal-Evangelical Dialogue, (London: Hodder & Stoughton,
1988,315-6.
8
Morgan, C., Jonathan Edwards andHell, (Tain: Christian Focus Publications, 2004), 59.
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to other interpretations. For example, when John says that worshippers of the beast
"will be tormented with burning sulphur...And the smoke of their torment rises for
ever and ever", the reference could be to the moment of their judgment, not their
everlasting condition with the smoke going up forever being testimony to their final
destruction.9
Augustine's belief in endless, retributive punishment has a major influence on
medieval Western theology 10- for example, on Aquinas - and the principal Protestant
reformers, Luther and Calvin follow in the same tradition. It should also be noted that
the Arminian, John Wesley, also strongly supports eternal, conscious punishment.
Modern exponents of the traditional view lay emphasis upon a God who justly
demands that unredeemed sin be punished, and because God is infinitely good, that
means that the sin merits endless retribution. Some affirm belief in eternal, conscious
spiritual torment rather than physical suffering,11 and suggest that to be estranged from
God for ever, could in fact be worse than to endure endless, physical punishment. Yet
another group refuse to speculate on the detailed workings of hell, and confine
themselves to the belief that hell connotes eternal separation from God.12 Human
beings are created for communion with God, and this is the heart of salvation and the
gospel. To lack such communion is to find oneself in hell, estranged from the love of
God. This view is the main emphasis of C.S. Lewis's allegory of salvation and
damnation, entitled The Great Divorce, which concentrates on 'privation' from the
love ofGod, rather than on endless torture or extinction.13
The traditional view appears to be unacceptable because it proposes the view that the
God revealed in the person and teaching of Jesus, would permit unrepentant sinners to
9
Pinnock, op.cit., 257.
10 Augustine expresses a parallelism between eternal life and eternal punishment as follows - "How
absurd it is to interpret eternal punishment as meaning merely a fire of long duration, while believing
eternal life to signify life without end... The phrases are parallel: eternal punishment; eternal life. To
say in the same context, 'Eternal life will be without end; eternal punishment will have an end', is
utterly ridiculous. Hence, since the eternal life of the saints will be without end, tire eternal punishment
of those who incur it, will, without doubt, be endless." {City ofGod, XXI, 23, 1000-2.) He also rejects
tire view that eternal punishment is unjustly disproportionate to any crime committed in the finite
context of life on earth, because all human beings are implicated in tire universal sin of Adam, (ibid.,
XXI, 12, 988-9).
11 For example, Anthony Hoekema, Murray Harris and Peter Toon.
12 For example, Kendall Harmon, Alec Motyer and Peter Head.
191
languish in the torture chamber of hell.14 The traditional view appears to subordinate
God's love to his justice, whereas it seems more probable that his justice is an aspect
of his love. No matter how recalcitrant sinners may be, God in his loving mercy has
forgiven them - and this is the gospel of the Cross. The witness of the Bible, outlined
above, favours conditional immortality, rather than the traditional view.15 It is not
inconsistent with God's love that the impenitent are annihilated, either straight after
they have been resurrected, and judged, or, more probably, after a time of purgative
punishment in an intermediate state. The annihilation of evildoers could also have the
effect of freeing the universe of all evil, which would appear to be the contention of
some Pauline passages often quoted by universalists.
One of the attractive features of conditionalism for this thesis is the recognition which
it gives to the possession by human beings of free-will. It is the fact that God has given
us the power to choose, which opens up the possibility of final rejection of God's offer
of salvation, and which may lead to annihilation.16 The suggestion has been made that
when God intervenes to allow an impenitent sinner to die, this may be tantamount to a
violation of human freedom, because the sinner may prefer to remain in hell, rather
13
Lewis, C.S., The Great Divorce, op, cit.
u John W. Wenliam is a prominent conditionalist who puts his finger upon the main difference
between conditionalism and the traditional view - "It shares the doctrine of judgment held by the
upholders of everlasting torment in almost every particular - except for one tremendous tiling: it sees
no continuing place in God's world for human beings living on in unending pain, not reconciled to
God. The wrath of God will put an end to sin and evil." - Wenliam, J.W., "The Case for Conditional
Immortality" in Cameron N. M.de S., (ed.), Universalism and the Doctrine ofHell, (Carlisle:
Paternoster Press, 1992), 162.
15 This is also the view ofDonald Baillie who maintains that - "Die idea of everlasting punishment
need not imply that any one individual will remain forever in that torment; in any case, a dogma should
not be built upon parabolic and apocalyptic foundations." - Baillie, D.M., "The Kingdom of God and
the Christian Hope" in unpublished lectures (1954).
16 Archbishop William Temple gives forcible expression to the fact of human freedom - "God so longs
for a freely offered life that he risks die loss involved in a choice which brings perdition. Because he is
love, he made us free; because we are free, we may choose to perish...The New Testament certainly
teaches diat, on die choice of every will, an infinite issue lies. Die question at stake is not of less or
more, nor one of sooner or later; it is one of life or deadi. And it is good for us diat it should be so. It is
bracing to the will, diat it should have real responsibility; and of diis, a dogmatic universalism would
deprive it." - Christus Veritas, (London: Macmillan, 1924), 209.
Wheeler Robinson also identifies human freedom as a key issue, involved in questions of ultimate
destiny. After reviewing die alternatives to universalism and everlasting suffering for die impenitent,
and acknowledging tiiat a case can be made out for both on the grounds of scripture and reason, he
believes a "revised form of conditional immortality can make die best case for itself." The issue of
one's final destiny, he avers, is bound up witii freedom, because - "If, according to his (God's)
purpose, die right use of freedom is necessary for die attainment of eternal life, tiien die wrong use of
freedom, ifpermanent, must forfeit it. We cannot assert diat all men will or will not turn to God; how
do we know what use personality will make of its freedom under entirely new conditions." - Robinson,
H. Wheeler, Redemption andRevelation, (London: Nisbit, 1942), 310.
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than have his life terminated.17 A more likely scenario would be a situation where a
sinner's life comes to an end through spiritual deterioration, resulting from his own
evil choices, without any infringement of free-will through divine intervention.18 The
radically wicked simply cease to be; they have lapsed into non-being. At the end-time,
there will be a resurrection to eternal life for the virtuous, but for the wicked, death
will mean final extinction. This notion of conditionalism has much to commend it,
because it avoids the choice between universalism and unending hell. Opponents, of a
universalist persuasion would, of course, criticise it, on the grounds that it amounts,
they would aver, to God abandoning sinners to their fate, a view which they find
morally unacceptable. Important support for conditionalism over against either
universalism or eternal torment is provided by the Doctrinal Commission of the
Church ofEngland, although it finally comes to an agnostic conclusion.19
The traditional belief that God decrees from all eternity, that some are predestined to
salvation, and others to damnation, is quite unacceptable to opentheists, who maintain
the universality ofGod's intention to save all of humanity, as expressed in texts like 2
Pet. 3:9 and 1 Tim. 2:4. The atonement is not limited as in Calvinist thinking, but
universal in its outreach, although particular in its efficacy. Opentheists also react with
17 This suggestion is made by W.S. Anglin in Free Will and the Christian Faith, op.cit., 179.
Intervention by God is also alluded to as a possibility by R.R.Cook who explores die relationship
between rejection of the gospel in this life, and the human will. He notes that people may refuse the
offer of salvation because of a weak will, or because of an impotent will, and that the weak-willed soul
might be tempted - "to procrastinate forever, unless God made clear that the offer of salvation is not
open-ended. The warning diat one day God will withdraw his offer could be perceived as a loving act."
-Cook, R.R., "Is Universalism an Implication of the Notion ofPostmortem Evangelism? in Tyndale
Bulletin, 45 (1994), 408.
lsKeith Ward quotes C.S. Lewis's description in The Great Divorce of such people as "men who have
been so engrossed with themselves, that their personalities have gradually shrivelled, and grown totally
self-enclosed, until, in tine end, they wither away as personalities." Ward, K., Ethics and Christianity,
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), 260. Lewis's position is also clarified in The Problem ofPain
He believes that souls in hell may leave, if they wish. In a memorable phrase, he describes the doors of
hell as "locked on the inside". But the wish diat diey might have to escape is weak because - "they
certainly do not will even die first preliminary stages of diat self-abandonment, dirough which die soul
can reach any good. They enjoy forever die horrible freedom diey have demanded, and are dierefore
self-enclosed." -Lewis, C.S., The Great Divorce, op.cit., 115-6.
Kallistos Ware comments on die opinion of anti-universalists diat diere is a point of no return, after
which repentance becomes impossible - "God does not deprive die damned of their freedom, but die
misuse of their freedom becomes eventually so deep-rooted in diem diat diey cannot diereafter change,
and thus remain fixed forever in dieir aditude of rejection. God has not ceased to love diem, but diey
have rendered diemselves incapable of ever again responding to that love." Ware, K., The Inner
Kingdom, (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2000), 213.
19The Doctrinal Commission of the Church ofEngland: TheMystery ofSalvation, (London: Church
House Publishing, 1995), 115-6
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revulsion to the view that hell means everlasting torture for the damned.20 They hold,
surely correctly, that eternal torment would be vindictive, and completely out of
keeping with the love of God. They also maintain that if there were to be endless
impenitence of the damned in hell, this would mean that Christ had not won the
victory over sin and death. The biblical picture, they maintain, is that Satan and all
other enemies have been consumed in the lake of fire and the Second Death.21 The
opentheist views, arise out of their picture ofGod's nature, and of how he relates to his
creatures. This relationship is sometimes described as 'the fellowship model.'22 In the
covenant relationship between Jehovah and Israel, there is a pattern of withdrawal and
return like that of a mother interacting with her child, in order that the child might
respond and develop. It can also be compared to the relationship between lovers and
marriage partners. Each has a part to play, and choices to make, as in marriage. The
initiative, of course, lies with God in his grace, but his grace does not manipulate or
determine our response, since we are able to accept or refuse it. This marks a further
departure from the Augustinian/Calvinist tradition, because opentheists maintain that
we are saved by grace through faith - the grace is not irresistible. Opentheists -
particularly Pinnock, lay great stress upon the 'faith principle' which is soundly based
on scriptural texts like Gen. 15:6 and Heb. 11:6 - "And without faith it is impossible
to please God, because anyone who comes to him, must believe that he exists, and that
he rewards those who earnestly seek him." Sinners require to consent and yield to
God's persuasion, but the love of God is seen as empowering rather than
overpowering. Here, once again, there is a significant departure from traditional
theology. Augustine, followed by Luther, is of the opinion that sinners are not able, of
themselves, to respond to God, because they are dead in their sins. (Eph. 2:1). They
require regeneration first, which then enables them to respond. They cannot believe,
before this, because of the bondage of the will. But this is tantamount to salvation
without faith, rather than salvation by grace through faith. Opentheists see this as faith
programmed by irresistible grace.23 It is immediately obvious that the gift by God to
20
They hold that sensitive people (in Pinnock's words) - "cannot accept that God would subject
anyone, even most corrupt sinners, to unending torture, in both body and soul, as Augustine and
Jonathan Edwards taught. If that is what hell means, many will conclude that there should not be a
doctrine of hell in Christian theology." - Pinnock, C.H, A Widenessin God'sMercy, op.cit., 157.
21 Pinnock C.H. in Crockett, W. (ed.), Four Views on Hell, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan,
1992), 154.
22 Sanders, J. "God as Personal" in The Grace ofGod and the Will ofMan, op.cit., 177.
23 Pinnock, C.H. Flame ofLove, op.cit., 159.
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his creatures of free-will is of vital importance to opentheists. The love of God is more
fundamental than his control, and so he creates human beings with moral freedom.
This is a risky strategy for God, because he is then vulnerable to the possible misuse
by humans of their freedom. While it is still possible for everyone to be saved, people
have a genuine choice, and God's love can be ignored or spurned. When the offer of
salvation is rejected, hell is a possible outcome, and the fate of impenitent sinners, if
they persist in rejecting the offer of salvation, is, in opentheist eyes, annihilation.24 The
final destiny of some of the unevangelised, if they persistently reject postmortem
offers of salvation, could therefore lead to spiritual deterioration and eventual
extinction.
(d) Is the Final Decision on Human Destiny Taken in this Life?
Within the time-span covered by the New Testament, the expectation of the parousia
begins to fade, and, with it, the idea of a second judgment. The popular Christian view
which emerges is that each person, as he or she dies, goes to heaven, (either directly or
via purgatory), or to hell. The judgment of the individual at death becomes
indistinguishable from the final judgment at the end of the world, and therefore the
destiny of the soul is decided at the hour of death. One either dies after having
repented, and goes to heaven in a state of grace, or, if one is still impenitent, one goes
to hell. The exposition of this argument by restrictivists, such as Nash, in their
opposition to postmortem evangelism, has already been discussed in Chapter 4.
Such a view, however, appears to devalue the soul. To believe that, at death, some are
elected for eternal life, while others are doomed to eternal death, would imply that no
further moral improvement is possible after death. It seems much more likely that, as
most of us fall far short of perfection when we die, there will be further stages and
methods of spiritual growth in an intermediate state. As life here and now is a vale of
soul-making, the experience of education, so incomplete here, will fructify hereafter.
The fate of the soul will therefore not be finally determined at death. Furthermore, if
24 Pinnock is always anxious to ground his views on scripture, and so he quotes with approval the New
Testament scholar, E.G. Selwyn's advocacy of annihilationism - "There is little, indeed, in the New
Testament, to suggest a state of everlasting punishment, but much to indicate an ultimate destruction or
dissolution of those who cannot enter into life: conditional immortality seems to be the doctrine most
195
death itself is the guillotine which lops off all opportunity for further moral and
spiritual development, this would mean that death is stronger than God's love and
grace, particularly in those cases where that love and grace has not had sufficient
opportunity before death to appeal to the soul. All that we know ofmoral and spiritual
progress suggests that death will make very little difference, for it will scarcely
interrupt the continuity of growth and progress. There is no sudden leap at death,
either into perfection, or hopeless damnation.
In rejecting the Augustinian view that the individual faces at death the definitive,
divine judgment, account is being taken of modern biological, psychological and
sociological knowledge. That is to acknowledge that a person's state of soul at death is
considerably influenced by his inherited inclinations, and by his family and social
environment. These factors, while not determining his character, can seriously reduce
his freedom of choice. Final determination of his destiny should therefore await his
experience of a postmortem existence where the limiting effect of these factors can be
counteracted. The fulfilment of God's purpose for that life would require its
prolongation beyond the confines of this life. It would also be difficult to understand
the redemptive work of Christ, if death is an arbitrary cut-off point in the destiny of
the soul. Scriptural passages such as Lk. 23:43 and Phil. 1:23 suggest that a deceased
soul journeys forward in the continuing presence of Christ. If, as Scripture assures us,
"he ever lives to make intercession for us", it would seem strange indeed, and, in fact,
contradictory to believe that the onset of death would bring Christ's redemptive work
to a sudden, and, in countless cases, an unsuccessful end.
The history of religious thought outwith the Augustinian/Calvinist tradition, would
seem to give strong indication that death itself does not determine final destiny. This is
so, because of three attempts which have been made in different periods to overcome
the sharp polarity of the 'double outcome' at death. These are 'reincarnation', belief in
an 'intermediate state' and 'purgatory'. All three express the feeling that one cannot
make the moment of death decisive for ultimate destiny. Where infants die
prematurely, such a final cut-off point would be a complete absurdity. The
arbitrariness of making death the final judgment reveals itself when one considers the
consonant with the teaching of Scripture." - Selwyn, E.G., The First Epistle ofPeter, (London:
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a spiritual body at death, rather than waiting for a reunion of soul and body at the
parousia.
It is also of value to speculate on the likelihood of the unevangelised being required to
take the final postmortem decision on destiny, while in fellowship with other humans.
Too often questions of final destiny appear to focus on the individual on his or her
own. A decision for Christ cannot be taken apart from one's horizontal relationships
with other humans. J.A.T. Robinson in his assertion about postmortem membership in
the Body of Christ, as part ofwhat it means to have a 'spiritual body', goes too far. It
is true, however, that how the individual soul relates to other souls would influence
the eventual decision affecting one's destiny. The idea that Christ might be assisted by
other postmortem evangelists is an attractive one, and here, one recalls C.S. Lewis's
speculation along these lines in The Great Divorce.1
The major influence bearing in upon the one making the decision, would, of course,
be Christ's. One might wonder how an approach from the risen, exalted Christ might
affect the freedom of the human response. It would still be of cardinal importance that
the manifestation of Christ was not so blindingly overpowering that the freedom of
the individual's response was inhibited. One would imagine that, although we shall
still 'see through a glass darkly' but not quite so darkly as we do here, God will
ensure that the decision will still require to be made in faith rather than by sight.
As Chapter 5 indicated, the role which character plays in moral choices is crucial. It is
important that the deceased retains his or her identity in the life to come. Some souls
will therefore carry into the future life the desire and predisposition to sin. What
chance, then, is there for that soul's inclination to change? One would think that in the
case of those who never encountered Christ in this life, there would be a real chance
of improvement and ennobling of character resulting from a first encounter with
Christ. On the other hand, it is possible that an evil soul may be so habituated and
fixed in its ways that change for the better is ruled out. This eventually would explain
Swinburne's Tost souls', or Lewis's 'shrivelled souls', or indeed, 'remains'. The soul
1 "The Solid People have come further for the sake of the Ghosts than ye can understand.. .Everyone of
them has interrupted that journey and retraced immeasurable distances to come down today on the
mere chance of saving some Ghost."- Lewis, C.S., The Great Divorce, (London: Harper Collins, 1946),
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may be so far removed from the appeal of goodness, the character so ingrained by evil
ways, that even exposure to the holy love of Christ, fails to bring about any
amelioration. The key question here is whether the power of divine love overmasters
the human will, or the human will, in its freedom, retains the sinful hardening of heart
which makes it impervious to the overtures of divine love. Universalists will say that
the former is true.
(b) The Doctrine of the Second Chance
The possibility of repeated approaches by Christ to the unevangelised in the
intermediate state opens up the scenario of 'second chances'. This is a different
question from what happens when an unevangelised person meets Christ in the
afterlife for the first time - that would be a 'first chance'. Consideration, however,
must be given to the case of someone who, in this life, made a decision to reject
Christ. It could be that his decision was due to inadequate proclamation of the gospel,
or to the experiences of life predisposing him to doubt, or to the prevailing influence
of other people militating against faith. Even Christians, in this life, sometimes fail to
make an absolute choice, hovering between love of God, and love of themselves.
Also, there are those who might have become saintly, if they had lived longer.
The idea of a 'second chance' goes right back to Marcion and Origen in the Early
Church, and to Schleiermacher, Dorner, Godet and others in more recent times. The
possibility, not simply of a 'second chance', but of a whole succession of chances, is
supported by modern theologians, like Leslie Weatherhead and Fredrick Levison. The
Jehovah's Witnesses also maintain this view, but it is rejected by many theologians of
conservative views. The chief arguments for it are general considerations about divine
love and justice; the position defended by texts like John 3:18,36 that conscious,
deliberate unbelief in Jesus is the only legitimate ground for condemnation, and so,
those, at least, who have never heard of Christ, or have not seriously considered him,
ought to have another chance; and texts like Matt. 12:32 and 1 Pet.3:19 and 4:6,
which can be interpreted as teaching probation after death.
A God of love would surely wish to give his creatures all possible opportunities to
become the persons he wants us to be, to return to our life, so that in the light of his
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grace and in the power of his mercy we could put right what had gone wrong, finish
what was uncompleted, forgiving trespasses against us and healing hurts. Indeed, it
could be said that there can be no maturity without further chances of moral and
spiritual growth. As long as a person has the faintest perception of an ideal which is
higher than that expressed in his own life, there is the chance of reformation. There
can be no such thing as a static soul. Postmortem existence will be something like
ascending or descending a ladder. As it is likely that free-will is still possessed by
souls after death, there will be many choices still to be made. The Parable of the Rich
Man and Lazarus (Lk. 16:19-31) is often quoted to show that the gulf between saved
and unsaved cannot be bridged after death, but it has also been used to show that there
can be postmortem progress. Even the rich man in his torment showed concern for his
brothers, to warn them of their possible fate, whereas at the beginning he had shown
no concern for anyone other than himself. The probability that we can make
postmortem choices does, of course, imply that there will be sin beyond death -
possibly spiritual sins such as pride, jealousy, resentment etc. - and this would be
unacceptable to many.
The doctrine of a 'second chance', however, is rejected by all orthodox Protestant
churches. It is argued, for example, by Augustinian/Calvinist theologians that God
owes man nothing, because he has already given to us a fair probation (in Adam); that
when any of us has the opportunity to hear the gospel, it is an extraordinary divine
kindness; also that John 3:18 and similar passages teach that Jesus is the only way to
salvation, but not that disbelief in him is the only ground for condemnation; we are
condemned by all of our sin, including our corporate sin in Adam. (Rom. 3:23; 5:12-
17; 6:23). The texts mentioned in support of future probation can also be interpreted
in other ways.
It is also frequently maintained that the possibility of a 'second chance' cuts the nerve
of mission, but this objection can be countered, simply by quoting our Lord's
commission - "Go into all the world and preach the good news to all creation." (Mk.
16:15). It is also suggested that if someone knew he was going to receive a 'second
chance' of salvation beyond death, this would encourage an attitude of carelessness,
and would undercut the sense of urgency associated with seeking salvation. But if
such a person continues to reject salvation on the presumption that he can repent later,
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he is forming, by that very attitude, a settled disposition to prefer his own will to
God's. At the very least, this may make it much more difficult for him to come to
accept God's will.2 Also, an attitude of carelessness in this present life could be true
only for 'the spectator', for one who stands outside the faith. No-one who has met
God, in any real sense, could possibly become spiritually indifferent, because a
compassionate God leaves the definitive act of final judgment to the parousia. For
these reasons, it does not seem to be true that a 'second chance' casts doubt on the
urgency of the choice we make in this life, or the significance of our earthly life as our
time of probation. This life will predispose us in one way or another, and the longer
we turn away from God, the more painful the process of our return will be. The
principal argument, however, against a 'second chance' is the view that the final
decision regarding our destiny must be made in this life, and this position will be
extensively discussed later in this chapter. At this point, this thesis parts company
from certain views, held by the opentheists, Pinnock and Sanders. They support the
position of a postmortem 'first chance' for the unevangelised but they reject 'second
chances' on the grounds that the decisions taken in this life determine the direction in
which a human being is heading. It would not be possible, in their view, for a soul to
change direction in the after-life, and therefore 'second chances' would not come into
play. A similar belief appears in the theologies of Karl Rahner and Ladislaus Boros
2 H.P. Owen believes that a careless refusal to respond to Christ here and now will predispose the
sinner to continued rejection in tire after-life - "An objection to the possibility of a fresh choice after
death is that it would make this life spiritually pointless, or at least rob it of the spiritual importance
that tlieists have usually ascribed to it. 1 do not think that this objection can be sustained. If there will
be a new and final choice beyond death, it will be integrally related to tire choices we have made on
earth. In so far as we have freely chosen good, we shall be disposed to a final choice that will lead us to
God; but in so far as we have chosen evil we shall be disposed to a final choice that will lead us away
from him.. .And so a final choice beyond death would complete a pattern that is exhibited within this
present world." - Owen, op.cit., 137.
A similar point of view is expressed by Walls -. "Tire question may be asked why anyone should
endeavour now to love God and do good if there may be further opportunity at death or after death, to
receive salvation. Would this not undercut the sense of urgency associated with seeking salvation? But
if such persons continue to reject salvation on tire presumption that they can repent later, it may well be
that tlrey are forming, by that very attitude, a settled disposition to prefer their wills to God's. At the
very least, this may make it much more difficult for them to come to accept God's will." - Walls, J.L.,
Hell, the Logic ofDamnation, op.cit., 93-4.
Russell Aldwinckle is another scholar who rejects the objection in these terms: "It is argued that ifmen
and women know that there may be a further chance of repentance and faith after death, then this will
induce in them an attitude of carelessness in this present life. But this could be true only for 'the
spectator', for one who stands outside the faith. Our argument is a deduction from the character of the
holy love of God, not from general philosophical considerations. No-one who has met God in this
sense could possibly become spiritually flippant because God in his compassion has decided to leave
the definitive act of final judgment until the Parousia." - Aldwinckle, R., Death in the Secular City,
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972), 136-7.
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who identify the experience of death as the point where final destiny is determined,
and closer attention will be paid to this below.
The argument in favour of future probation rests on reflection upon the nature of
God's love. The love of God as revealed in the life and death of Christ, as well as in
his teaching, emphasises its infinite and resourceful nature. God pursues the sinner
like Francis Thomson's Hound ofHeaven, searching for the lost soul, as the woman
searches for the lost coin, or the shepherd for the lost sheep, or the Father waiting for
the prodigal son --and he searches until he finds. There is an immeasurable depth and
length to the divine love. To make death the point where this love abandons its pursuit
of the soul would seem to be an arbitrary cut-off. The limitless, endless nature of
God's love is fully revealed on Calvary, where God goes to the ultimate length of
self-sacrifice to save mankind. This is also, as Chapter 3 showed, one of the main
lessons contained in our Lord's descent to hell, where he travelled to the extreme
depths ofGod-forsakenness to redeem mankind. If, then, it is true that humans survive
death, and continue to exist in an intermediate state, the love of God must surely
follow us there, never giving up the purpose of winning all souls to himself. It is
encouraging, in this regard, to reflect upon those passages of Scripture, which tell us
that God accompanies his creatures, even into hell - for example, Ps.139. Indeed,
even in hell there is the possibility that the caring love of God will finally succeed in
converting the soul, and translating it to heaven. In such a case, of course, the soul
would be, not in the traditional hell of endless, retributive punishment, but rather, in a
kind of purgatory, where the loving presence of God would exercise a purificatory,
healing influence upon the sinner. Will, however, the infinitely resourceful love of
God, which pursues the sinner even into the depths of hell itself, finally succeed in
effecting the salvation of everyone? This leads on to consideration of conditional
immortality.
(c) The Scriptural Case for Conditional Immortality
Conditionalists believe that the soul is not inherently immortal, but acquires
immortality as a condition of justification by grace through faith. They believe that
the unrighteous will cease to exist, because, apart from Christ, they will be mortal.
This position is supported by texts from both Old and New Testaments. The Psalter is
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a particularly fruitful ground for conditionalism, in verses such as - "The face of the
Lord is against those who do evil, to cut off the memory of them from the earth".
(Ps.34:16); "Evil will slay the wicked; the foes of the righteous will be condemned."
(Ps.34:21). Ps.37 contains several verses in the same vein - "for like the grass they
(evil men) will soon wither, like green plants they will soon die away." (Ps.37:2);
"For evil men will be cut off, but those who hope in the Lord will inherit the land. A
little while, and the wicked will be no more; though you look for them, they will not
be found." (Ps.37:9-10); "But the wicked will perish...they will vanish - vanish like
smoke." (Ps.37:20); "But all sinners will be destroyed; the future of the wicked will
be destroyed." (Ps.37:38). In both testaments, the means of destruction is often fire, as
in "Surely the day is coming; it will burn like a furnace. All the arrogant and every
evildoer will be stubble, and that day that is coming will set them on fire." (Mai.4:1).
Conditional immortality is described throughout the New Testament. It is particularly
evident in the teaching of Jesus, especially in Matthew, having been already predicted
by John the Baptist. - "The axe is already at the root of the trees, and every tree that
does not produce good fruit will be cut down and thrown into the fire." (Matt. 3:10).
He refers to the advent of Christ in these words - "His winnowing fork is in his hand,
and he will clear his threshing-floor, gathering his wheat into the barn, and burning up
the chaff with unquenchable fire." (Matt. 3:12). In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus
forecasts annihilation for many - "Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate
and broad is the road that leads to destruction, and many enter through it."
(Matt.7:13). It is significant that there is no mention here of the traditional view of
eternal torment in hell for the wicked. A frequently quoted saying is - "Do not be
afraid of those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One
who can destroy both soul and body in hell." (Matt. 10:28). Opponents of
conditionalism interpret this text as suggesting that soul and body are destroyed at
death, then resurrected at the Last Judgment when they are condemned to eternal
torment in hell, but this appears to be groundless and fanciful eisegesis. The text
marks a contrast with the Greek philosophical concept of the eternal soul, with hell
pictured instead as a realm of obliteration. In the Parable of the Weeds, our Lord
likens the fate of the wicked to the burning of weed - "At that time I will tell the
harvesters: First collect the weeds and tie them in bundles to be burnt." (Matt. 13:30).
"The Son of Man will send out his angels, and they will weed out of his kingdom
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everything that causes sin, and all who do evil. They will throw them into the fiery
furnace, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth." (Matt. 13:41-42). The
identical fate for the wicked is also outlined in the Parable of the Net - "This is how it
will be at the end of the age. The angels will come and separate the wicked from the
righteous and throw them into the fiery furnace, where there will be weeping and
gnashing of teeth." (Matt. 13:49-50). Additional teaching on final punishment,
meaning loss of life, recurs in Jesus's words to his disciples - "Whoever wants to save
his life will lose it...What good will it be for a man if he gains the whole world, yet
forfeits his soul?" (Matt. 16:25-26). Furthermore, the 'stormy north side' of the
favourite text at John 3:16 clearly implies 'perishing' where the condition of faith is
absent - "For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever
believes in him, shall not perish, but have eternal life."
Study of the letters of St Paul, reveals frequent references to the destruction of the
wicked, and also shows that many passages used by universalists to support their
position, can equally well be interpreted as describing conditional immortality.
Conditionalism, for example, is to be found in these passages - "He will punish those
who do not know God, and do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus. They will be
punished with everlasting destruction and shut out from the presence of the Lord". (2
Thess. 1:8-9). In the Letter to the Romans, the connection between sin and death is
emphasised as in "they are senseless, faithless, heartless, ruthless...those who do such
things deserve death." (Rom. 1:31-32). Equally clear is the well-known verse - "For
the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord."
(Rom. 6:23). The theme is repeated in several other epistles, for example, - "If anyone
destroys God's temple, God will destroy him." (1 Cor. 3:17). Paul assures the
Philippian Christians that those who oppose them will be punished - "This is a sign to
them that they will be destroyed, but that you will be saved." (Phil. 1:28). Later, in the
same letter, Paul refers to those who "live as enemies of the cross of Christ. Their
destiny is destruction." (Phil. 3:18-19). In all of these passages, there is no mention of
eternal torment as the fate of the wicked.
The same theme of destruction for the wicked is to be found in other New Testament
writers. The author of 2 Peter warns of destruction for false teachers - "But there were
also false prophets among the people, just as there will be false teachers among you.
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They will secretly introduce destructive heresies, even denying the sovereign Lord
who bought them - bringing swift destruction on themselves." (2 Pet. 2:1). "In their
greed, these teachers will exploit you with stories they have made up. Their
condemnation has long been hanging over them, and their destruction has not been
sleeping." (2 Pet. 2:3). The author also cites the condemnation of Sodom and
Gomorrah which were burned to ashes, "and made them an example of what is going
to happen to the ungodly." (2 Pet. 2:6). In the following chapter, it is said that the
wicked will perish like the ancient world in the great Flood. (2 Pet. 3:6-7).
In the Letter to the Hebrews, it is recorded that "Anyone who rejected the law of
Moses died without mercy." (Heb. 10:28), and later, in the same chapter, "But we are
not of those who shrink back and are destroyed, but of those who believe and are
saved." (Heb. 10:39). Once again, faith is mentioned as the condition of immortality.
James also warns of death at the end of sin's road, referring to salvation from the
Second Death. - "Whoever turns a sinner from the error of his way, will save him
from death." (Jas. 5:20). Again, as happens repeatedly, there is no mention of eternal
torment. The writer of 1 John (as is the case with Paul), connects sin with death - "If
anyone sees his brother commit a sin that does not lead to death, he should pray and
God will give him life. I refer to those whose sin does not lead to death. There is a sin
that leads to death." (1 John 5:16). Jude is another who uses Sodom and Gomorrah as
an analogy to God's judgment upon the wicked - "They serve as an example to those
who suffer the punishment of eternal fire." (Jude 7). John, in Revelation, describes the
suffering which will fall upon the unrepentant Jezebel, leading to the death of her
children. (Rev. 2:20-23). In chapter 19, the smoke which rises from the fall of
Babylon speaks of eternal destruction. (Rev. 19:3). At the end of the same chapter, the
beast and the false prophet are thrown into the lake of fire and brimstone, identified as
the Second Death. (Rev. 19:20). The witness of the Bible throughout is, strongly in
support of conditional immortality, with salvation as a gift of God's grace, requiring a
response of faith. Where such faith is lacking, and the sinner remains recalcitrant, he
brings annihilation upon himself.
This position is at variance with that of those who uphold the traditional view that
God consigns the impenitent sinner to the punishment of everlasting torment in hell.
J.I. Packer is a notable upholder of this position. Part of the debate centres upon the
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unequal time of probation which this life provides in different cases. Some live a long
life and have ample opportunity before death to come to repentance and faith, while
others are cut off in their prime, not to mention those who die in infancy. It would not
seem to be in keeping with belief in a fair and loving God to hold that he would assign
some of his creatures to eternal bliss and others to eternal separation from himself, on
the basis of what would appear to be such an arbitrary moment of time. A further
difficulty becomes evident on reflecting upon the view that death decides final destiny.
This would mean that an individual Christian whose faith, by God's grace, would
enable him to reach heaven became instantaneously perfect at death. If that were to be
the case, he or she would not be in any morally significant sense the same person as
the weak and sinful mortal who had died. A more accurate description might be that
that imperfect mortal had ceased to exist, and that a perfect individual had been
created in his or her place. Yet, if that were to happen in the twinkling of an eye, it
would seem to make all the travail of our faith and moral effort here on earth,
pointless. For God could have transformed us into perfect creatures in the first place25.
As this has not happened, it would seem that the sanctification of human beings
requires a longer process of interaction with, and response to God, which would be
sustained, not only through this life, but into further phases beyond the incidence of
death.
This would be the view of John Hick, and it seems to deserve support, but it would not
be acceptable, for example, to T.F. Torrance who draws attention to this astonishing
fact:
.. .within the one indivisible epiphany or advent of the Son of God, the
'moment' when each of us dies, and goes to be with Christ is
somehow identical with the 'moment' when he will come again to
judge and renew his creation, for in a real ontological sense those who
die in Christ are already risen with him.26
Torrance comes to this view because of the difficulty of reconciling time as we
experience it in this world, and as would seem to be necessary for continued
development beyond death, with the changed conditions in an otherworldly sphere. If
Macmillan, 1961), 358.
25 This point is made by John Hick in his Evil and the God ofLove, (London: Collins, 1968), 383.
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postmortem 'development' is to occur rather than instantaneous transformation, then
some kind of temporal successiveness would seem to be necessary, rather than
Torrance's 'relativity of simultaneity'. The apparent collapsing of individual judgment
at death into final judgment at the final consummation also occurs because one cannot
conceive of an individual's entry into heaven at death without the collateral
relationships of fellowship with others who are not yet dead. Final decision on a soul's
destiny at death would appear to isolate that individual in denial of the corporate
nature of final salvation. It is because one cannot separate individual and corporate
eschatology, that individuals do not enter into their final destiny at death, but must
wait for the general resurrection, and the Last Judgment at the end of history.
The view which is promoted in this thesis is strongly supported, for example, by
William Temple in a sermon preached in Westminster Abbey on All Saints' Day,
1919, defending the practice of praying for the dead. He maintains that one of the
objections to it is unfounded - "the assumption that at death, all is irrevocably settled."
This was a delusion which, he claims, was once prevalent, but had no evidence to
support it, either in revelation or in reason.27
The traditional Augustinian view maintains that persons determine their own eternal
destiny through a conscious decision 'for' or 'against' Christ prior to their death. Thus,
physical death seals the fate of those who are spiritually dead. This position has dire
consequences for those who have never heard of God's salvation, provided freely by
Christ. They are bound for hell. The postmortem destination of all human agents is
fixed by divine decree, so that the person's state vis-a-vis salvation at the point of
death is such that it characterises their postmortem existence. Postmortem conversion
is then impossible, nor can the elect ever fall into sin, after their acceptance into
heaven. It also denies any notion that the reprobate might be punished for a period
after death, so that they might be purified of their sin and then enter heaven. In this
final separation, taking place at death, traditional Augustinian theology conceives God
26
Torrance, T.F., "Immortality and Light", in Colwell, J. (ed.), Called to One Hope, (Carlisle:
Paternoster, 2000), 141.
27 Quoted by Welsby, P.A., in Theology, 69 (1966), 250. Yet, "the delusion" does not lack support,
notably by O.C.Quick who believes that "At death the destiny of the individual soul to salvation or
perdition is fixed for ever." - Quick, O.C., Doctrines ofthe Creed, (Welwyn: Nisbet, 1938), 241.
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as displaying his mercy and grace in the elect, and his wrath and justice in the
reprobate.
One of the ideas associated with this view is that, although the introduction of a soul
into the spiritual world may of itself have a converting effect where there is already a
germ of faith, there is no new sin in the intermediate state, only what the soul carries
with it, and no fresh temptation to sin. That view certainly entails the finality of
decision on destiny at, or before, death. The scriptural witness, however, locates
judgment upon sin and unbelief at the Last Judgment, rather than at death. Several
texts indicate this - for example, Acts 17:31; 2 Tim. 1:12; 4:8; 1 John 5:25-29; Matt
8:11 and Rev. 21:25. These texts can be interpreted as indicating that God still invites
sinners from all areas of the globe, and all periods of history, to repentance in the
after-life. Indeed, if this were not so, the Last Judgment, which figures so prominently
in the Bible, would appear to be superfluous, as the critical separation would have
already taken place at death. The Last Judgment would simply mark a confirmation of
judgment at death. Even if the Last Judgment is to be understood as a process rather
than as a climactic event, the process would require to continue beyond death, if
justice is to be done to those biblical texts.
Texts supporting this view, have been mentioned and it is worth enquiring whether the
opposite point of view also has scripture to support it. The text which comes nearest to
that position is Heb. 9:27 - "Just as man is destined to die once, and after that, to face
judgment, so Christ was sacrificed once to take away the sins of many people; and he
will appear a second time, not to bear sin, but to bring salvation to those who are
waiting for him." Yet, this text cannot prove that final destiny is decided at death. It
does not foreclose the possibility of an interim period between death and final
judgment - indeed, the reference to 'those who are waiting for him' would seem to
imply an intermediate state where changes in destiny could occur.
Attention must now be given to the distinctive position of two modern Roman
Catholic theologians - Karl Rahner and Ladislaus Boros. Their view has similarities to
the opentheism ofPinnock and Sanders in this respect - that final destiny, or, at least,
the direction in which souls are heading, is fixed at, or around, death. Rahner believes
that "the single and total perfecting of man in 'body' and 'soul' takes place
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immediately after death."28 He rejects an understanding of 'eternity' which conceives
it to take place 'after' the time experienced before death, as if it prolonged time. His
view is that through death, "there is.. .the achieved definitiveness of the freely matured
existence ofman."29
This understanding of death is seen as the fulfilment of all that the individual has
achieved during his earthly life. It can be regarded as the final act of human freedom
for which his whole personal history has been the preparation, and it cannot be undone
after death. Rahner conceives the soul as entering into deeper relation to the world
which he describes as a 'pan-cosmic' relation. When we see death in relation to the
death and resurrection of Christ, for the Christian believer it is the final act of self-
surrender to the God in whom one has trusted, and to whom one looks for forgiveness
and acceptance. This is the way in which the believer enters most fully into the
mystery of dying and rising with Christ, as Paul affirms in Rom. 6:4-5. This fixity of
destiny at death is in line with official Roman Catholic teaching that death marks the
end of the possibility for conversion, and for merit or demerit - the souls of the
departed proceeding to heaven, hell or purgatory after death. Rahner believes that
death is the point at which every human being is ultimately and expressly confronted
by the gospel, by the crucified and risen Lord. This would apply both to believers and
unbelievers. Unbelievers, coming from, for example, other religions, would have an
explicit offer of redemption. It is, therefore, possible, on this view, to be hopeful about
the salvation of non-Christians. It is interesting to note that we have, here, a similar
conflation between the particular judgments of individuals on their deaths and the
general judgment, as was seen above in the thought of Torrance. The resurrection of
the flesh and the general judgment take place 'parallel' to the temporal history of the
world. Here, Rahner, like Torrance, is grappling with the problem of time 'after'
death. He views eternity, not as a never-ending continuation of time, but as the definite
and permanent outcome of time.
Moltmann, however, raises objections to the identification of personal death with the
eschatological resurrection of the dead, because, even if this life's categories of time
28 Rahner, K., Theological Investigations, XVII, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1981),115.
29 Rahner, ibid., IV, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 348.
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and space no longer apply to human beings after death, "personal perfecting and the
perfecting of the world do not have to coincide."30
In the light of these view on death, one might wonder how Rahner perceives
purgatory. He understands the transformation of the person, under the grace of
conversion, as involving temporal punishments due to sin, which cannot fail to be a
painful process of development. Purgatory, or the payment of these temporal
punishments is in his words -
a maturing process of the person through which, though gradually, all
the powers of the human being become slowly integrated into the
basic decision of the free person.31
But if death is the last and definitive act of human freedom, and the dead are released
from the flux of time, how can they undergo a process of purification and integration
'after' death? Rahner's answer is that the purification in purgatory is an aspect of
death itself. So, the 'duration' of the person's purification is understood, not in
temporal terms, but as the depth and intensity of the purifying pains the person
experiences in death itself.32
One would have to say that there is an ambiguity in Rahner's thought here. On the one
hand, he says that there is a finality achieved by man in death, but, on the other hand,
there is a perfection of his fulfilment which is still to come "in the transfiguration of
his bodily existence." He maintains that there is no continuity 'in time' after death.
Yet, he believes in maturation beyond death. Maturation suggests postmortem spiritual
development, and that, in turn, is difficult to imagine without temporal successiveness.
It may be that he agrees with Moltmann, that, after death, there is a different kind of
'time', than we experience here on earth.33
A key question related to one of the main emphases in this thesis is - Does Rahner
believe in an intermediate state? Rahner believes that the doctrine of the intermediate
30 Moltmann, J., The Coming ofGod, op.cit., 103.




state arose because of the problem of the delayed parousia. An intermediate, temporal
and bodiless state was inserted in between the death of the individual and the general
resurrection at the end of the world.34 Rahner appears to accept the possibility of an
intermediate state, as he says that we cannot deny an interval between death and the
person's corporate fulfilment, during which there is personal maturation in "a state of
purification." Rahner's view of the finality of the decision, in, or about death, creates
problems for him in relation to the traditional concept of purgatory, and his use of the
term 'process'. Peter Phan recognises these difficulties when he observes that Rahner
believes that the dead continue to participate in "the fundamental temporality and
historicity of the world." This presupposes the traditional representation of purgatory,
and seems to imply an intermediate state.35
The theology of Ladislaus Boros agrees with Rahner's position. He also believes that
death brings the individual to a final state in which no further change is possible in its
basic tendency. Once beyond death, no more decisions can be made.36 This finality
applies to the blessed, to the reprobate and to those who are destined for the place of
perfection. This means, as with Rahner, that the traditional concept of purgatory is
33 Rahner notes that "in Catholic theology the question is not yet settled with regard to the sense in
which, and die degree to which, temporal categories can still be applied here." - Rahner, Foundations
ofChristian Faith, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1978), 442.
34 Rahner says - "Such a difference of phasing.. .is in fact also to be seen in die contrast between die
fulfilment of the individual in deadi and die universal consummation of die world, between die finality
achieved by man in deadi, and die clarification and perfection of this fulfilment which is still to come
in die transformation of his bodily existence. Since it cannot be denied tiiat tiiere is an 'intermediate
state' in die destiny of man between deadi and bodily fulfilment, unless one holds tiiat what is saved is
not what was to be saved, tiiere can be no decisive objection to die notion tiiat man reaches personal
maturity in die 'intermediate state.' - Rahner, op.cit., IV, (London: Darton, Lonman & Todd, 1966),
353.
35 Phan says that Rainier believes that since die dead are not cut off from die world, it is conceivable
diat tiiey must continue, in tiieir own way, to participate in die fundamental temporality and historicity
of the world, even if tiiey have already reached tiieir consummation in die beatific vision of God. This
preserves die traditional representation of purgatory, but Rahner is not sympatiietic to it since it
ultimately presupposes that tiiere is a kind of intermediate state. - Phan, P.C., Eternity in Time,
(London: Associated University Presses, 1988), 127. Elsewhere Rahner says - "It is by no means
certain tiiat die doctrine about die Intermediate State is anything more tiian an intellectual framework,
or way of diinking. So, whatever it has to tell us (apart from statements about die commencement
dirough deadi of die final form ofman's history of freedom, and about die inclusion of the body in tiiis
final form), does not necessarily have to be part of Christian eschatology itself." - Rahner, "The
Intermediate State" in Theological Investigations XVII, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1981),
117.
Phan points out furtiier ambiguity in Rahner's tiiought when Rahner concedes tiiat -. "perhaps die
unintegrated elements in man are incorporated into die final personal decision, now become definite in
deadi, in a lengdiy 'process' which (while still maintaining what I said earlier about die release of die
deceased from our time) might nevertheless be seen as analogous to die present time in a way that by
and large corresponds to die traditional idea of purgatory." -Theological Investigations, XIX, 185.
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decisively modified. It is the point of intersection between life and death. It is no
longer conceived as a process of purification that can be measured, similar to the
passage of time in our earthly life. It is, rather, in Boros's view, the passage which we
effect in our final decision, through the purifying fire of divine love. The encounter
with Christ would be our purgatory. In typical Roman Catholic thought, he believes
that every sin a person commits entails a debt of punishment. In the process of
purification, this debt is paid through the pains of satisfaction. But remission of sin can
only take place during the person's earthly pilgrimage before death. The final decision
still requires to be taken where forgiveness can be obtained. The state of purification is
associated with the last, final meeting with Christ, and this occurs in, and not before or
after death. Death, therefore, in his eyes, is not only a sign of bringing punishment, but
also a sign of God's mercy and kindness. The hypothesis of death as a final decision
does not mean a devaluation of the decisions made during earthly life. It is in part
determined by the preparatory decisions taken during the course of a life-time, and
grows out of them.
This view of Rahner and Boros is an improvement on the Augustinian/Calvinist
position which maintains that the decision 'for' or 'against' Christ taken in this life is
final and irrevocable. In such a case, death, as it were, freezes people either in grace or
sin forever. This is especially the case when one considers that such earthly decisions
are limited by knowledge, passion and restricted possibilities. According to Boros, at
the moment of death, one can make the first totally personal choice about one's final,
eternal destiny.
There are, however, serious objections to the views propounded by Rahner and Boros.
For example, there is no basis in experience for the idea that people make, or are in
any condition, to make, a choice at the moment of death. In practice, Boros attributes
the final option to the disembodied spirit, in which case it is no longer the final option
of life, but the initial option after death. It is also difficult to see what kind of choice
one could have as the final option. What sense does it make for Boros to speak of self-
surrender to God in face of the immediate, inevitability of death? If one is perfectly
36
Boros, L., The Moment ofTruth, (London: Burns & Oates, 1962), 86.
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aware at the moment of death, one will realise that the inevitable is now present. Will
this amount to a real choice?
Where an unbeliever experiences the moment of death, it is hardly credible that such
an instantaneous encounter with Christ could enable an unevangelised person (albeit
heading in the right direction for salvation), to understand and learn about confession
and reconciliation to God through faith in Christ - and retain any continuity or identity
with his earthly personality. Spiritual development towards perfection, and the beatific
vision would appear to require a much longer period through some kind of
postmortem time. The view which we have found in both Rahner and Boros, that death
renders a person's decision 'for' or 'against' God, reached during the time of his or her
earthly life and finalised in the moment of death, unalterable, runs counter to the main
thrust of this thesis which would prefer to hold open the possibility of postmortem
evangelisation and conversion. Otherwise, if the fateful decision regarding final
destiny has to be taken in this life, the only way in which the unevangelised who have
not had an opportunity to encounter Christ in this life, can be saved, is through
inclusivism a position rejected above.
(e) Scriptural Evidence and Theology For and Against Universalism
The New Testament contains two main series of passages and texts relevant to
universalism. One series is interpreted in a universalist sense by some theologians, but
not by others. The second series of texts suggests that some humans attain salvation,
but others are condemned. The following texts seem to point to the salvation of the
complete human race, although some of them could be interpreted in an Arminian
sense, according to which God desires to save everyone, but may not actually achieve
his desire:
Christ said if he were lifted up from the earth, he would draw all men
unto him (John 12:32). Just as all men die in Adam, they live in Christ
(1 Cor. 15:22). God has reconciled the world to himself. (2 Cor. 5:19).
God will sum up the entire universe in Christ. (Eph. 1:10). God
desires all men to be saved. (1 Tim. 2:4). The grace of God brings
salvation to all men. (Titus 2:11). God is not willing that any should
perish, but that all should come to repentance. (2 Pet. 3:9). Christ's
death is the propitiation of the sins of all the world. (1 John 2:2).
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Death and hell are destroyed in the lake of fire (Rev. 20:14). God is
going to restore all things to their primal unity. (Acts 3:21). Just as
Adam brought all men into condemnation, Christ brings all men into
salvation. (Rom. 5:18). Christ has tasted death for every man. (Heb.
2:9). Christ shall reign until he is Lord of all. (1 Cor. 15:25; Phil. 2:9-
11).
Among the second series pointing to a dual outcome (salvation for some and
condemnation for others), are a number of texts in the Synoptic Gospels which express
warnings by Jesus. They are - about the consequences of rejecting the gospel. There
are dangers of losing one's soul. (Mk. 8:36), and of being denied by the Son ofMan.
(Mk. 8:38; Matt. 10:33). He also spoke about the one sin which could never be
forgiven, the sin against the Holy Spirit, which is to be understood as the sin of
refusing to see and acknowledge the work of God in Jesus himself. (Mk. 3:28f.). Jesus
also warns that sinners and those who lead others into sin will suffer an unimaginable
fate and be cast into Gehenna, a place of unquenchable, everlasting fire. (Mk. 9:43-
47), etc. These teachings, which are quite clear, are confirmed by the teaching of
various parables and parabolic sayings, among which the well-known Parable of the
Sheep and the Goats is prominent. (Matt. 25:31-46). We can see, therefore, that there
are frequent references in the Gospels to a 'double outcome', and this has been the
position held by most of the theologians of the Christian Church - Eastern Orthodox,
Roman Catholic, Reformed, Lutheran and Anglican. There is to be a final separation
of the saved and the lost, of sheep and goats. (Matt. 25:46; cf. Matt. 7:21-23).It is also
significant that most of the 'hard sayings' in the Gospels, the passages which most
clearly and unmistakably warn of eternal punishment, are found on the lips of Jesus
himself.
As was noted in connection with the scriptural basis for conditional immortality, there
is scholarly division of opinion on how to interpret aionios ('everlasting') in the
Parable of the Sheep and the Goats.37 The same division of scholarly opinion is to be
found in the interpretation of Pauline passages. These include the passages which
37 The prominent modem exponent of universalism, Thomas Talbott, maintains that in the New
Testament, aionios ('everlasting'), never refers to a 'temporal process of unending duration.' He
believes that the key question is how we are to understand divine punishment and its essential purpose,
and his conclusion is that, by his use of kolasis, ('punishment'), tire Gospel writer had in mind 'an
eternal correction of some kind'; the punishment in Matt. 25:46 is remedial and not unending. -
Talbott, T., "A Pauline Interpretation ofDivine Judgment" in Parry R, and Partridge C., (eds.),
Universal Salvation, op.cit., 46-47. Scholars who take the opposite view say that if the punishment is
everlasting, neither is die life given to the righteous.
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speak of the restoration of all things (Eph. 1:10 and Col 1:20); the ending of the hymn
in Phil. 2 with its vision of the glorified universe in its peace and concord (Phil. 2: lOf.)
and particularly 1 Cor. 15:28 where Paul after asserting that Christ's enemies will be
put under his feet, pictures him handing over the rule to God, now consummated as his
kingdom, that God may be 'all in all.'38
Universalists like Thomas Talbott claim that the victory which Christ won over sin
and death through his resurrection, involves the redemption of sinful men and women,
and that every Christian represents the defeat of an enemy, and the destruction of our
sinful nature. Our reconciliation to God means that Christ has "defeated and placed
under his feet the enemy that we once were."39 Christ's overcoming of the last enemy,
death, means that all separation from God is overcome, when all persons will be in
subjection to Christ. Then the Father will be 'all in all' because all persons belong to
him. This emphasis upon the destruction of sin reveals one of the ways in which
universalists depart from the traditional view which holds that God does not destroy
sin completely, but keeps it alive through an eternity of hell. Over against this view,
the Pauline hymn in Phil. 2 and Col. 1:20 seem to show that Paul's concept of
reconciliation, which is a redemptive concept, applies not only to human beings but to
all of the spiritual principalities and dominions as well.
Another Pauline doctrine to which universalists refer is the doctrine of the two Adams.
This doctrine occurs in Rom. 5 and 1 Cor. 15. The first Adam symbolises humanity in
the context of sin and death; the second Adam, Jesus Christ, represents the victory of
divine power over sin and death, and all separation from God. The key text is Rom.
5:18 - "Consequently, just as the result of the trespass was condemnation for all men,
so also the result of one act of righteousness was justification that brings life for all
men." Confirmation of the universalist thrust of this text can be found in the earlier
verse at 5:12 - where Paul identifies the group or class he has in mind as all human
beings - "Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through
38
Jurgen Moltmann, in buttressing his support for universalism notes significantly - "The great chapter
on the Resurrection (1 Cor. 15) makes no mention at all of a judgment with a double outcome. Paul
builds up his Adam-Christ typology on the same pattern (Rom. 5:18), and, consequently, 1 Cor. 15:22.
This universalism embraces Jews and Gentiles without abolishing the difference between them, or
reducing it to uniformity."- Moltmann, J., The Coming ofGod, op.cit., 240-1.
39 Talbott. T., "Christ Victorious", in Parry, R., and Partridge C., (eds.), "Universal Salvation", op.cit.,
27-28.
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sin, and in this way death came to all men, because all sinned..." A different
conclusion can, however, be drawn from these verses, namely that Paul is not
necessarily asserting that all will be saved, but that the work of Christ is for all, and
that he alone is the Saviour in virtue of the one saving event of his death. There are
alternative ways of understanding Rom. 5:18-19 which reject universalism. There is,
for example, the Augustinian view that Paul did not literally have in mind all human
beings, but only 'all of the elect'; there is also the Arminian view that, although Paul
literally meant 'all human beings', this carries no implication of actual salvation.
Where the interpretation of Scripture leads to such a division of scholarly opinion, full
weight must surely be given to the views ofNew Testament specialists, most ofwhom
would appear to reject universalism. Howard Marshall's conclusion is representative
of this opinion, when he writes that the New Testament teaches that there will be a
final judgment on the impenitent, which will mean that some will be lost. He
concludes therefore, that "the New Testament does not teach or imply universal
salvation."40
The main thrust of universalism would seem to arise out of theological views implied
by a general understanding of New Testament teaching as a whole, rather than from
exegesis of particular texts alone. It tends to focus on the love of God which is all-
embracing, including the whole human race in its compass. It is inconceivable to
universalists that such divine love would not desire to redeem creation.
It is instructive to explore, in some detail, the thought of Origen of Alexandria, whose
doctrine of apokatastasis panton - 'the restoration of all things' is the first real
universalism. He teaches that the life of the soul did not begin when the soul joined to
the body,41 but that the soul had pre-existed, and had fallen in that earlier state.42 His
deduction from this is that the soul's ultimate destiny is assured, for 'the end is always
like the beginning'43. Humanity will be restored to its original state - to unity with the
Logos. Origen's ideas have influenced universalist thinking ever since. It should be
40
Marshall, H., "The New Testament Does Not Teach Universal Salvation" in Parry, R., and Partridge
C. (eds.), Universal Salvation, op.cit., 74.
41
Origen, Against Celsus, 3.81.
42 The pre-existence of the soul derives from the philosophy of Plato, and was rejected by die Filth
Ecumenical Council. It was also later rejected by Gregory ofNyssa and Maximus die Confessor.
207
noticed, for instance, that he regards 1 Cor. 15:24-28 as a decisive passage, as does
Moltmann many centuries later. In Origen's view, this text pictures 'the end' because
it prophesies the subjection of all enemies, including death, to Christ, and the delivery
of the kingdom by Christ to the Father. Then God would be all in all.44
Such a view has immediate repercussions, relevant to the ultimate destiny of the
unevangelised. If all human beings are to be incorporated into the eschatological
church, and know God as the Son knows him, some kind of postmortem conversion
will be required. One would, therefore, wish to enquire how Origen views this
happening. It involves Origen in believing that the power of the saving will of God
extends beyond the limits of this earthly life, granting people a further opportunity for
purification and eventual salvation after death. It could be that there is to be found here
the origins of belief in purgatory. It is interesting to note that Augustine, while
opposing Origen's universalism, nevertheless believes that there are 'temporary
punishments after death'45, and that it is appropriate to pray that some of the dead be
granted remission of sins.
In this postmortem existence, Origen believes that the soul retains the form (or eidos)
of the body, in the sense of being the bearer of the body's essential characteristics.
From the eidos the spiritual body is built up. Unlike the more traditional view that
souls after death are disembodied, Origen believes that souls are corporal in some
sense, because only God is completely incorporeal.46
The process of purification, which Origen envisages, is conceived in intellectual terms,
and is described by him as being 'a school for souls'.47 Origen follows Clement of
Alexandria in regarding the punishment as medicinal, and therefore, temporary, which
means that he expects the wicked to repent.48 This view of postmortem punishment as
43
Origen, On First Principles, 1.6.2.
44 The corporate nature of this submission to God is noted by Robert Doyle who comments thus - "The
whole eschatological church will know God as the Son knows him...This knowledge is a mingling and
union widi God in love. God will ultimately be the totally satisfying object of every mind's
activity.. .all human souls will ultimately be saved, and will be united to God forever in loving
contemplation." - Doyle, Robert C., Eschatology and the Shape ofChristian Belief op.cit., 66.
45
Augustine, City ofGod, 21.13.




therapeutic is also held many centuries later by Schleiermacher, the first influential
theologian since the Early Fathers to support universalism. He rejects the traditional
notion of the eternal punishment of sinners as inconsistent with the 'eternal fatherly
love of God'. He asserts that if the punishment were physical, it simply could not go
on for ever, and, if it consisted of the pains of conscience, it would be difficult to
imagine how the awakened conscience, as a living movement of the spirit, could fail to
issue in some good. His assumption is that good punishment is reformatory, bringing
with it' a sharpened feeling for the difference between good and evil.'49
It is worth observing that Origen is not alone in the Patristic period in espousing
universalism. Gregory of Nyssa follows in his footsteps. Like Origen, Gregory
grounds his belief in universal salvation on 1 Cor. 15:28 and Phil. 2:10. It is
noteworthy that both Origen and Gregory are circumspect when they mention
universal salvation, yet the main thrust of both theologies is towards the conclusion
that all will be saved.30 A particularly interesting aspect of Gregory's thought is his
doctrine of perpetual progress in the future state. We progress, not so much in the
sense of advancing towards God, but rather in the sense of participating more fully in
God.
As with Origen, one finds echoes of Gregory's views in the thinking of modern
universalists. In particular, Hick's belief in postmortem development is reminiscent of
Gregory's position on perpetual progress. Gregory believes that, in its perfect, purified
49 Schleiennacher, F.D.E., The Christian Faith, trans, of 2nd Gernan edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1989).
50 This circumspection is mentioned by Morwenna Ludlow when she notes that Gregory "sometimes
attributes tire idea to a character other than himself in a dialogue, or prefacing his remarks with tire
comment that 'some people claim'" - Ludlow, Morwenna, "Universalism in the History of
Christianity" in Parry, R., and Partridge, C., (eds.), op.cit., 193.
Sometimes more than 'circumspection' has been noticed in the view of Origen. Indeed, it could be
described as 'ambiguity'. Frederick Norris draws attention to tire fact that in On First Principles 1.7.5,
it is difficult to tell whether tire claim that God will be 'all in all' includes every creature, or only the
kingdom which Christ delivers to the Father, a kingdom comprising those who follow Christ" - Norris,
Frederick W., "Universal Salvation in Origen and Maximus" in Cameron, Nigel M. de S., (ed.),
Universalism and the Doctrine ofHell, op.cit., 52. Norris believes that Origen's vacillation is due to tire
ambiguity of Scripture - "In tire documents which we have, he (Origen), says that tire reader must
choose between whether tire lost are eternally damned, or whether, at some time, they will be released
from their suffering and punishment. As Scripture reads, he finds no answer to these alternatives."
(ibid. 58). Norris, in fact, represents Origen as teaching two views - universal salvation and limited
hell, as well as salvation only for those who live tire Gospel and eternal damnation, perhaps even
annihilation, for those who, like the devil, continuously refuse. The balance of scholarly opinion,
however, is heavily weighted in favour ofOrigen's universalism.
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state, the soul is naturally attracted towards God. While this may refer to the
blissfulness of heaven rather than to the imperfect condition of the soul in an
intermediate state, it seems uncommonly similar to Hick's belief that God created us
with a bias towards him, which can be clouded over, but never obscured, by sin. Hick,
believing in a kind of purgatory, feels that some will require long periods of reform
after death before turning to God.51 This view of Hick's is possibly true, but does not
necessarily lead to his conclusion that all will eventually turn to God.
Most universalists today would follow Origen in regarding God's justice as
restorative, and his punishment as corrective. This is so, because they do not believe
that to condemn sinners to eternal, conscious torment in line with the traditional
doctrine of hell is consistent with a just and loving God. The sending of people to a
temporary hell can be reconciled with divine love. It is, however, difficult to see how
the 'torture chamber' of an eternal hell can be a just punishment for the finite sins of
any mortal. The vitally important aspect of any view of hell for universalists is that
people should be able to be delivered from hell before it is too late. This view of hell
as temporary, rather than eternal, arises from the conviction that a just and loving God
would not leave anyone in hell permanently.
The universalist view, however, that divine punishment is reformative in a temporary
hell is rejected by theologians coming from the neo-Calvinist and conservative-
evangelical wings of the Church. They seek to retain the retributive view of
punishment, arguing that hell is the place where God's undiluted anger is poured out
against sinners, who have rebelled against him, and that all sin must be punished
infinitely.52 Whereas universalists regard God's justice as an aspect of his love,
traditionalists do not think that the New Testament anywhere makes God's love and
51 Hick, J., Death andEternal Life, (London: Collins, 1976),, 242-261.
52 Daniel Strange, for example, argues from God's angry revulsion to sin, and concludes that the -
"primary purpose of divine punishment, and therefore the purpose of hell is not remedial or restorative,
as Talbott thinks, but retributive... (Hell is) the place where God's undiluted anger is poured out against
sinners who have rebelled against him. What must be noted here is that while God is just in the degrees
of punishment inflicted in hell, all sin must be punished infinitely." - Strange, D., "A Calvinist
Response to Talbott's Universalism" in Parry, R., & Partridge, C., (eds.), Universal Salvation,
op.cit.,150-1.
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justice identical, and hold that the wrath of God signifies God's retributive judgment
upon those who have transgressed his law.33
Such views are unacceptable because they seriously restrict the depth and endurance
ofGod's love. While God feels revulsion against sin, he would never allow his wrath
to stifle his love, abandoning the sinner to eternal punishment. The belief that sin must
be punished infinitely, seems to be out of proportion to the degree of wickedness
perpetrated by mortal human beings. One of the main assertions of this thesis is that
there exists a postmortem intermediate state, affording further opportunity for
repentance leading to salvation.
Opentheists tend to reject universalism because, with the irrationality of sin, there is
no guarantee that God will overcome our irrationality with his love. Furthermore,
when universalists claim that God can bring about the reconciliation of all free
creatures, they never plausibly demostrate how this can be, if the creatures remain
forever free. The opentheist position is that the God of the Bible is a vulnerable God
whose will is not always fulfilled, and that includes his desire to redeem all his
creatures.54 As far as postmortem conversion is concerned, the universalist view that
God, in his persistent love, will eventually wear down the resistance of sinners is
rejected by opentheists on two grounds - (1) There are too many biblical texts warning
of possible rejection. (2) Universalism does not allow humans to say 'no' to God. The
response of love cannot be forced, and to believe otherwise, suggests a divine
determinism, unacceptable to opentheists of an Arminian persuasion. Opentheists,
then, seem generally to agree that universalism must be rejected, in order to preserve
genuine human freedom; at most, universal salvation can be only a possibility - a
position which is held by many other theologians who are not opentheists.
The conclusion of this discussion must be that although one may hope that all will be
saved, there can be no certainty that this will be so.35 It is important to note that if the
53 Packer, for example, believes that the wrath of God signifies - "his retributive judgment upon those
who have transgressed his law. This means diat unbelievers are subjected to death: being under the law
and under sin, they are inescapably under wrath and imder death. (Rom. 3:23)." - Packer, J.,
Celebrating the Saving Work ofGod, op.cit., 173.
54 See Sanders, J., No Other Name, op.cit., 112-3.
55 This is die view ofmany eminent theologians, including, for example, Donald Baillie, who, after a
careful weighing ofbiblical texts 'for' and 'against' universalism, concludes - "We can only rest in die
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doctrine of dogmatic universal salvation, is rejected, this should not imply that some
people will definitely be rejected by God. Once again, it is simply a question of hoping
and praying that all will be saved. There is always the possibility that God, in his free
love, will save everyone, but this can never be promulgated as a dogmatic
proposition.56
Universal hope requires an intermediate state for God to effect the salvation of
everyone. God's infinite love is immeasurably patient. This is the sustained teaching
of the New Testament in our Lord's Parables of the Lost Coin, the Lost Sheep and the
Prodigal Son. Jesus came to 'seek and to save the lost'. As the writer of the Letter to
the Ephesians prays - "And I pray that you, being rooted and established in love, may
have power, together with all the saints, to grasp how wide and long, and high and
deep, is the love ofChrist." (Eph. 3:18). The Cross itself indicates the lengths to which
the love ofGod goes in pursuing the purpose of redemption. As there is no compulsion
about his love, he waits until each of his creatures responds to his love. As Paul
observes, -. "Love never fails". (1 Cor. 13:18). It is never exhausted, nor does it come
to an end.
Those who do not accept hopeful, universalism might argue that it would contradict
Jesus's judgment discourses. Yet, these give no indication as to whether people are
actually lost, because they are not factual descriptions, but summonses to personal
decision for God.57
hope of the Gospel. Eternal death is tire ultimate tragic possibility. But it may be that no person will
ever inherit and realise it; because God's omnipotence may win all people in the end." - Baillie, D.M.,
"The Kingdom of God and the Christian Hope" op.cit. Baillie also believes that it is difficult to adopt
restoration as a dogmatic position, because it reduces the significance of choice.
A similar view is held by Paul Tillich who finds it impossible to remove uncertainty about our ultimate
destiny, yet concludes that "above this incertitude there are moments in which we are paradoxically
certain of the return to the eternal from which we came.. .both have to be denied - the threat of eternal
death, and tire security of the return." - Tillich, P., Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, (London: Nisbit,
1964), 444.
56 In Torrance's words - "At the very best, universalism could only be concerned with a hope, with a
possibility. But to turn it into a dogmatic statement is to destroy the possibility in tire necessity." -
Torrance, T.F. "Universalism or Election", op.cit., 313.
57 As Peter Phan observes - "They can be lost forever if they reject God's offer of salvation. It is not
possible to deduce from Jesus's judgment discourses a clear indication as to whether people are
actually lost, and how many may be, since these discourses are not factual descriptions, but a summons
to personal decision for God." -. Phan, P.C., Eternity in Time, op.cit.,, 140-50.
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It is interesting to note Von Balthasar's opinion (another 'hopeful universalist') that
we have a duty to hope for the salvation of all; otherwise, we are not loving
unreservedly, and are usually tempted to leave others to their fate.58
A further point which can be advanced in support of 'hopeful' rather than 'dogmatic
universalism' arises out of God's freedom. The freedom of God means that
reprobation is always a possibility59. It also means that when a human being dies, God
has unlimited possibilities in relation to that individual's destiny. Dogmatic
universalism, while offering supposed comfort to the individual, must be rejected
because the gospel does not provide assurance about destiny, but rather guides one on
how to live in faith, while uncertain about one's future.60 It is also a strong point of
'hopeful universalism' that we must obey God, because he is the Lord, and not in
order to receive some reward. Where people have no dogmatic assurance about their
destiny, they have to rely solely on the grace ofGod.
Other reasons why we may benefit from uncertainty about our future destiny, are
expressed in the sermons of Hugh Blair, a Scottish Enlightenment preacher. In a
sermon entitled On Our Imperfect Knowledge of a Future State,61 taking as his text,
"For now we see through a glass darkly," (1 Cor. 13:12), Blair maintains that ifwe had
knowledge of our future state, it could have disastrous consequences. We would lose
interest in promoting the good order and happiness of society in this life, because all
our desires and attention would be focused on the glorious regions beyond death. As
we face up to the difficulties and temptations of this life, the discipline which develops
virtues, such as courage and self-denial, serves as a preparation for the life to come.
Blair compares our earthly life of disciplined preparation for eternity, to the education
58 Von Balthasar's 'hopeful universalism' receives strong support from the Jesuit theologian, Jolm R.
Sachs who observes - ".. .his (Von Balthasar's) is a pointed, but not extreme position, quite consonant
with Church teaching, and the thought ofmost other major Catholic theologians". - Sachs, J.R., S.J.,
"Current Eschatology: Universal Salvation and the Problem ofHell." in Theological Studies, 52
(1991), 232.
59 This freedom of God is a pronounced emphasis in the theology ofKarl Bartli, as is clear from this
quotation - "The love that God has in Himself as the triune God has also turned and manifested itself in
freedom outwards. It did not have to do this. It would not have been any less love if it had not done so.
But it lias done so." - Bartli, K., Church Dogmatics II/1, Bromiley G.W., and Torrance, T.F., (eds.),
(London and New York: T. & T. Clark International, 1957), 476.
60 Bartli, K., Church Dogmatics, II/2, ibid., 147.
61 Blair, H., Sermons, vol.1 (Edinburgh 1824), 40-53, referred to inBroadie, A., The Scottish
Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd., 2001), 147-8.
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of children which fits them for adulthood. It is, he believes, the sign of a wise
providence, that we are not given a clear vision of our future state.
The conclusion of this chapter, then, is a belief in 'hopeful universalism', likewise
rejecting on scriptural grounds, and also, in order to make due allowance for human
freedom, any dogmatic assertion of universalism. As the Arminian thrust of
opentheism maintains, there is a need for faith, in acceptance of the offer of salvation,
under the promised guidance of the Holy Spirit. In the case of the millions who are
unevangelised at the time of their deaths, this will require postmortem encounters with
Christ, when faith will become a real possibility. This faith will still require
acceptance in response to the grace of God in Christ. Acceptance of a full-blown
universalism would have meant a positive outcome for the final destiny of the
unevangelised, and further debate would have been superfluous. As universal salvation
is, uncertain, conditional immortality should be accepted as a possibility in the event
of hope for universal salvation, not being realised. The thesis contends for a
considerable departure from traditional eschatology which would have repercussions
in the life of the Church. The practical consequences following upon its conclusions
will now be outlined.
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CHAPTER 7
PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH
This final chapter of the thesis explores practical consequences affecting the life of the
Church. As Robert Doyle observes:
A little reflection on ecclesiology shows that our understanding of
'heaven' and how it relates to 'church', strongly influences our
practical church activities.1
(a) Pastoral Care
One of the obvious aspects of decline in church attendance in Western Europe today is
that there are far fewer men than women at worship on a regular basis. In innumerable
households the wife retains a live faith and active membership of the Church, but the
husband is either agnostic or an atheist, and his church membership is either non¬
existent or merely nominal. It is also a fact that men tend to die before their wives.
When the minister visits the bereaved widow, what comfort can he bring to her? She is
apt to reflect upon her husband's lack of faith, and wonder about his final destiny. If
she retains a smattering of traditional teaching, she may well believe that an active faith
in Christ is the sole passport to heaven, and that her unbelieving and indifferent
husband is consigned to eternal damnation. This is the 'dark and bitter question' which
Rahner addresses - the apparent lack of Christian faith in a loved one with the
consequent anxiety about the person's attainment of salvation.2
It is striking that so little attention has been paid in theological and churchly literature
to the pastoral and personal consquences of the doctrine of hell and its torments. The
subject is referred to by Alan Billings in Dying and Grieving, where he mentions an
uncomfortable moment in his ministry as a young Anglican priest, when a very
distressed, newly bereaved widow gripped his hand and asked, "Where is my husband
now?" The question, as Billings comments leads on to others - Are the dead anywhere?
1
Doyle, Robert C., Eschatology and the Shape ofChristian Belief, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), 6.
2 Rahner, K., Theological Investigations, IE, op.cit., 361-2.
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Do the dead pass straight into the presence of God? Is there a period of purgation and
preparation? Are the dead resurrected altogether at the end of the age?, and. if so,
where are they in the meantime? Billings's own answer to that question is that when we
consider the dead from the standpoint of this world, they are absent. The only way in
which they 'exist' is in the mind of God. According to Billings, God holds "the
'blueprint' - the template of each individual" until they are present again at the final
resurrection.3
This answer seems profoundly unsatisfactory, as it denies the deceased any opportunity
in an intermediate state for conversion and spiritual development, and would offer scant
support to the bereaved widow. Many would seek to comfort her here, by saying that
she should realise that she is leaving the fate of her loved one in God's hands. Yet, this
would offer small consolation as the traditional criteria for God's judgment would
suggest that her loved one would be found wanting. Every evangelical sermon
suggesting that a personal relationship with Christ in this life, is vital for salvation
reinforces the anxiety in bereaved relatives that their loved ones are in danger.
That traditional views regarding the destiny of the unevangelised are still very much in
vogue among church people recently came to light in a survey conducted by Eric
Stoddart. He discovered that a clear majority of Scotland's clergy believe that there will
be a Judgment Day at which we will be separated into two categories - 'the saved' or
'the lost'. A similar majority consider there to be no further opportunities for us, then,
to switch from being lost to being saved. The result, in their opinion, will be that some
of us will be eternally separated from God. Over a third of clergy believe that this
separation will involve eternal mental anguish in hell; more than one fifth hold that this
suffering will be an eternal physical torment. Most ministers in Scotland also believe
post-mortem evangelisation is not a valid hope for people who are 'lost'. The prospect
of loved ones being condemned to everlasting punishment in hell would be almost
unbearable for their relatives to contemplate.4
3
Billings, A., Dying and Grieving, (London: SPCK., 2002), 34.
4 The alarming consequences of these views are well described by Stoddart as follows - "At stake is not
something akin to the anxiety of the loved-ones of kidnap victims. In that scenario there is always the
possibility that death will have intervened and the victim suffer no more. The tonnent believed to be in
store for 'the lost' will have no end. This is awful enough for those people whom the hell-torment-
believer will never know personally. The prospect of such suffering coming upon someone known
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In her search for some extenuating factor, the bereaved widow might well point out that
her husband had lived a morally exemplary life, and enquire of her pastor if this might
enable God to forgive his lack of faith, and save him at least from the torment of
everlasting punishment. Her minister, should he be personally convinced, if not of the
truth of this thesis, at least of the possibility that its conclusion might be true, could
offer strong words of comfort. He could perhaps discover that the husband had been an
'honest doubter', and that his agnostic views were sincerely held. He could not have
joined the Church in these circumstances without being untrue to himself. Or, it could
have been that he had suffered, in earlier life, a tragic misfortune, such as the early
death of a child, which he could not reconcile with the existence of a loving God.
Another possible scenario is that the husband had at one time, perhaps as an adolescent,
attended a church in an undecided, seeking frame of mind, only to hear a very
inadequate proclamation of the gospel, or to encounter, among a professedly Christian
congregation, many whose lives and morals contradicted their Christian profession. In
the mind of the adolescent seeker, doubts would thus be sown. The possible reasons for
the husband's lack of faith could be diverse. The sceptical influences of colleagues or
workmates, or his origins in a home where his parents had been unbelievers - any of
these factors could have outweighed the church-going example and influence of his
believing wife.
H.P. Owen alludes to the difficulties which many encounter in this life when the
decision which may determine their ultimate destiny has to be taken before death. He
points out that the concept of God in many people's minds is either non-existent or
false. In addition, they do not have a clear idea of what it means to be morally good.
Their ability to choose for, or against God, and indeed, to make moral choices, has been
seriously weakened by heredity or their environment. Owen also notes that even
Christians can find it difficult to make a clear-cut choice because the existence and
providence of God are not always obvious in this life. Even for them the choice
between good and evil is never an absolute choice. The fact that we are all sinners
intimately to them, about whom they care, is truly horrendous." - Stoddart, E., "Hell in Scotland: A
Survey of Where the Nation's Clergy Think Some Might be Heading," in Contact 143 (2004), 22.
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means that, apart from the saints, we 'constantly hover' between our love for God
which brings eternal life, and our self-love which brings eternal death.5
In view of these difficulties, which would make the wife uncertain about her husband's
destiny, her pastor could extend to the wife the assurance that the God of love in whom
she believed would have full knowledge of the causes responsible for her husband's
lack of faith, and, because he is a just God, would make allowances for him, and offer
him a postmortem encounter with Christ.
The fact that the husband was being honest and true to himself would indicate that he
was on the right path, without having arrived at an assured faith. Keith Ward draws
attention to the fact in which inclusivists believe, that millions are saved by a God
whom they do not recognise or know, because as long as they have honestly responded
to the "claims and opportunities they discern in their lives", they are heading in the
right direction for eternal life. Ward is also in agreement with Owen's point, noted
above, that even for Christians, the final realisation of eternal life may be "very
different from what they imagine."6
There is a further point to be considered here. As has already been indicated in Chapter
4 above, much speculation about the after-life focuses upon the salvation of the
individual. The emphasis of the Bible, however, is upon the social fellowship which is
involved in salvation. If the believing wife were to die and enter heaven without her
beloved earthly partner, her own bliss would be seriously impaired. We know from the
doctrine of the Trinity that God is the very essence of loving community. God takes
delight in his creatures as social beings themselves. If millions are excluded from the
possibility of eternal life, then the social fellowship beyond death is incomplete and
flawed. Many who could have shared the divine fellowship as his friends, cannot do so,
because they have not been invited. This would sadden and spoil the fellowship, both
for God and the deceased loved ones. The happiness of the saved must be incomplete
while some they loved best are still on the other side and separated from visible
companionship with them. They have to wait until their loved ones rejoin them "that
they without us should not be made perfect." (Heb.l 1: 40).
5 Owen, H.P., Christian Theism, (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1984), 137.
6 Ward, K., God, Faith and the NewMillennium, op.cit., 191.
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(b) Postmortem Ministries
There is a sense in which the joy of the saved cannot be complete until all men and
women have submitted in love and obedience to God.7 While it is true that God's
family will not be perfected until the final consummation, the joy of communion could
be enhanced in the intermediate state by missionary enterprise. If we are, as the New
Testament asserts, 'one body in Christ' (Rom. 12:5), 'members one of another'
(Eph.4:25), and called to 'bear one another's burdens' (Gal.6:2), it is inconceivable that
committed Christians in the after-life will remain passive, leaving the evangelical
initiative entirely to God. They will wish to share the faith and companionship with
God, which has brought them such bliss, with those who, because of ignorance,
immaturity or incapacity, have not received the same enlightenment, which comes only
through accepting Christ. The idea that God will use human creatures as his messengers
beyond death is to be found as far back as the theology of the Early Church Fathers8. It
occurs also in the writings of some modern theologians, including Jerry Walls.9 The
intriguing suggestion was made by a Victorian theologian, Herbert Luckock, that a call
to postmortem ministry might explain "why God cuts short the earthly life of one
whose life is of priceless value to Church or home."10 The possibility of postmortem
ministry, then, could strengthen the hopes of a bereaved Christian widow that her
unevangelised husband might ultimately be led to faith and salvation.11
That 'final reconciliation to the love of God' mentioned by Ward, would be much more
likely for the husband to make in the very different conditions of the after-life. The
resplendent glory of the risen and exalted Christ would surely banish doubt from his
mind. Furthermore, if indeed he had led a virtuous life on earth, his response would be
7 This is an emphasis strongly felt by Lesslie Newbigin in his SignsAmid the Rubble, op.cit., 24.
8 Trmnbower quotes from Shepherd ofHernias, Similitudes, IX, 16.1-7 - "...these apostles and teachers,
who preached the name of the Son of God, having fallen asleep in the power and faith of the Son of
God, preached also to those who had fallen asleep before them, and themselves gave to them the seal of
the preaching." Trumbower also records Clement of Alexandria's view in Stromateis ,6.6.38-53 that
"the best among the apostles and teachers descended to convert and baptise dead Gentiles." -
Trumbower, J.A., Rescue for the Dead, op.cit., 48, 99.
9
"Perhaps God may even continue to use human messengers on his behalf. Persons may learn about
God from their fellow human beings, and respond in faith to what they learn." - Walls, J., op.cit., 90-
100.
10 Luckock, H.M., The Intermediate State Between Death and Judgment, (London: Green & Co., 1894),
99.
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that of a sincerely honest man. In such a case no prolonged period of painful purgation
might be necessary before he would 'come to the light.' There is little doubt that unless
a character is habituated in evil ways and the soul 'shrivelled' and lost as Lewis and
Swinburne conceive possible, repentance and forgiveness could occur beyond death.
As these are moral acts, they must be possible under a perfectly moral being.
All these considerations would afford the grieving widow strong consolation. No small
part of that comfort would be the assurance that she would be reunited with him on her
own death. It would not be the case that she would be destined for heaven, and he, for
hell, but that both would enjoy reunion in the intermediate state.
Attention must now be given to more difficult applications of the principle. Can any
hope be extended to the bereaved relatives of deceased, unrepentant sinners? The idea
that a final decision, fixing one's ultimate destiny, must be taken in this life before
death has already been rejected in this thesis, and the doctrine of the 'second chance'
accepted. Is it, however, likely that the changed environment beyond death would be
conducive to conversion? It is probable that earthly conditions, which make some
people uncertain and perplexed about God in this life, will give way to a postmortem
environment, where souls can experience a much clearer vision of God. While it is true
that here on earth, we "see through a glass darkly" (1 Cor. 13:12), it could be that in the
intermediate state, there will be a fuller revelation of the Risen Christ, which will bring
to the sinful soul a quickened conscience, and a desire to change.
Once again, the almost blinding revelation of Christ's divine goodness would surely
melt and convert all but the hardest of hearts. It is, of course, entirely possible that an
evil soul whose iniquity had become ingrained to the depth of a Hitler or a Stalin,
would even then reject the overtures of Christ's love. As was concluded in the last
chapter, God's love will never compromise the freedom of the human will, and, unless
a universalist position is adopted, entrenched evil may continue to corrupt the
inveterate sinner, making his purgatory a hell, until all traces of God's image are
extinguished and a 'second death' occurs. In many, many cases, however, it would
appear more likely that, after a prolonged and painful period of purgation, the sinner
11 Ward, Keith, God, Faith and the NewMillennium, (Oxford: One World, 1998), 191.
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would surrender to the converting power of Christ's love, and begin to climb the lower
rungs of the ascent to heaven. Bereaved relatives who might otherwise have resigned
themselves to losing the 'black sheep' of the family to final damnation, could now be
comforted. The possibility of final apostasy, in some cases, however, would of course
restrict the assurance provided in most other cases by pastoral comfort.
(c) Prayers for the Dead and Reassurance for the Dying
A further source of comfort for the bereaved widow of an unevangelised husband could
be provided by prayers for the dead. The Jews, in intertestamental times, appear to have
used such prayers. The author of 2 Maccabees 12:43b-45, for example, believed, not
only in intercession by the living for the dead, but also the reverse12. Jewish service-
books such as the Kaddish and Haskarath Neshcimoth corroborate it. There is no direct
mention of the practice in the teaching of Jesus, but he could well have approved of it.
We do know, however, that the practice prevailed widely in the Early Church, which
took it over from Jewish forbears. Scripture warrant for such prayers is, nevertheless,
minimal. The most frequently quoted text is 2 Tim. 1:18, in which prayer is offered up
for Onesiphorus and 'his household'. It is not clear that Onesiphorus is actually dead,
but R.H. Fuller points out the "prayer for his 'house', and the grateful memory of his
services makes better sense if he has recently died."13 Stauffer also finds authority for
the practice in Jesus's words which show that the intercessions of the Church "reach
beyond this life and beyond this world."14 Intercessory baptism for the dead is also
mentioned by Paul in 1 Cor. 15:29. In the Primitive Christian Church, prayers for the
dead appear to have been an essential part of Church life in both Western and Eastern
Communions. In the West, such prayers were probably used, as far as public worship
was concerned, only for the faithful departed, but, in the East, Christians had a duty to
pray for those who had led a sinful life, and had been called away in the midst of their
sin. Kallistos Ware notes that, while prayers for the departed in the Orthodox Church
sometimes ask for deliverance from the terrors of the coming judgment, "more often,
the note is one of sober and repentant hope."15
12 See Trumbower, op.cit., 29.
13 Fuller, R.H., "Prayer for the Departed," in Theology 53 (1950), 125.
14 Stauffer cites Matt. 16:19; 18:18 and John 20:23 in his New Testament Theology, op.cit., 223.
15 Ware explains that "We ask that tire departed may dwell in a place of light, green pasture and
refreshment, when pain, sorrow and sighing have fled away." Ware goes on to inform us that "at the
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In the medieval Church ofRome, masses, prayers and alms were thought to bring relief
for the dead in purgatory. At the Reformation, to begin with, the Protestant Reformers
also prayed for the dead, but eventually came to denounce the practice. They failed to
see clear support for it in scripture, and so they rejected it, along with the doctrine of
purgatory. In the Anglican Churches it had disappeared from the 1552 revision of The
Book ofCommon Prayer.
In more modern times, the practice tended to be disapproved of by evangelicals, but
was followed by those in the Anglican Churches with high Church leanings, until
World War I, when, in Fuller's words, "it caught on in the Church of England." In the
20th century, it had some notable supporters - among them, William Temple and P.T.
Forsyth16. More recently, the practice has been commended by Polkinghorne, although
he is careful to advise that we rid our prayers for the dead "of some unfortunate and
unedifying medieval distortions."17 The official position of the mainline churches in
Britain today will be referred to, below, during consideration of "Funeral Rites."
Enough has been said to show that there is a long pedigree for the practice down
through Christian history, but it is sad, that for some centuries after the Reformation, it
was widely neglected. Given the theological presuppositions of this thesis, its
reintroduction could be of some pastoral value to the churches. The theological views
encouraging its revival are a widening of the scope of purgatory to include the
unevangelised, and the offering of hope for a 'second chance.' If there is opportunity
for spiritual development, and even conversion in the intermediate state, intercessory
prayer could be as effective as it is in this earthly life, and no-one could logically object
"Vespers ofKneeling' on the evening of the Sunday of Pentecost, prayers are said even for those in
hell." -Ware, K., "One Body in Christ: Death and the Communion of Saints" in Sobomost 3:2 (1981),
187, 189.
16 William Temple, in a sermon preached in Westminster Abbey on All Saints' Day, 1919, and already
referred to above in Chapter 6, defended prayer for the dead. We pray for the dead "because we know
that he (God) loves and cares for them, and we claim the privilege of sharing our love for them with
God." -. quoted by Welsby op.cit.,250.
Welsby also draws attention to the view of P.T. Forsyth who writes -"I venture to say, then, that the
instinct and custom of praying for our dearest dead.. .should be encouraged and sanctified as a new bond
for practical life between the seen and the unseen.. .Nothing in our Christian belief is against it, and
there is a good deal for it." - Forsyth, P.T., This Life and the Next, (London: Independent Press Ltd.,
1918), 36.
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to the practice. Archbishop William Ramsay has written about the theory of
intercession, and how "the compassion of God... seems to wait upon the co-operation of
human wills," and he describes our prayers as "channels of God's compassion."18
While Ramsay is speaking about intercession for those here on earth, this theory could
also apply to prayers for the departed. Loving relatives of an unevangelised, deceased
person could express their continuing sympathy and concern along with their mourning
grief, by taking their prayers into the stream of that divine love which is just as active
after death as before death. Such prayers would be addressed to God through Christ,
who is at God's right hand, and "always lives to make intercession." (Heb. 7: 25). The
view put forward here is especially compatible with opentheism, for, as was noted
above in Chapter 5, opentheists believe that God interacts in dialogue with his
creatures, and can even change his mind in response to intercession. Belief in "the
communion of saints" can undoubtedly be of comfort to bereaved Christians, because
they can still have prayerful relationships with deceased loved ones, who were
believers through the Risen Christ. It has also been suggested that the departed can help
surviving relatives here on earth by their intercession.19 Where this thesis breaks new
ground is in contending that intercession can benefit, the unevangelised dead.
The opportunity for postmortem conversion could have yet another beneficial effect
upon pastoral ministry. As well as offering comfort to the bereaved, it could also offer
reassurance to the dying, particularly to those of the unevangelised who hold agnostic
views. Although they might not admit it openly, many probably entertain anxious fears
about death, and what may lie beyond. Uncertainty about one's postmortem destiny
probably means, if not anxiety and distress, at least a hopeless resignation at the
prospect that death ends all. Unless earthly life has been shadowed by suffering and
pain, when death would come as a welcome release, how could anyone who had
enjoyed life, look forward to its being snuffed out into nothingness at the last? Death, to
the agnostic, could also spell a final farewell to loved ones lost, not 'for a while', but
forever.
17 Polkinghorne's concern expresses itself thus - "We are not involved in an instrumental manipulation
on their behalf, as an unreformed notion of 'masses for the dead' seemed to suggest." - Polkinghorne, J.,
The God ofHope and the End ofthe World, (London: SPCK., 2002), 110.
18
Ramsay, W., Be Still and Know, (London: Collins, 1982), 74.
19 For example, by Leslie Weatherhead - "We believe that there is a gracious and kindly ministry, too
long neglected, to be rendered by prayers for tire dead, and perhaps a mutual helpfulness - who knows?
- by their prayers for us." - Weatherhead, L.D., After Death, (London: Epworth Press, 1923), 122.
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Kallistos Ware calls upon Christians to "oppose the death-denying culture around us."20
There is a tendency in modern Western society to ignore death, to keep it out of sight,
and this means that life becomes 'mean and mediocre.' Ware emphasises the
importance in Orthodox Churches of preparation for death, whereas in Roman Catholic
and Anglican spirituality, mentioning the imminence of death has become
unfashionable. Pastoral care, based upon the conclusions of this thesis, would seek to
counter-act this escapist avoidance of the subject of death. It would hold out to the
doubting agnostic, a future full of hope beyond death. This hope would be founded
upon faith in a future encounter with Christ, bringing a revelation of God's loving-
kindness, which the dying person had never experienced upon earth. While the vision
of Christ would cause painful pangs of conscience, the judgment he would bring upon
himself would gradually recede before the mercy and forgiveness of God. The soul
would enjoy peace, joy and the expectation of reunion with loved ones - a vista,
preferable by far, to the anxiety-ridden, joyless prospect of extinction which faces most
agnostics and atheists. Reassurance for those dying unevangelised, allied to comfort for
the loved ones about to be bereaved, would greatly enhance pastoral ministry in these
circumstances.
The conclusion of this thesis, if true, means that the prospect of postmortem life in an
intermediate state applies to every human being, both to the evangelised and to the
unevangelised. As Paul reminds us - "All have sinned and fall short of the glory of
God" (Rom. 3:23). A process of sanctification continues beyond death, even for those
who have been justified by faith, through the continuing operation of the Holy Spirit
upon human hearts. Some, of course, will be much further along the road of their
spiritual pilgrimage towards the beatific vision in heaven, than others. This conclusion
is not presented as a dogmatic article, but rather as a reasonable hope based upon the
nature ofGod as a God of love and justice.
20 Ware, K. op.cit., 179-80.
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(d) Funeral Liturgies
Paul Sheppy, in his Ph.D thesis, Liturgy and Death,21 examines the pastoral and
theological issues relating to funerals, with special reference to selected funeral rites.
He draws attention to the growing need for alternative funeral provision, which is now
required by the growth of pluralism, agnosticism and non-belief. There are no longer
beliefs and practices which are socially agreed, and many Christian funerals are seen as
meaningless. Sheppy's point is that "Theological presuppositions of rites may not
correspond with the beliefs and understandings of those who mourn."22 The normal
position seems to be that "Christian funeral rites frequently presume the Christian faith,
not only of the deceased, but also of the mourners."23
Some of the theological positions which Sheppy advocates are in line with this thesis-
for example, his use of our Lord's descent to the dead which he believes has "cosmic
implications" and implies "that in Jesus's death there was a progress to God which was
inclusive of all the dead." Sheppy, however, draws a universalist conclusion, and,
instead, it would seem preferable to say that Jesus's descent holds out the offer of
progress to God for everyone.
The application of Sheppy's theological presuppositions to funeral rites ought to be
examined. He believes that the question - "What happens when I die?" ought to be
addressed in the funeral because "it is central to the rites of death,"24 and that "the
funeral must rehearse the journey which the living and the dead must travel.25" Sheppy
examines the various funeral rites in use in mainline Churches up until his thesis was
completed in 1994; he finds them all inadequate, although the New Zealand Prayer
Book of 1989, in its introductory notes, honestly recognises the difficulties posed by
those who do not profess full Christian beliefs. It advocates our dependence upon God
21






in life, and in death, and emphasises that there is no separation for anyone from God's
love.26
A perusal of the funeral rites published by mainline denominations in Great Britain
since 1994, reveals that little has changed. The Funeral Service, for example, prepared
in 2001, by the Joint Liturgical Group for use in Roman Catholic and Protestant
Churches in England,27 emphasises rest and peace for the deceased, but the closest it
comes to addressing the needs of the unevangelised and their mourners is contained in
one of the optional prayers, recommended for use "Where Faith is Difficult." The
prayer reads -
We scarcely know the words to speak,
We scarcely know if they are heard.
When all seems dark, we look for light
When all is pain, we long for help.
In the silence we wait
Silence
We grieve for N, and mourn our loss.
Accept all that was good in her.
Forgive all that was wrong in her, and in us.
For past joy we give thanks,
In present sorrow we seek courage,
In the silence, we wait.
Silence.28
Even the prayer for "The Death of a Child" omits any kind of hope or petition for the
child's ongoing maturation in the life to come.
Also published in the same book is "The Funeral Service from 'Common Worship'" -
containing services and prayers for the Church of England. In these prayers, the
assumption is made that eternal life is promised to those who believe, and the prayers
26 The "Prayer for General Use" in the New Zealand Prayer Book, although it does not specifically refer
to the unevangelised, could be understood to include them. It reads - "Father of all, we pray to you for
those we love, but see no longer. We thank you for the peace and light you bestow upon them; in your
loving wisdom and almighty power, continue to work in them the good purpose of your perfect will,
through Jesus Christ our Lord, Amen." -A New ZealandPrayer Book, (Auckland: Collins, 1989), 858.





ask God "to bring all who rest in Christ into the fullness of your kingdom."29 There is
no mention at all in any of the prayers of the destiny of the agnostic or the
unevangelised.
Study of earlier Roman Catholic funeral rites reveals, however, that their priests are
advised to be aware that there could be persons present at funerals, "who seldom or
never participate in the eucharist, or who seem to have lost their faith."30 A more
recent Roman Catholic "Order of Christian Funerals" actually contains a prayer for a
deceased non-Christian married to a Catholic.31
The latest compilation of prayers for use at funeral services in the Church of
Scotland,32 appears also to assume that the deceased are believing Christians. The
nearest prayer which could be used appropriately at the funeral of an unevangelised
person reads -
Now that you have called her to yourself
help us to learn to be content
to release her to you,
her Father and our Father.
We trust in your unending mercy
And commend her to your care.
Rest eternal grant unto her, O Lord,
And let light perpetual shine upon her.32
The revision of funeral rites to accommodate prayers for the unevangelised, for which
Sheppy pleaded in 1994, has not yet taken place. Ministers and vicars are regularly
asked to conduct funerals for deceased agnostics, and require to compose prayers of
their own without guidance from the published service books of their denominations.
It is because the eternal destiny of those deceased is unclear, that traditional
29
ibid., 32.
30 Rite ofFunerals Revised by Decree of Second Vatican Council.. .Approved for use in Scotland,
(London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1972), 11.
31 The prayer reads - "Almighty and faithful Creator, all tilings are ofyour making, all people are
shaped in your image. We now entrust the soul ofN to your goodness. In your infinite wisdom and
power, work in him/her your merciful purpose, known to you alone from the beginning of time. Console
the hearts of those who love him/her in tine hope that all who trust in you will find peace and rest hi your
kingdom." - Order ofChristian Funerals, (Approved for use in die Roman Catholic Dioceses of
England, Wales and Scotland), (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1991), 419.
32 Book ofCommon Order ofthe Church ofScotland, (Edinburgh: St Andrew Press, 1994).
33 ibid, 266.
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theological presuppositions about the 'double outcome' of heaven or hell cannot be
expected to undergird appropriate prayers. It is interesting to learn that when Cicely
Saunders, the founder of St Christopher's Hospice fell in love first with an atheist and
then two Catholics, her clear-cut evangelicalism softened in reaction to their deaths.34
There ought to be, in officially sanctioned funeral rites, optional or alternative prayers
for deceased persons who are not Christian believers when they die.35 Completely
secular funerals would not be welcomed by surviving relatives who do have faith.
They would prefer a Christian service, but one which does not unthinkingly assume
that their deceased loved one is entering heaven straightaway, despite her lack of
Christian belief.
According to the presuppositions of this thesis, more needs to be included in the
prayer than a petition to God to grant the dead person 'rest and peace.' Reference
should clearly be made to the all-encompassing efficacy of Christ's death and
resurrection. In many cases a prayer referring to sin and forgiveness, mentioning the
significance of Christ's Cross would be appropriate. As well as releasing the deceased
to 'God's care and keeping', there should be an expression of hope which would be a
particular comfort to mourners. The most obvious shortcoming in existing liturgies is
the complete absence of faith in postmortem growth and spiritual development., far
less of conversion. If this thesis corresponds to the truth, the continuing existence of
the unevangelised in an intermediate state ought to be one of the prominent facts
influencing the content of the prayers. There would still appear to be a long-
established prejudice in many Protestant churches against prayers for the dead, which
are associated in many minds with the Roman Catholic doctrine of purgatory.
Liturgical Commissions in the churches are unlikely to supply appropriate prayers
until their Panels on Doctrine are prepared to revise traditional theological positions
regarding the destiny of the unevangelised.




The conclusion of this thesis could also make an important contribution to theodicy.
The traditional theology which promotes belief in a 'double outcome', when based on
Calvinist predestination, raises questions about God's nature. The view that some are
elected to salvation, and others to damnation, irrespective of their deserts, discourages
belief in a God of love and justice. Yet this opinion is disputed by theologians of
conservative views. John Gerstner, for example, does not accept that it is unjust ofGod
to condemn someone who has had no opportunity to be saved. He believes that such
persons are damned because they are sinners, and not because they had an opportunity
to be saved, and did not accept it. "What is unfair," he asks, "in God's damning
sinners?"36
The answer to Gerstner's question is that it is unjust of God to condemn sinners without
giving them an opportunity for repentance. Gerstner goes on to observe that "Grace by
definition is undeserved," and so he asks - "How can it be said that God owes it to
anyone?" The answer is that he offers it to everyone, not because they deserve it, but
solely by reason of his love.
The traditional view of hell, pictured as a kind of 'torture chamber' would also
engender scepticism about God and his nature. The traditional beliefs must act as
powerful disincentives to faith, and contribute to modern secularism.
Also, the problem of unmerited suffering poses critical questions for faith, and may
indeed be the single most important reason for atheism and agnosticism. There are so
many cases of what Moltmann calls 'the spoiled life.' He means us to think of those
who die without their characters and personalities coming to full maturity.37 IfGod is a
God who affords postmortem opportunity for the flowering of character, then one of
35 A plea for liturgical revision along these lines was made by Perham, M. Communion ofSaints,
(London: SPCK., 1980), 108-14.
36 Gerstner, J.H., "The Fate of the Heathen" in Dictionary ofTheology, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker
Book House, 1961), 263.
37 "Think of die life of those who were not pennitted to live, and were unable to live; die beloved child
dying at birdi; the little boy run over by a car when he was four; die disabled brother who never lived
consciously, and never knew his parents; die friend torn to pieces by a bomb at your side when he was
sixteen; die dirongs of children who die prematurely of hunger in Africa; die countless number of die
raped and murdered and killed." - Moltmann, J. The Coming ofGod, op.cit., 116.
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the strongest arguments against his existence and loving nature, crumbles. Why should
the dice of human happiness and privilege be so heavily loaded against some, and not
against others? There must surely be, beyond death, some redress of such apparent
injustice, if belief in a God of love is to be preserved.
The nature of God as portrayed in this thesis, is of One who relates - as opentheism
suggests - to his human creatures, more like a loving marriage partner or parent, than
as an autocratic king. Such an understanding of God would, it seems likely, prove
attractive to seeking souls. A God who honours human freedom, and limits his
sovereignty to allow for their free response, would encourage responsible human co¬
operation in the fulfilment of his divine purposes.
The necessity for human freedom after death is stressed by Walls in response to the
idea that such freedom might be infringed by God's grace. It is sometimes suggested
that, after death, God's reality may be so evident, that it would inhibit a free response to
him. His majesty and power might be so dominant, that persons would submit out of
fear. But Walls observes that if people were to react in this way, it would not be out of
faith and love. His point is that God "would reveal himself only to such an extent as
would enable a free response."38
Such a God inspires moral endeavour in a way that a manipulative God would never
do. Life, both before and after death, then becomes much more meaningful than it
would be if God's creatures were simply pawns moved around willy-nilly by an
almighty chess-player.
The pastoral comfort outlined above, and the contribution made to theodicy, combine
to provide the Church with a powerful aid to mission. The main contention of this
thesis, however, has been regarded by some as undermining the urgency of mission.
This danger, as was noted already, is alluded to by John Baillie. Although there is a
danger of this, it need not threaten the Church's commission to evangelise. The idea
that the gospel should be preached in order to save souls from hell-fire, although at one
time widely accepted, is now regarded as unworthy. It encourages people to become
38 Walls, J.L., op.cit., 100.
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Christians to save themselves from damnation - a prudential, self-serving motive for
accepting Christ as Saviour. Furthermore, the fulfilling nature of following Christ in
this life, in obedience to his commission, would in itself be sufficient justification and a
far worthier imperative to mission than 'pie in the sky when you die'.
Pinnock also rejects the charge that universal access to salvation would imperil the
motivation for mission. He rejects the argument that the main motivation for mission is
to save non-Christians from hopelessness, before the prospect of eternity, or to deliver
them from the wrath to come. Christian missions have a much broader purpose,
including, not only the foundation of church communities, but also to forward God's
strategy - "to change life's atmosphere, to infect people with hope, love and
responsibility for the world."39
In addition, it would surely be true that the rejection of the gospel would lead to a
painful, purgatorial healing process in the intermediate state, and, while avoidance of
this should never be the principal reason for accepting Christ, it would have a part to
play in a decision affecting one's destiny. The process through which self-regard is
purged, and we come to terms with ourselves, while it can be speeded up by the degree
to which we co-operate with grace, can also be slowed down by our own reluctance,
and this means that proclamation of the gospel remains an urgent necessity.
In commending this thesis as an aid to mission, it is contended that a philosophy of life
which directs people to a way of life here and now, leading to an enhanced and fully
satisfying existence hereafter, for which this life is a preparation, is far more
meaningful and attractive than the traditional theology of the 'double outcome', or than
one which envisages life petering out in final extinction.
The concept of an amended version of purgatory advanced in this thesis would lend
comfort to another group of people, namely the victims of crime. Those who suffer as a
result ofwrongdoing by others, do not always see justice done in this life. A murderer,
for example, may never be apprehended, or, there is a miscarriage of justice. Also,
there are plenty of examples of people perpetrating cruel injustices upon their fellow-
39 Pinnock, C.H.,T Wideness in God'sMercy, op.cit., 176-8.
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men and women, and never receiving their just deserts this side of death. Conversely,
multitudes of ordinary people live decent, hard-working lives without receiving the
accolade of recognition or appreciation from their fellows.
One of the attractions ofMoltmann's eschatology is that he envisages the restoration of
all things, when, at the Judgment, God in his righteousness, "creates justice and puts
things to rights."40
While Moltmann's universalist conclusion is not acceptable, it seems probable that
after death, God will seek, without overriding human freedom, to 'put things to rights'.
He will seek to redress the injustices which some of his creatures have suffered on
earth, and he will aim, through reformative punishment, to heal and transform the
wrongdoers whose earthly crimes went undetected and unpunished. One strongly
recurring theme in many obituaries is the idea that in the after-life God will correct the
unfairnesses which are such a feature of life in this world.
Put your arm around her, Lord,
Treasure her with care,
Make up for all she suffered
And all that seemed unfair.41
(f) Relations with Other Faiths
A further advantage which would accrue from the practical implementation of this
thesis's conclusion would be an improvement in relations between the Christian Church
and people of other faiths. According to mainline traditional theology, adherents of
other religions cannot be saved. Conversion to Christ, it maintains, in this life, is
necessary for salvation. This thesis, too, supports the finality of Christ as the sole
source of salvation, but also maintains that conversion does not require to take place
before death. As already indicated in Chapter 4, the 'anonymous Christian' principle of
Rahner, the inclusivism of the opentheists, and the pluralism of, for example, Hick, are
rejected. Instead, it is contended here that followers of the great world religions, such as
Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, will have a postmortem opportunity to
40 Moltmann, op.cit., 243.
41 Quoted inHoggart, Richard, The Uses ofLiteracy, (London: Penguin, 1957).
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encounter Christ. Some Christian theologians, including, in particular, some Lutherans,
believe that other religions can be a preparation for hearing the Gospel of Christ, and
that, at the end of history, there will be a revelation of Christ. Carl Braaten holds to the
finality of Christ, and believes that, what God is doing in other religions can only be
known in the light of Christ which comes from the gospel.42
The beauty ofBraaten's position is that, while believing that "outside of Christ there is
no salvation", he attributes value to other faiths. It might be said that they can set their
adherents on the right road, and at the final consummation they will find in Christ the
fufilment of their own faiths.43
The idea of convergence among the world religions in an intermediate state, as they
apprehend the truth more clearly will also mean that we as Christians may then come to
a clearer understanding of the importance of other worldviews.44
The Lutheran view, expressed by Braaten, that non-Christian religions can act as a
preparation for the Gospel is also held by theologians of other branches of the
Church.45 Hans Kiing, for example, believes that Christ should be proclaimed as
'normative' for all peoples. He describes Christianity as the necessary 'critical catalyst'
for all other faiths. Without Christ's revelation, the religions cannot really understand
and appropriate the salvation at work within them. Once again, as Braaten also
believes, for full understanding of the truth, the preaching of the Christian Gospel is
42
Braaten, C.E., "Lutheran Theology and Religious Pluralism" in Lutheran World Federation, (1988),
113.
43 Braaten's conclusion is as follows - "Tire model we are proposing...pictures Jesus Christ as the
revelation of tire eschatological fulfilment of the religions. The gospel of Jesus Christ does not destroy
but fulfils tire religions. The universality of Christ is something that is being worked out through tire
interaction of tire religions and will be established for all eyes to see only at tire end of history. Neither
Christianity nor tire plurality of religions has arrived at tire endpoint of history where Christ will be
revealed as tire universal future and fulfilment of the totality of nature, history, culture and religion." -
ibid., 125.
44 In Keith Ward's words - "...tire truth of tire Christian account entails that beyond this earthly life,
there will be opportunities to leam and develop and come to know God more clearly. This will be true of
Christians as well as of others, so that we may be sure that our particular views of Christian truth may
change considerably as we conre face to face with truth. At that point we may understand more fully
what tire importance is of tire existence of so many different worldviews, and to what extent there can be
a convergence, towards a presently hidden truth between them." - Ward, op.cit., 171.
45
See, for example, Carl Braaten- "Just as tire church fathers could say that Greek philosophy was a
preamble to tire gospel analogous to the function of Jewish law, so also tire religions may play a similar
role in the history of humanity. Every religion has its prophets, something like John tire Baptist,
preparing tire way for tire coming ofChrist." -Braaten, Carl E., "Lutheran Theology and Religious
Pluralism" in Lutheran World Federation 23-24 (1988), 112.
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necessary.46 Kung uses a much better phrase than Rahner's 'anonymous Christians'. He
describes adherents of other faith aspotential Christians. To obtain salvation, however,
the potential must be realised, and that means in by far the majority of cases, in
postmortem encounters.
A full survey of views across the various denominations of the Church is contained in
Paul F. Knitter's No Other Name 47 Anglican beliefs held by M.A.C. Warren, Kenneth
Cragg and John V. Taylor, describe Christ as 'the hidden Christ' or 'the unknown
Christ' who saves even when he is unrecognised as the Saviour. In Eastern Orthodoxy
also, there is the belief that Christ is active in all the religions through the activity of the
• • 48 • •
Spirit. Roman Catholic theologians tend to say that both revelation and salvation can
be found beyond the borders ofChristianity. Christ is, in Knitter's words:
the final cause of salvation, which cause clearly expresses and
incarnates a divine presence given and operative in all religions.49
The documents of the Second Vatican Council, while affirming the dignity and worth
of other religious traditions, and even atheism, see "whatever goodness or truth is
found among them...as a preparation for the gospel."50 Grace Jantzen comments
critically on this position, because she does not regard it as obvious that the
enlightenment which Christianity gives is superior to that of other religions, nor does
she accept that Christianity should be regarded as their fulfilment. A Muslim or
Buddhist, in her eyes, does not adhere to his religion, "as a preparation for some
further religion which he has not yet discovered."51
The mainline Protestant model is much more exclusive. While affirming a universal
revelation, it holds that this can never lead to salvation.5233
46
Kung, Hans, On Being a Christian, op.cit., 113, 447.
47
Knitter, Paul F., No Other Name, (London: SCM Press, 1985), 133-141.
48 Knitter quotes Georges Khodr, metropolitan ofMt. Lebanon in Lebanon - "the economy of Christ
cannot be reduced to its historical manifestation." - "The Economy of the Holy Spirit" in Samantha, SJ.
(&&.), Living Faiths and the EcumenicalMovement, (Geneva: WCC,, 1971), 131-142.
49
Knitter, P.F., op.cit., 140-141.
50 Abbott, Walter M., (ed.), The Documents ofVatican II, op.cit., 35.
51 Jantzen, G., "Human Diversity and Salvation in Christ" inReligious Studies, 20 (1984) 582/4.
52 Knitter, P.F., op.cit., 114, 116.
53 Distinctive among Protestantviewpoints is that ofBartli - "According to this, the way in which God,
acting in Christ, saves non-Christians is thoroughly 'objective'. Their status in the eyes of God has been
transformed quite apart from any 'subjective' changes in themselves. They have become 'potential
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After having surveyed this wide spectrum of differing views, it is time to state where
this thesis stands on the possibility of salvation for non-Christians. While rejecting the
full inclusivist position, it is, however, maintained that the Spirit of Christ can be
active among adherents of other faiths.54As Swinburne observes, it is important that
people are honest in their search after truth. But, if they fail to discover the truth (i.e.
the Christian faith), in this life, it should not prevent them from reaching heaven.55
It is arguable, therefore, that honest seekers after truth in any religion, can unwittingly
be guided by the Spirit of Christ, and are on the path to salvation. They are 'potential
Christians' and their potential salvation may be realised in an intermediate state, and,
where necessary, with greater or less purgatorial accompaniments. J.A. Dinoia prefers
to speak of future or 'prospective' affiliation of non-Christians with the Christian
community rather than their present but 'hidden' membership in it. This would indeed
appear to be less patronising towards other faiths, and would recognise the value of
their own particular doctrines. They would not then be described as 'anonymous' or
'implicit' Christians, but, if they were leading lives of morally upright and altruistic
conduct, they would ultimately share in the divinely willed consummation which Jesus
Christ makes possible.56 This point of view should be endorsed.
An interesting, but very radical suggestion has recently been made by Mark Heim who
suggests that the faithful followers of all the major religions, when they die, go to their
own particular paradise. These are not to be considered as blessed as the Christian
Christians'. Explicit faith makes only a noetic difference, informing non-Christians ofwhat they already
are. There are no signs of it in experiences of non-Christians." - Lindbeck, G. "Unbelievers and tire Sola
Christ in The Church in a PostliberalAge, op.cit., 79.
54 This is the view held, for example, by Sir Norman Anderson, who asks - "What ofmature persons
who have sinned consciously but have never heard (and are therefore in no position to accept with
explicit faith), the gospel of God's matchless love for tire whole world? May it not be drat 'God our
Saviour, who wants all men to be saved' (1 Tim. 2:4), and does want 'anyone to perish' (2 Pet. 3:9)
quickens in some men by his Spirit a consciousness of sin and need, and enables drenr, in dre twilight, to
cast drenrselves on Iris mercy? If so, dren drey too, would be saved by the grace of God in Christ alone."
- Anderson, Sir Norman, Christianity and WorldReligions, (Leicester: IVP., 1984), 168.
55 Swinburne, R., "A Theodicy ofHeaven and Hell," in Freddoso A., (ed.), The Existence andNature of
God, (Notre Danre: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983), 39.
56
Dinoia, J.P., "Implicit Faidr, General Revelation and dre State of Non-Christians," in The Thomist V
47 (1983), 235.
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heaven, but are given by God as 'intermediate ends', with the possibility of further
progress to 'the celestial city.'57
This suggestion, and the pluralism it entails, is unlikely. Heim probably would agree
that it would be more in keeping with the divine purpose that the ultimate
consummation brings adherents of all the world religions together into one reconciled
fellowship, in a common allegiance to the Christ who said, "But I, when I am lifted up
from the earth, will draw all men to myself "(John 12:32). But the all-inclusive social
nature of the fellowship in the intermediate state is important . Too often salvation is
pictured in individualist terms, instead of in terms of fellowship.28
No doubt a theological position which maintains the finality of Christ as this thesis
does would be less acceptable to non-Christian believers than a pluralist one. Yet it
seems probable that Kiing's description of the world religions as the 'ordinary', the
common way to salvation, whereas Christianity makes up the 'extraordinary', the
special way,59 would be more congenial to them than the traditionalist view which
would claim that they are completely barred from salvation.
The conclusion of Chapter 4 was that Lesslie Newbigin's reverent agnosticism about
the fate of the individual non-Christian does not go far enough, but his overall position
on the question of salvation in the world religions is admirable, and should be a basis
for dialogue between the Church and other faiths. He says:
57Heim's suggestion is as follows - "...perhaps faithful Christians go to heaven, but faithful Muslims
find themselves in an Islamic paradise, faithful Vaishnava Hindus dwell in company with Krishna,
devoted Buddhists enjoy Nirvana, North Americans go to a happy limiting or fishing ground, and so on.
These alternative religious ends are not, from the Christian point of view, nearly as blessed as the
Christian beatitude of fellowship with the Triune God and Christ's Church in the New Jerusalem. But
they are granted by God as intermediate ends, which people have chosen and properly pursued, and
from which, some, perhaps, will yet move onward to the celestial city." - Heim, S.M., The Depths ofthe
Riches: A Trinitarian Theology ofReligious Ends, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2001), quoted
by Stackhouse, J.G. (ed.), No Other Gods BeforeMe, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic,
2001), 199.
58 This is one of the emphases in Lesslie Newbigin's escliatology. He observes that: "The only fruition
for die individual soul is in fellowship and a perfect fellowship implies perfect souls who form it.. .It
will be seen diat all the labours of faidiful souls to create true human fellowship have not been lost, but
taken up and consummated in die perfection of God's Kingdom." (Newbigin, L., SignsAmid the Rubble,
op.cit., 49-50.
59
Kung, H., "The World Religions in God's Plan of Salvation" in Christian Revelation and the World
Religions, 25-66, quoted by Knider, P.F., op.cit., 127.
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The Church, as it is in via, does not face the world as the exclusive
possessor of salvation, nor as the fullness of what others have in part,
the answer to the questions they ask, or the open revelation of what
they are anonymously. The Church faces the world, rather, as
arrabon, of that salvation - as sign, firstfruit, token, witness of that
salvation which God purposes for the whole.60
(g) Conclusion
The conclusion of this thesis is that there is scripture warrant for the hope of salvation
for the unevangelised. This confidence does not rest so much on individual texts as on
deduction from the love and justice ofGod in Christ revealed in the pages of the Bible.
The nature of God, as opentheism pictures him, namely as a God whose sovereignty
and omniscience is self-limited in order to allow his creatures freedom and
responsibility to respond to his grace, opens up the prospect of conversion, not just in
this life, but also beyond death. Opentheism is to be followed in believing in the
finality of Christ as the sole source of salvation. The inclusivist position of
opentheists, however, should be rejected on the grounds that general revelation is an
insufficient basis for salvation. Belief in an intermediate state is, therefore, central to
the thesis, an intermediate state during which opportunity would be given to the
unevangelised to respond to divine initiative through encounter with Christ. The
postmortem experience would be similar to purgatory - shorn of the features which
have proved unacceptable to Reformed doctrine, and not being confined to those who
had already found faith in this life, and allowing, in some cases, a 'second' or even
more chances of conversion. Belief in 'hopeful universalism' is preferred to dogmatic
universalism. The practical applications of this theological position could be of real
value to the life of the Church - and this, in three main ways. The possibility of
postmortem conversion could be a powerful source of comfort to bereaved relatives of
dead loved ones who were unevangelised. Also, the picture of God's nature, as
portrayed in this thesis, could make an important contribution to the mission of the
Church, through theodicy, by removing one of the principal sources of atheistical and
agnostic views. Finally, a hopeful outlook for the salvation of non-Christian adherents
of other religions could advance dialogue between the Church and other faiths, leading
to future theological and churchly convergence.
60 Newbigin, L., The Open Secret, (London: SPCK., 1978), 202-3.
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As, however, there is mystery and uncertainty surrounding future destiny -
particularly for the unevangelised - the conclusions of this thesis, involving, as they
do, belief in an intermediate state, postmortem 'second chances' and conversion,
cannot be accorded dogmatic status. It is presented, rather, as a theologically sound
possibility, based on the firm foundation of God's infinite love and mercy, and,
hopefully, as a reasonable approximation to what may ultimately be true of final
destiny.
(h) Areas for Further Research
This thesis has uncovered a number of areas which require further research. The
concept of spiritual development in an intermediate state raises questions about
whether temporal categories apply beyond death. If they do not apply, as Rahner, for
example, maintains, how can there be growth in character and personality, as growth
seems to imply past, present and future, or is there a special kind of postmortem time,
which seems to be Moltmann's position?
A second area calling for further study is an enquiry into how the non-Christian
religions regard the future destiny of unbelievers. Is there something to be gleaned, for
example, as Ward believes, from the Vaishnava interpretation of rebirth in
Buddhism,61 or, from the Muslim concept of the intermediate state - the barzakh?62
Fredericks prefers what he calls "comparative theology" to the more traditional
"theology of religions." By "comparative theology", he means exploring "the truths of
Christianity in dialogue with the teachings and traditions of other religious
believers."63 In this way, Christians can come to understand their own beliefs in a
novel and enriching way. Fresh light could therefore be shed from other religions on
the final destiny of the unevangelised.
A third area, requiring sustained discussion is whether in the intermediate state,
continuing existence would be disembodied, as traditional exegesis of some scriptural
61 Ward, K., Religion and Human Nature, op.cit., 62.
62 ibid., 262.
63 Fredericks, op.cit., 162.
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texts might imply. Or, would the resurrected 'spiritual bodies' of Paul's theology in 1
Corinthians be created at death rather than at the parousia? An investigation into this
subject would require to consider ideas such as H.H.Price's 'ideoplastic' image-world,
mentioned in his book, Essays in the Philosophy ofReligion.64
64 Price, H.H., Essays in the Philosophy ofReligion, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 115.
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